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THESIS SUMMARY 
 
 
 
Along the process of economic development, marriage patterns have gradually changed. 
Nonetheless, we still observe contrasting differences across regions. This thesis first 
examines those differences, and questions what determines those marriage patterns. The 
answer to this will be the economic role played by women within a society. In this regard, 
we explore the relationship between gender differences in labour participation and marital 
outcomes across regions and over time. To do so, we use ethnographic evidence and 
country-decade data. Moreover, we reconcile distinctive literatures in an attempt to answer 
our main research question.  
 
The focus of the thesis lies within two specific issues regarding marriage patterns: (i) 
marital systems, namely polygyny and monogamy, and (ii) the spousal age gap. First, we 
examine the relationship between female labour participation and polygynous unions. 
Then, we concentrate on monogamy to explore the spousal age gap. In addition, we discuss 
our main findings and its implications for the long run. Whether societies have followed a 
similar path but at different speeds throughout history is our last topic of discussion.  
 1
1. Introduction   
 
Goode (1963) argued that family and household systems across societies were moving 
towards similar patterns, though their origins differed. The main objective of this thesis lies 
with providing further economic analysis and discussion to better understand some of 
these contrasting patterns. For this purpose, we concentrate on the formation of 
households. A household can be defined as “a cooperative economic unit aimed at the fulfilment of 
the physical and emotional needs of its members, and characterised by certain inequalities between 
generations and sexes. It is based on implicit and explicit contracts between household members, such as the 
marriage contract and the implicit contracts that exist between different generations” 1. The formation of 
a household implies a commitment for the purpose of production and/or reproduction 
between its members which traditionally has been achieved through marriage.  
 
Theoretically, marriage takes place if, and only if, the gains from marriage outbalance the 
costs (Becker, 1973; 1974). The benefits from marriage will be greater when differences 
between men and women are more severe. For example, the optimal age at marriage for 
men and women may vary depending upon the desired number of children, or the 
economic ability of men and women to set up an independent household. Fertility 
decisions (reproduction) and the gender division of labour within a household (production) 
become crucial elements for understanding marital choices and marital outcomes.  
 
This thesis looks at the gender division of labour within the household. Notwithstanding 
the enormous relevance of family planning and fertility decisions, we concentrate on the 
relationship between female labour and marriage. The way men and women may contribute 
                                                 
1 De Moor and Van Zanden (2010; pp. 3) 
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to the wealth of the household will be reflected in the process leading to the formation of a 
household2. For example, women who supply market work and earn an income would also 
be able to spend resources to search for a suitable spouse and perhaps postpone marriage. 
Then, a major contribution of the thesis is the economic analysis and empirical evaluation 
of the impact that the economic role played by women have had on marriage patterns 
throughout history. Boserup (1970) observed how the economic role of women may be 
closely associated with marital systems. If women’s economic role has also changed along 
the process of economic development, we would expect marital outcomes to adjust to the 
distinct economic environments. 
 
Explaining marriage patterns has been at the core of the literature for an extended period 
of time. Goode (1963), Goody (1983, 1990) and Hajnal (1982) among several others have 
described and examined marriage patterns. Nonetheless, these studies are mostly 
descriptive. This thesis sheds new light by using economic rationale to explore the 
relationship between female labour and two specific marriage patterns: marital systems and 
the spousal age gap. Furthermore, we use sources from several disciplines in an attempt to 
reconcile ideas, while also contribute to extend the existing research agenda. 
 
The thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 2 we define marital systems following 
ethnographic evidence, among other sources3. Polyandry and polygynandry will be 
excluded from our analysis because both have been rarely observed among humans. Then, 
we concentrate on monogamy and polygyny and explore the prevalence of both marital 
                                                 
2 Household members can contribute to augment the household wealth through household work and market 
work. Household work leads to the production of household goods, while market work implies the 
production of food in subsistence economies or earning an income.  
3 The marital systems observed among human beings can be classified into five main types: (i) monogamy, (ii) 
polygyny where co-wives share habitation, (iii) polygyny where co-wives live in separate dwellings or African 
polygyny, (iv) polyandry and (v) polygynandry or ‘group’ marriage.  
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systems by geographical region and country. Unfortunately, ethnographic evidence may not 
fully capture past and current trends. Thus, chapter 2 introduces a new methodology to 
classify countries by the incidence of polygyny. For that purpose, we use marital status data 
for three census rounds, 1970, 1980 and 1990, and direct measures of polygyny from 
national surveys. Overall, we classify 184 countries and territories. From these, there are 
167 United Nations member states, which represent 87 percent of the total4. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study that classifies countries and regions according to the 
incidence of polygyny. Additionally, we compare and test the robustness of our results with 
historical records and the available ethnographic evidence. In doing so, we expect to obtain 
a better understanding of the distribution and prevalence of marital systems across regions 
and over time.  
 
After exploring marital systems we continue in chapter 3 by focusing on African polygyny 
as opposed to monogamy. First, we develop a simple theoretical model that explores the 
incentives’ structure of men and women to form or join a polygynous household. We 
assume that marital outcomes cannot be considered exogenous with respect to the labour 
participation decision (Van der Klaauwe, 1996). In this way, we will argue that African 
polygyny may be sustained at low levels of economic development when income inequality 
remains low, if and only if, wives contribute largely to augment the wealth of the 
household. Secondly, we test our main predictions using a cross-section of societies and 
countries. For that, we collect qualitative data for 379 societies from the Ethnographic 
Atlas, and quantitative data for 112 polygynous and non polygynous countries following 
chapter 2 classification. Our findings support the view that female contribution to 
subsistence, and thereby gender equality in labour participation, is a strong predictor of 
                                                 
4 Only 25 United Nations member states were not classified. Moreover, 17 dependent territories were 
included in our sample.  
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African polygyny. In line with the model, these results are stable and sizeable once 
controlling for the level of economic development. On the whole, our findings and 
discussion may raise further questions regarding the evolution of marital systems across 
regions in the long run.  
 
The next chapter turns our attention to the spousal age gap. We leave aside polygyny and 
focus on the spousal age gap within monogamous unions in chapter 4. To do so, we collect 
data for monogamous countries following chapter 2 classification, and construct a novel 
cross-country panel for the period 1950-2000. Then, we explore the correlation or potential 
causality between gender differences in labour participation and the spousal age gap. In 
general, we find that the spousal age gap decreases with gender equality in labour 
participation. Like some other studies, we observe that gender equality in the labour market 
translates into marital outcomes. In contrast to previous studies, we find this relationship at 
a macro level and over a long period of time, which for some countries imply two or three 
generations. The empirical results are tested to the inclusion of some control variables such 
as the sex ratio and the rate of urbanisation, and to different estimation methods and 
sample sets.  
 
Chapter 5 bonds the previous results with economic development. This chapter introduces 
the Goldin and the Kuznets curves which relate female labour and income inequality with 
economic development respectively. We also discuss the implications of our results in the 
long run. Moreover, the Goldin curve is augmented with the inclusion of hunting-gathering 
societies. To some extent, the Goldin and the Kuznets curves have followed opposite paths, 
which in turn may explain how female labour and income inequality have had an impact on 
marriage patterns throughout history. In this line of thinking, African polygyny would have 
prevailed at early stages of economic development where income inequality is low and 
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gender equality in labour participation prevails. Nonetheless, we claim that African polygyny 
would not have been sustainable among hunter-gatherers and pastoralists, who would have 
opted for other marital systems. As income rose, income inequality increased and gender 
inequality in labour participation grew. Under these circumstances, monogamy would have 
become the preferred marital system. Additionally, we expect a considerable spousal age 
gap within monogamous unions. This situation would be partly reversed when traditional 
societies turn into modern ones. As a result, falling income inequality and increasing gender 
equality in labour participation would drive the spousal age gap down5.  
 
The final chapter of this work briefly summarizes our findings. 
                                                 
5 In our study, we do not reflect on ‘sequential’ polygyny which is a marriage pattern associated with modern 
societies where men and women mate or marry with several partners at different points in time.  
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2. Marital Systems   
 
“Marriage is a legally and socially sanctioned union that is regulated by laws, rules, customs or beliefs” 
Encyclopaedia Britannica (2008) 
 
2.1 Introduction  
Thomas Robert Malthus argued that monogamous unions were the dictate of nature and 
virtue6. As if we were journalists in search of an answer, we question Malthus and ask, why 
monogamy? People marry for a variety of reasons, mainly love and the desire to form a 
household and have children. There is a vast literature related to marriage choices or 
whether assortive mating is positive or negative regarding height, race, intelligence or 
wealth. However, marital systems have received less attention. By assuming that 
monogamous unions are the “dictate of nature and virtue” we omit a relevant episode in the 
history of marriage and the family. For that reason, we evaluate in this chapter the 
incidence of polygyny, as opposed to monogamy, across countries, territories and 
geographical regions.  
 
For the purpose of this study, we first and foremost define marriage as a union between 
two or more spouses involving common residence and being regulated by laws, rules, 
customs, or religious and non-religious beliefs7. In this way, marital systems can be broadly 
organised into four different types: (i) Monogamy, which can be defined as the marital 
system that allows a person to be married to only one spouse; (ii) Polygyny, which is a 
                                                 
6 “Whether the law of marriage be instituted or not, the dictate of nature and virtue seems to be an early 
attachment to one woman” Malthus (1798: 15) 
7 Sexual partnerships will be excluded. Concubinage, unregistered marriage, consensual, visiting or de facto 
unions in general will also be analysed in this study as long as data are available.  
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union between one man and two or more women8; (iii) Polyandry involves one woman and 
two or more men; and (iv) Polygynandry or ‘group’ marriage. From these marital systems 
only the first two are of concern in this study as they are the most frequently observed, 
with polyandrous and polygynandrous unions being rare among humans throughout 
history9. 
 
Therefore, our research objectives are threefold. First, we define marital systems using 
qualitative data from the Ethnographic Atlas. Furthermore, we discuss basic ethnographic 
concepts. Secondly, we develop a novel methodology to measure the incidence of 
polygynous unions across countries. Thirdly, we classify countries according to our new 
measure of polygyny for the period 1950-2000. Finally, we test our country estimates with 
available ethnographic evidence and historical records. This chapter contributes to the 
literature in a relevant way. This is the first study, to our knowledge, that compiles data 
drawn from the Ethnographic Atlas and classifies societies by modern countries and 
geographical regions. This is the first study, to our knowledge, that classifies countries 
according to the incidence of polygyny observed for the period 1950-2000.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2 we present the main 
data sources. Section 2.3 defines and discusses some basic concepts, and introduces an 
ethnographic classification of countries by marital system. This is followed by section 2.4 
where we present a new methodology to measure the incidence of polygyny across 
                                                 
8 We will be referring to simultaneous polygyny, not sequential polygyny or second, third, fourth marriages.   
9 The Ethnographic Atlas illustrates just four polyandrous societies out of total of 1,231 with available data: (i) 
Tibetans who inhabit the Tibetan central plateau in China; Toda people which are a pastoral tribe of southern 
India; Sherpa (also called Sharwa), mountain-dwelling people of Nepal, Sikkim state in India, and Tibet in 
China; and finally Marquesan people who inhabit the Marquesas Islands, French Polynesia, (World Cultures, 
1999). Polygynandry has not been recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas, but is also associated with 
polyandrous unions.  
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countries. A review of the geographical distribution of polygyny and monogamy is 
introduced in section 2.5. Section 2.6 offers a discussion and some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2.2 Data Sources 
This chapter makes use of qualitative and quantitative data. The qualitative data are 
ethnographic evidence collected mainly from the Ethnographic Atlas, whereas the 
quantitative data are collected from censuses and national surveys.  
 
2.2.1  Ethnographic Atlas 
Data on marital systems are for the most part taken from the Ethnographic Atlas. The 
complete 1,267 society Ethnographic Atlas was published by Ethnology in twenty one 
instalments between 1962 and 1971. In 1967 Ethnology published codes for 862 societies, 
Murdock (1967a; 1967b). Murdock continued to add more societies to the Ethnographic 
Atlas after 1967. Furthermore, various corrections were made to the previously published 
codes. The Ethnographic Atlas presents 115 variables for each society. The data presented 
in this chapter corresponds to an updated and corrected revision of the original 
Ethnographic Atlas (World Cultures, 1999). Coded data are derived mostly from 
ethnographic publications. 
Societies are understood as ethnically homogeneous populations. Each society is identified 
with a particular period of time and geographic coordinates. The period of time is often the 
earliest reliable ethnographic description found in the literature. There were ten societies in 
the Ethnographic Atlas where the time period was not specified, and hence they were 
removed from the sample. Thus, we classified societies according to three different periods 
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of time: pre-1500, 1500-1800 and 1800-1965. We denote societies described before 1500 as 
Ancient Civilisations, among them Babylonian, Ancient Egyptian, Hebrew, Aryan, Roman, 
Icelander and Khmer people. The second group corresponds to 29 native-American 
societies i.e. Aztec, Inca, Cherokee, Taino, Chibcha or Tupinamba; and the Kerala and 
Guanche people located in present India and Spain. Finally, we have those societies first 
found and described in the period 1800-196510.  
 
Geographic coordinates (latitude; longitude) are also offered in the Ethnographic Atlas. We 
use them to organize societies by geographical region and country11. We do not necessarily 
entail that sorting data in this way will culturally describe present regions and countries 
truthfully. Today, many countries are far from being ethnically homogenous (Alesina et al., 
2003). Culture may have evolved since ethnographic evidence was first reported. 
Nonetheless, the Ethnographic Atlas is sufficiently rich and descriptive to be ignored. For 
that reason, we will use ethnographic evidence to classify geographical regions and 
countries by the prevalence of marital systems, and also to test the robustness of existing 
data on the incidence of polygynous and monogamous unions.    
 
Furthermore, there were also nine societies in the Ethnographic Atlas described as 
speaking a language non-indigenous to the continent where they were located. These were 
Boer, French Canadian, New England, Haitians, Djuka, Saramacca, Brazilian, Camba and 
                                                 
10 Figure A.2.1 in appendix 2 illustrates a timeline with the earliest reliable ethnographic evidence recorded in 
the Ethnographic Atlas by continental areas. For that, we assume four main continental areas: (i) Eurasia: 
Northern Africa, Europe and Asia; (ii) America; (iii) Sub-Saharan Africa and (iv) Oceania. All Ancient 
Civilisations were found in Eurasia. In figure A.2.1 we observe that ethnographic evidence for sub-Saharan 
Africa and Oceania just comprises societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
11 The term “country” refers to territories or areas, irrespective of their legal status or delimitation of their 
frontiers or boundaries. There are 192 independent countries recognised by the United Nations and 48 
dependent territories. Throughout the study, we follow the geographical classification of the United Nations. 
Table A.2.1 in appendix 2 presents the number of countries or territories by geographical region.  
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Groote Eylandt people. To preserve cultural continuity, we removed these societies from 
our sample. Additionally, seven societies were dropped from the sample either because they 
were repeated or unclassified by geographical region. Finally, the Seminole people were also 
taken away since it was the only group where data on economic activity were not available.  
 
As a result, out of 1,267 societies in the Ethnographic Atlas, we have removed twenty-
seven for the aforementioned reasons12. Table 2.1 distributes societies by geographical 
region for the whole period, and for the period 1800-1965. From the table, we observe that 
fewer societies have been described for the Caribbean and Europe than for Northern 
America, South America and Africa. It is important to understand the cultural nature and 
purpose of the Ethnographic Atlas. Some of the societies may already be extinct, while 
many others may currently represent small minorities within countries and geographical 
regions. Thus, we have created a dummy variable called Old World (as opposed to New 
World), which takes the value of 1 for those countries or geographical regions where more 
than fifty percent of the population have an indigenous language as mother tongue, and 0 
otherwise13.  
 
Data in Table 2.1 corroborate Northern America, South America, Central America, 
Australia, New Zealand and the Caribbean as the New World geographical regions. We 
understand that in the New World, the relevance of indigenous societies described in the 
Ethnographic Atlas play nowadays a lesser cultural role than in the Old World. This is 
particularly acute after the European colonisation of America and the Pacific that gave way 
                                                 
12 Table A.2.2 in appendix 2 shows the societies that were removed from the sample.  
13 To construct the dummy variable Old World, we used data from Alesina et al. (2003) and Lewis (2009). 
First, we classified languages by family. Then, we verified which languages and families were indigenous. We 
define a language as indigenous if it was widely spoken in the continent where the country belongs before 
1500. Finally, the percentage of the population speaking an indigenous or non-indigenous language was 
computed.  
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to ensuing cultural changes. In subsequent chapters we will refer to this variable to control 
for cultural continuity.  
 
Table 2.1 The Ethnographic Atlas: Societies by geographical region  
Geographical region Sample 
Old World Total 1800-1965 
Western Africa 170 170 
Eastern Africa 147 147 
Middle Africa 125 125 
Northern Africa 70 69 
Melanesia 69 69 
South-Eastern Asia 68 67 
Southern Asia 58 56 
Eastern Asia 27 27 
Eastern Europe 25 25 
Micronesia 18 18 
Polynesia 18 18 
Southern Africa 15 15 
Western Asia 16 14 
Southern Europe 9 7 
Northern Europe 4 3 
Central Asia 2 2 
Western Europe 2 2 
New World Total 1800-1965 
Northern America 262 243 
South America 86 82 
Central America 34 30 
Australia and New Zealand 13 13 
Caribbean 2 0 
Total 1240 1202 
Source: Ethnographic Atlas; Alesina et al. (2003); Lewis (2009); Encyclopaedia Britannica (2008) 
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2.2.2 Censuses and National Surveys 
We also use quantitative data to measure the incidence of polygyny, and henceforth 
monogamy. For that purpose, data have been collected from three main sources: (i) United 
Nations (1990): Patterns of First Marriage14, (ii) the Demographic and Health Surveys 
(1985-2005)15, and (iii) marital status data collected from national censuses, survey reports, 
and national statistical yearbooks and presented in United Nations (2000a) Women’s 
Indicators and Statistics Database Version 4, Wistat 4, for the decades 1970, 1980 and 
199016. 
 
United Nations (1990) present data and evidence on the incidence of polygyny from 
different sources, essentially national surveys and other published work17. These data 
sources offer values of the percentage of married men in polygynous unions, and the 
percentage of married women in polygynous unions. Furthermore, information on the 
number of wives per polygynist is also given for some countries. Data range from 1946 for 
Tunisia to 1986 for Liberia. Percentages are computed for married women aged 15 years 
old or over, although this is sometimes restricted to 15-49 years old.  
                                                 
14 Patterns of First Marriage: Timing and Prevalence was prepared by the Population Division, Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (United Nations, 1990). Main data are presented in table 8: Levels of polygamy, 
selected countries of Africa, various years 1947-1982. Additionally, tables 13 and 14 compiled data on 
polygynous behaviour.  
15 Data collected from the Demographic and Health Surveys were extracted from the STATcompiler 
(http://www.statcompiler.com/). For those countries where there was more than one survey, we computed 
the average. Therefore, data collected from the Demographic and Health Surveys illustrate averages for the 
period 1985-2005. 
16 United Nations (2000a) extracted data mainly from the United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1978 
Historical Supplement, 1982, 1987 and 1990; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Demographic Yearbook 
1990. 
17 Many studies on the incidence of polygyny are based on Dorjahn (1959) and Chamie (1986). Dorjahn 
(1959) surveys polygyny in Africa while Chamie (1986) provides a good review of polygyny in Arab countries 
Clignet (1970) and Lesthaeghe et al. (1989) also provide a good review of polygyny in Africa.   
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Second, the Demographic and Health Surveys -which are a collection of national surveys-, 
also present data on the percent distribution of currently married men by number of wives 
and the percent distribution of currently married women by number of co-wives. These 
surveys covered mostly African, and some Asian and South American countries between 
1985 and 2005. Percentages are computed for married women aged 15-49 years old; and 
married men aged 15 years old and over.  
 
Finally, country data on marital status have also been collected. These data will be used to 
derive the ratio of the number of currently married women (CMF) to the number of 
currently married men (CMM) aged 15-64 years old. This, in fact, could be a good proxy or 
indirect measure of the incidence of polygyny for countries where direct measures on the 
incidence of polygyny are not available. Data on marital status were collected from United 
Nations (2000a), and correspond to the available country data provided by the United 
Nations for three census rounds, 1970, 1980 and 1990.   
 
These three separate datasets, jointly with the Ethnographic Atlas, will assist us to 
construct an estimate of the incidence of polygyny, and henceforth monogamy, across 
countries for the period 1950-2000. In this regard, United Nations (1990) provides data for 
the period 1948-1986, whereas United Nations (2000a) offers marital status data for three 
census rounds 1970-1990, while the Demographic and Health Surveys cover the latest 
period 1985-2005. Additionally, the earliest reliable ethnographic evidence was reported for 
the Babylonian people, and dates back to BC 2000. Figure A.2.1 in appendix 2 and table 2.1 
illustrate the first ethnographic evidence reported by geographical region. In sub-Saharan 
Africa and Oceania ethnographic evidence dates back to the nineteenth century, whereas 
Ancient Civilisations were only reported in Eurasia.   
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2.3 Concepts and Definitions 
In the Ethnographic Atlas marital systems are described under variable 9: Marital 
Composition: Monogamy and Polygamy. Table 2.2 presents the codified classification. 
Based on this codification, we distinguish three different types of marital unions: 
monogamous (codes 1 and 2), polygynous (codes 3 to 6) and polyandrous (code 7). As 
stated above, we concentrate on the first two and leave polyandrous unions aside. 
 
Table 2.2 Marital Composition: Monogamy and Polygamy 
CODE DESCRIPTION 
0 Missing data  
1 Independent nuclear, monogamous  
2 Independent nuclear, occasional polygyny  
3 Preferentially sororal, co-wives in same dwelling  
4 Preferentially sororal, co-wives in separate dwellings  
5 Non-sororal, co-wives in separate dwellings  
6 Non-sororal, co-wives in same dwelling  
7 Independent polyandrous families 
Source: Ethnographic Atlas  
 
In table 2.2 residential arrangements and sororate are fully described for polygynous 
unions18. We use this piece of information to distinguish between the scenario where co-
wives live under the same dwelling, and the case where co-wives live in separate dwellings. 
This, in fact, is relevant because co-wives living in separate dwellings potentially imply 
higher costs, but also lesser strife and strain within the family. Moreover, White (1988) 
states that there is a strong positive correlation between co-wives sharing habitation and 
                                                 
18 Sororate is the practice of marrying a sister or sisters of a wife. Sororate comes from the Latin soror “sister”, 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2008) 
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sororal polygyny. We observe in our sample that out of 84 societies described as having 
sororal-polygyny, in just 16 cases co-wives live in separate-dwellings.   
 
In general, sororal-polygyny does seem to be the exception rather than the rule, out of 578 
societies described as polygynous in the Ethnographic Atlas only 84 were described as 
preferentially-sororal, less than 15 percent. In this line of thinking, White (1988) advocated 
for two specific types of polygyny. First, wealth-increasing polygyny where co-wives largely 
contribute to the household; then sororal-polygyny, mainly observed in nomadic societies 
where sisters assist one another in household activities. In this chapter we will classify 
polygyny on the grounds of residential arrangement between co-wives, leaving aside 
sororate. This is largely due to the fact that sororal-polygyny is strongly associated with co-
wives sharing habitation as we have previously stated.  
 
Table 2.3 Marital Composition: Monogamy and Polygyny 
Marital composition Residential arrangement Code 
Monogamy 1 (Perfect monogamy) Independent nuclear Mo1 
   
Monogamy 2 (Occasional polygyny) Independent nuclear Mo2 
   
Polygyny 1 Co-wives in same dwelling  Po1 
   
Polygyny 2 Co-wives in separate dwelling Po2 
      Source: Adapted from the Ethnographic Atlas 
 
Based on the above discussion we introduce a new classification of marital systems in table 
2.3. In this case, we distinguish between three different marital systems: Perfect monogamy 
-Monogamy 1 (Mo1), henceforth-; Polygyny where co-wives live in the same dwelling -
Polygyny 1 (Po1), henceforth-; and Polygyny where co-wives live in separate dwellings -
Polygyny 2 (Po2), henceforth. Moreover, we also present in table 2.3 Monogamy with 
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occasional polygyny (Mo2) –Monogamy 2, henceforth-. Although it can not be understood as 
a proper marital system, because it just implies monogamy with a low incidence of 
polygynous unions, we will show the available ethnographic evidence to enrich the 
following description and analysis.  
 
One drawback with this classification and with the Ethnographic Atlas in general is the 
qualitative nature of the data. We are not provided with enough quantitative information to 
determine the exact incidence of polygynous unions within a society. Societies are just 
classified as mainly polygynous or monogamous. Statistically, census and national surveys 
illustrate the incidence of polygyny with the percentage of married men and married 
women in polygynous unions. In this regard, the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS) 
provides qualitative and quantitative data for a sub-sample of societies recorded in the 
Ethnographic Atlas19.  
 
Table 2.4 reports the percentage of married men with more than one wife and the 
percentage of married women in polygynous unions (share husband with one or more co-
wives) by marital system. In table 2.4 we observe that the incidence of polygyny for both 
types, Polygyny 1 (Po1) and Polygyny 2 (Po2) is above 40 percent for women and 25 percent 
for men. On the other hand, the incidence of polygyny for those societies described as 
                                                 
19 Ethnographic evidence can also be found in the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS), which is currently 
one of the most valuable tools used in cross-cultural research. The SCCS is a sub-sample of the Ethnographic 
Atlas, with just 186 societies, though presents a much wider range of variables, 2,000 for each of them. It was 
first published in 1969 (Murdock and White, 1969). Some data presented in this chapter corresponds to an 
updated and corrected revision of the original Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (World Cultures, 2004). 
Although the SCCS provides a richer description of societies, we will concentrate on data from the 
Ethnographic Atlas for the remainder of the study. The reason being is the widespread coverage of the 
Ethnographic Atlas. 
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Monogamy 2 (Mo2), or monogamy with occasional polygyny, is relatively low, 7.7 percent of 
married men and 15.4 percent of married women respectively. 
 
Table 2.4 The incidence of polygynous unions by marital systems 
Statistics 
Monogamy 2  
(Mo2) 
Polygyny 1 
 (Po1) 
Polygyny 2 
 (Po2) 
Percentage of married men with more than one wife 
Mean 7.7 36.7 28.2 
St. Dev. 9.4 19.9 19.0 
Percentage of married women polygynously 
Mean 15.4 56.8 43.7 
St. Dev. 16.4 29.7 25.9 
Obs. 30 6 13 
Source: Standard Cross Cultural Sample20 
Notes: Monogamy 2 stands for those societies where monogamous (independent nuclear) unions are the 
principal marital norm, but some occasional polygyny is observed. Monogamy 1 is not included because the 
incidence of polygynous unions is zero. 
 
As a result, ethnographic evidence may be better understood in terms of the prevalence of 
polygyny. While monogamy with occasional polygyny (Mo2) involves an incidence, on 
average, of 15 percent of married women in polygynous unions, Polygyny 1 and Polygyny 2 
present averages well above 40 percent21. Recent estimates on the incidence of polygyny 
barely reach 40 percent. Using the Demographic and Health Surveys we found only 5 
countries where the incidence of married women in polygynous unions aged 15-49 years 
old was above 40 percent; these were Benin, Guinea, Mali, Senegal and Togo. In this 
regard, we will use 15 percent of married women in polygynous unions as the threshold to 
                                                 
20 The Standard Cross Cultural Sample (SCCS) provides ethnographic data for 186 societies. Only two 
societies were removed from the sample, Haitians and Saramacca, since they were described as speaking a 
language non-indigenous to the continent where they were located. There were 13 societies described as 
perfectly monogamous, 2 as polyandrous and the rest of the societies were unclassified or presented missing 
data.  
21 We acknowledge that the incidence of polygyny is determined by the percentage of married men in 
polygynous unions. Nonetheless, and for strict statistical purposes we have selected the percentage of married 
women in polygynous unions to determine the incidence of polygyny within a country or geographical region.  
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determine whether countries or geographical regions may be classified as polygynous or 
monogamous.  
Table 2.5. Societies by marital system and geographical region 
Geographical Ethnographic Atlas Marital  
Region Mo1 Mo2 Po1 Po2 System 
Northern Africa 1/ 15.2 37.9 7.6 39.4 Po2 
Western Africa 4.8 6.7 33.9 54.5 Po2 
Eastern Africa 4.2 19.6 3.5 72.7 Po2 
Middle Africa 0.0 9.7 4.8 85.5 Po2 
Southern Africa 0.0 26.7 0.0 73.3 Po2 
Western Asia 31.3 50.0 6.3 12.5 Mo2 
Central Asia 2/ 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 Po1 
Eastern Asia 59.3 37.0 0.0 0.0 Mo1 
Southern Asia 17.9 58.9 17.9 1.8 Mo2 
South-Eastern Asia 28.4 64.2 6.0 1.5 Mo2 
Northern America (*) 12.7 55.2 30.1 1.9 Mo2 
Central America (*) 48.3 41.4 10.3 0.0 Mo1 
Caribbean (*) 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 Mo2 
South America (*) 15.5 53.6 26.2 4.8 Mo2 
Eastern Europe 44.0 40.0 8.0 8.0 Mo1 
Northern Europe 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Mo1 
Southern Europe 88.9 0.0 11.1 0.0 Mo1 
Western Europe 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Mo1 
Australia and New Zealand (*) 0.0 23.1 76.9 0.0 Po1 
Melanesia 9.8 55.7 24.6 9.8 Mo2 
Micronesia 55.6 44.4 0.0 0.0 Mo1 
Polynesia 5.6 83.3 5.6 0.0 Mo2 
Total 14.6 37.1 18.3 29.7 Mo2 
Source: Ethnographic Atlas 
Notes: We follow a simple majority rule to determine the predominant marital system. Mo1 stands for 
Monogamy 1 or perfect monogamy, Mo2 stands for Monogamy 2 or monogamy with occasional polygyny, Po1 
stands for Polygyny 1 where co-wives live in the same dwelling, and Po2 stands for Polygyny 2 where co-wives 
live in separate dwellings. The asterisk denotes those regions described as New World.  
1/ Societies described as Polygyny 2 were all in Sudan. Monogamy 1 and Monogamy 2 were prevalent in the rest of 
Northern Africa.   
2/ In Central Asia, there are only two observations. The Kazak people are described as Polygyny 1, while 
Turkmen are described as Monogamy 2. We classify Central Asia as Polygyny 1 because both societies have 
exhibited some degree of polygyny. 
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Our next objective will be to illustrate, see table 2.5 below, the proportion of societies by 
predominant marital system and geographical region. In table 2.5, we found no record of a 
high incidence of polygyny (Po1 or Po2) for Eastern Asia, Micronesia, Caribbean, 
Northern Europe, and Western Europe, where monogamy (Mo1) and monogamy with 
occasional polygyny (Mo2) dominate. In sub-Saharan Africa, Polygyny 2 prevails. Nearly 86 
percent of societies in Middle Africa, exhibit this type of marital system, whereas in 
Southern, Eastern and Western Africa we observe 73.3, 72.7 and 54.5 percent 
respectively22. Based on this ethnographic evidence presented in table 2.5, it seems 
reasonable to assume that Polygyny 2 is almost exclusively African.  
 
Polygyny 1 is mainly observed among indigenous people in Australia, Northern America, and 
Western Africa. Noticeably, this type of marital system is mainly relevant in New World 
regions. White and Burton (1988) observed that in the New World co-wives have a 
tendency to be related to each other, sororal polygyny, and live in the same house. This, in 
fact, will be very relevant for our study, because if we assume that indigenous groups are 
today minorities, this scenario where polygyny is not limited and wives share the same 
dwellings might be extinct. As a consequence, widespread polygyny will be greatly 
associated with African polygyny or Polygyny 2.  
 
Finally, table 2.5 also illustrates that monogamy reigns mainly in Western Europe, 
Northern Europe, Southern Europe, and Eastern Asia23. Neither Western Europe nor 
Northern Europe presents any evidence of monogamy with occasional polygyny, though it 
is relatively common in the rest of the regions. On the whole, monogamy with or without 
occasional polygyny seems to be the principal marital system for most regions of the Old 
                                                 
22 Outside of Africa, we find isolated cases of Polygyny 2, e.g. the Ma'dan people in Iraq, the Nuri people of 
Afghanistan, the Lifu in New Caledonia or the Tikopia people of the Solomon Islands. 
23 Gheg Albanians are the only exception in Southern Europe, they are described as Polygyny 1 
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World, except for sub-Saharan Africa. African polygyny or Polygyny 2, as previously shown, 
appears to be nearly exclusive to the African continent. Polygyny 1 is very infrequent and 
only dominates among the Australian aboriginals, and some other indigenous societies in 
the New World. These results confirm that widespread polygyny where wives share 
habitation, namely Polygyny 1, is a rare phenomenon associated principally with hunter-
gatherers of the New World. This could be a relevant fact, even if we do not have reliable 
measures of the incidence of polygyny, because it would allow us to associate prevalent 
polygyny to sub-Saharan Africa and limited polygyny, henceforth monogamy to the rest of 
the world. Moreover, the Ethnographic Atlas provides consistent cultural evidence for a 
long period of time which could lead us to think that prevalent polygyny was relatively 
unknown in Eurasia for along period of time.  
 
On the other hand, the main limitations of the Ethnographic Atlas are threefold. First, 
countries are not fully represented by societies. Second, societies are not weighted; hence 
we do not know whether societies are minorities or a main ethnic group within a country. 
Finally, societies observed in one country may play an important role in a neighbouring 
country too. Moreover, the Ethnographic Atlas does not provide much evidence on the 
incidence of polygyny. In this way, our objective for the remainder of the chapter will be to 
construct a more reliable country measure of the incidence of polygyny for the period 
1950-2000. Then, we will contrast our main results with the available ethnographic 
evidence. For that reason, in the subsequent section we introduce a novel statistical way of 
measuring the incidence of polygyny across countries.  
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2.4 Measuring Polygyny and Monogamy  
The practical way to assess the incidence of polygyny across countries would be to obtain 
direct measures on the percentage of married men and married women in polygynous 
unions for various periods of time. Unfortunately, these data are scattered, time 
inconsistent, in some cases non-comparable, and in most cases do not even exist24. There 
are some exceptions, especially some sub-Saharan countries where the incidence of 
polygyny has been somehow described25. To overcome this problem, we propose in this 
section an alternative way of measuring the incidence of polygyny across countries for the 
period 1950-2000. Our proposed measure will be based on marital status data for the 
decades 1970, 1980 and 1990. Moreover, we will make use of existing direct measures of 
polygyny and ethnographic evidence to supplement the dataset and test the robustness of 
these novel estimates.  
 
In subsequent chapters, we will concentrate on exploring polygyny and monogamy in 
further detail. Marital systems may evolve in the long run. Unfortunately, marital status data 
usually captures short run changes. For that reason, our measure will chiefly exploit cross-
sectional rather than time series variation. The ultimate objective will be to embody 
countries according to the incidence of polygyny for the period of study. In this regard, 
                                                 
24 Chamie (1986) provides a good review of polygyny in Arab countries. However the data provided is the 
percentage of married men in a polygynous union which is not comparable with other direct measures of 
polygyny such as the percentage of married women in polygynous unions if, for example, the number of co-
wives per husband remains unknown.  
25 Table A.2.3 in appendix 2 illustrates existing direct measures of the incidence of polygyny by geographical 
region and source of data. 
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countries will be eventually classified into three main categories: (i) Monogamy (Mo), (ii) 
Occasional Polygyny (OP) and (iii) Polygyny (Po) 26.  
 
The methodology applied to compute the incidence of polygyny is based on marital status 
data, available from United Nations (2000a). First, we use these data to derive the ratio of 
the number of currently married women (CMF) to the number of currently married men 
(CMM) aged 15-64 years old27. This ratio is denoted as CMFM or Currently Married 
Female for every Male.  
  
 (15 64)
(15 64)
Currently married womenCMF
Total women
−= −  (2.1) 
 
 (15 64)
(15 64)
Currently married menCMM
Total men
−= −  (2.2) 
 
 CMFCMFM
CMM
=  (2.3) 
 
This, in fact, can be a good proxy or indirect measure of the incidence of polygyny in a 
country when data on the percentage of married men and married women in polygynous 
unions are not available. By multiplying CMFM by one hundred, we will have a measure of 
the number of currently married women for every hundred currently married men. Perfect 
                                                 
26 In the previous section, we distinguish between Polygyny 1 and Polygyny 2. We also showed that Polygyny 1 
was infrequent in Old World regions. As a result and for the remainder of the chapter we will associate Po 
with a high incidence of polygynous unions, which in turn is closely related to African polygyny or Polygyny 2.  
27 The number of currently married men and currently married women aged 15-64 years old include those 
men and women classified as married and also those men and women in consensual unions where country 
data were available.  
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monogamy may then be associated with a hundred, while a high incidence of polygyny 
would be associated with higher values.  
 
Table 2.6 presents summary statistics for each decade. Overall, we computed a CMFM 
value for more than one hundred countries for each decade respectively. Values below 100 
can be understood as “polyandrous” behavior. Nonetheless ethnographic evidence 
presented above suggested that polyandrous unions were a rare and unique phenomenon 
across societies. As a result, we assume a potential measurement error of 10 percent and 
discard those values below 90. In our sample, only Georgia and the Republic of Moldova 
in 1990 had a CMFM below 90, and were consequently removed from the sample28. The 
highest CMFM in each decade correspond to Liberia, Niger and Senegal respectively, 
which are generally known polygynous countries.  
 
Table 2.6 Descriptive Statistics. CMFM by decade 
Decade Obs. Mean St. Dev. Max Min 
       
1970 105 107 7 134 90 
1980 139 107 7 199 91 
1990 142 107 7 140 92 
Source: United Nations (2000a) 
Notes: CMFM values are weighted. Population in 1980 was used as analytical weight. Population data come 
from PRED Bank, Version 3.0.  
 
Table 2.7 illustrates CMFM values by geographical region. CMFM imbalances that might 
potentially emerge because of a high incidence of polygynous unions are mainly observed 
in Western Africa. CMFM values for Eastern Africa, Middle Africa, Northern Africa, 
                                                 
28 Data for Estonia in 1990 was also removed. The computed CMFM was 157, which is inconsistent with 
ethnographic evidence and CMFM values from neighbouring countries.   
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Southern Asia, Melanesia and Polynesia would also imply some degree of polygynous 
behaviour.  
 
Table 2.7. CMFM by geographical region 
Geographical  1970 1980 1990 
Region CMFM N CMFM N CMFM N
Northern Africa 111 6 107 6 109 4
Western Africa 133 2 141 10 129 7
Eastern Africa 116 10 111 13 114 12
Middle Africa   0 118 6 110 3
Southern Africa 108 2 100 2 99 5
Western Asia 107 8 112 9 108 11
Central Asia   0   0 97 5
Eastern Asia 102 4 106 5 105 5
Southern Asia 113 6 113 8 115 5
South-Eastern Asia 101 7 102 7 102 6
Northern America (*) 100 2 101 3 101 3
Central America (*) 105 7 103 5 102 6
Caribbean (*) 112 9 107 17 106 10
South America (*) 102 10 103 11 100 10
Eastern Europe 101 4 103 4 97 9
Northern Europe 104 7 106 7 107 9
Southern Europe 103 5 104 5 105 8
Western Europe 100 7 105 9 105 8
Australia and New Zealand (*) 108 2 106 2 107 2
Melanesia 115 4 119 5 114 5
Micronesia 98 1 104 2 102 5
Polynesia 114 2 112 3 110 4
Source: United Nations (2000a), PRED Bank, Version 3.0 
Notes: CMFM values are weighted averages. Population in 1970, 1980 and 1990 were used as weights. 
Population data come from PRED Bank, Version 3.0. The asterisk denotes those regions described as New 
World. 
 
In Southern Africa the value of CMFM would indicate perfect monogamy in 1980 and 
1990. This finding contrasts with the ethnographic evidence presented above. Recent data 
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on the incidence of polygyny presented in Table A.2.3 in appendix 2 supports the view that 
Southern Africa has shown the lowest incidence of polygynous unions within all sub-
Saharan regions. The rest of the Old World regions present a relatively well balanced CMFM 
value.  
 
The New World regions are predominantly monogamous, mainly because indigenous 
societies which are the ones recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas gave way to European 
traditions. Only exception is the Caribbean, where the presence of consensual and visiting 
unions and data collection problems related to misreporting or under-reporting may have 
driven up the CMFM value in 1970, United Nations (1990)29.  
 
Our next objective will be to obtain a more consistent CMFM value for the period of 
study. To do so, we compute the average of the available CMFM country values over 1970-
1990. An average will better describe the country for the period of study. Moreover, it will 
also provide us with a larger cross-section. Countries where the coefficient of variation was 
greater than 10 percent were also removed from our sample, leaving us with CMFM 
average values for 178 countries30.  
 
Finally, we test the robustness of our estimates with direct measures of the incidence of 
polygynous unions. For that purpose, we have to convert our CMFM country values into 
                                                 
29“In the Latin America and Caribbean countries, a major feature of the institution of marriage is the very high prevalence of 
consensual unions. There is also a high degree of prevalence of visiting unions in the Anglophone and francophone Caribbean 
countries. Although these two types of marital unions are socially recognized as marriage forms, their prevalence makes it 
considerably more difficult to estimate reliably both, the age at entry into first union and the overall prevalence of marriages, 
because current or non-legalized unions are not always reported as marital union” (United Nations, 1990:156) 
30 The coefficient of variation is a normalised measure of dispersion. It can be defined as the ratio of the 
standard deviation to the mean. Niger, Kuwait and the Dominican Republic presented a coefficient of 
variation of 34.7, 10.6 and 10.5 percent respectively and consequently were removed from the sample.  
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percentages of married men or married women in polygynous unions. To do so, we assume 
that, under perfect monogamy, there will be 100 married women for every 100 married 
men. Therefore, an estimate of the percentage of married women in polygynous unions can 
be computed. We denote this new estimate as polyest.  
 
 100 *100CMFMpolyest
CMFM
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (2.4) 
 
To compare the new estimate, polyest, with direct measures of the incidence of polygyny we 
first compute the average of all the existing data on the incidence of polygynous unions. 
Previously, we introduced the two main sources of past and current data on the incidence 
of polygyny: United Nations (1990) and the Demographic and Health Surveys (1985-2005). 
Both sources provide data on the percentage of married women in polygynous unions aged 
15 years old and over or 15-49 years old31.  
 
Figure 2.1a illustrates our estimate, polyest, against the average computed with the 
percentage of married women in polygynous unions from both sources. From figure 2.1a 
we observe a downward bias for our estimate, polyest. This is particularly acute for sub-
Saharan countries32. We did not find much evidence of a downward bias regarding non 
sub-Saharan countries. Therefore, to correct for this bias, we run a regression of our 
estimates on the average values of the percentage of married women in polygynous unions 
                                                 
31 Figure A.2.2 in appendix 2 illustrates the linear prediction with a 95 percent confidence interval for 
measures taken from both sources. As we stated above, United Nations (1990) provides data for a period that 
covers 1948-1986, whereas the Demographic and Health Surveys cover 1985-2005. 
32 In our study sub-Saharan countries are all countries classified by the United Nations within Western Africa, 
Eastern Africa, Middle Africa and Southern Africa. Also Sudan and Western Sahara, usually included as 
Northern Africa, were included in this category. Finally, countries classified as sub-Saharan but described as 
New World territories were excluded. These were Cape Verde, Mauritius, Reunion, Seychelles and Sao Tome 
and Principe.  
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for sub-Saharan countries33. Only 5 out of 33 countries with available data were not sub-
Saharan.  
 
 
Figure 2.1a: Linear regression estimate of the incidence of polygyny (uncorrected) 
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Figure 2.1b illustrates our corrected estimate34.   
                                                 
33 To correct for the bias, we run a regression of our estimates (polyest) on the average values (direct measures of 
polygyny). There are twenty eight sub-Saharan countries for which we have data. This regression yields a 
constant of 6.964435 and a coefficient of 1.306923. We use these coefficients to generate corrected estimates 
of the percentage of married women in polygynous unions for sub-Saharan countries. Results: average = 
6.964435 + 1.306923*polyest, N=28, R2 = 0.8099. Population in 1980 used as analytical weight. Population 
data come from PRED Bank, Version 3.0. 
34 Figure A.2.3 in appendix 2 illustrates our corrected estimate against the average values of polygyny only for 
sub-Saharan countries.  
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Figure 2.1b: Linear regression estimate of the incidence of polygyny (corrected) 
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We have also checked the robustness of our estimate, polyest, using the Ethnographic Atlas. 
Overall a high incidence of polygynous unions remains mainly a sub-Saharan Africa 
scenario. African polygyny is rarely found in other continents. Occasional polygyny (OP) is 
fairly common and found with relative ease across countries, while Monogamy (Mo) seems 
to be the main marital norm in Europe and the New World countries. The sample was also 
expanded with the addition of six countries for which there was no available data on 
marital status, but provided data on the incidence of polygyny. Eritrea, Ghana, Niger, Chad 
and Guinea presented data on the percentage of married women in polygynous union35. 
Moreover, data on the percentage of married men in polygynous unions were also available 
                                                 
35 Data for Eritrea (8.1%), Ghana (31%), Niger (36.9%), Chad (39.1%) and Guinea (53.5%) were the 
computed average over all available data from POFM (1990) and the Demographic and Health Surveys 
(1985-2005).  
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for Somalia in 198136. This will leave our sample with 184 countries with an estimated 
value, polyest, of the incidence of polygyny.   
 
Once our estimates have been introduced, discussed and tested, we proceed to classify 
countries according to the incidence of polygyny. In this regard, we adopt the 
aforementioned classification, based on the Ethnographic Atlas, and distinguish between 
three possible categories: (i) Monogamy (Mo), (ii) Occasional Polygyny (OP) and (iii) 
Polygyny (Po). Given the quantitative nature of the data, we will not be able to provide 
information regarding the residential arrangements of co-wives. Consequently, we will only 
have one type of polygyny (Po). Nonetheless, and as we stated above, Polygyny 1 was very 
infrequent and rare, and hence it is sensible to assume that a high incidence of polygyny 
would be mainly associated with Polygyny 2 or African polygyny.   
 
To classify countries as polygynous (Po) we selected, as stated above, a threshold of 15 
percent of married women in polygynous unions. In anthropology, the threshold between 
limited and general polygyny has arbitrarily been 20 percent of married men with more 
than one wife (Murdock, 1949; White, 1988). In our study, we take a more conservative 
approach selecting the cutting point. The reasons being are twofold. First, in the next 
chapters we will concentrate on the effect that female labour have on polygyny and the 
spousal gap in monogamous unions. For this purpose, we need to identify the extremes, 
that is to say, which countries have been somehow highly polygynous and perfectly 
monogamous during the period 1950-2000. Second, we acknowledge potential 
measurement error, and hence we allow for some error margin. In this regard, monogamy 
                                                 
36 The percentage of married men in polygynous unions in Somalia in 1981 was 20.8 percent. Therefore, it 
can be assumed that the percentage of married women in polygynous unions in Somalia in 1981 had to be 
greater than 15 percent.  
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(Mo) is assumed within a country when the percentage of married women in polygynous 
unions is less than 10 percent37.  
 
Finally, countries not classified as monogamous or polygynous are denoted as occasional 
polygynous (OP), this is the scenario where the incidence of polygyny has not been very 
high, but enough to separate them from the monogamous ones (Mo). Finally, we 
understand that monogamous unions are usually the main marital system; even if a country 
shows a relatively high incidence of men or women married polygynously, monogamy will 
be present. Our ultimate goal would be to use this classification to study marital patterns in 
the long run. Therefore, the extremes may provide further information, whether is extreme 
polygyny or perfect monogamy. Moreover, we understand our limitations and acknowledge 
potential measurement errors. For that purpose, and once we introduce the classification of 
countries by marital system in the next section, we will check the robustness of our country 
values with ethnographic evidence and historical records.  
 
 
                                                 
37 On the whole, the dataset seems reliable and consistent. We have only found two main discrepancies. First, 
marital status data for Haiti indicates a value of polyest of 7.9%, consequently Haiti was assumed to be 
monogamous. However, recent data from the Demographic and Health Surveys suggested that 25 percent of 
married women were in polygynous unions. Second, data for Burundi, corrected as a sub-Saharan country, 
showed a value of polyest of 8.7 percent, while a 1987 estimate from the Demographic and Health Surveys 
illustrated that 11.6 percent of women were polygynously married.  
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2.5 The Geographical Distribution of Marital Systems   
The objective of this section is to describe the geographical distribution of marital systems. 
To do so, we introduce a new classification based on marital status data and direct 
measures of polygyny. In appendix 2, Table A.2.4 we present our main findings. Column 
(1) classifies countries in one of the three main groups: (i) Monogamy (Mo), (ii) Occasional 
Polygyny (OP) and (iii) Polygyny (Po). When data were not available, we indicate 
appropriately (na). Columns (2) and (3) provide the percentage of societies by country 
where polygyny was prevalent either with wives sharing habitation (Po1) or living in 
separate dwelling (Po2). This is ethnographic evidence classified by country. As stated 
above, we used the geographical coordinates (latitude; longitude) to identify each of the 
1,240 societies with a country. Finally, column (4) indicates whether a country is New World 
or Old World. To control for cultural continuity, as we defined earlier, we used the 
proportion of individuals speaking, as mother tongue, an indigenous language.  
 
Overall, we present data for 225 countries or territories38. All the United Nations country 
members are in the dataset, including Montenegro. From these, we found 121 (Mo) 
monogamous and 39 polygynous (Po). There were 41 countries or territories for which 
data were not available. The remaining 24 were labelled as occasional polygynous (OP). 
Out of the 225, we also uncovered 170 Old World countries or territories, and hence 55 in 
the New World.  
                                                 
38 The excluded territories by continent are: (a) Africa: Saint Helena and Mayotte, (b) Asia: British Indian 
Ocean Territories, (c) America: Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Saint Barthélemy and Saint Martin, the Falkland 
Islands, (d) Europe: Alan Islands, Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands, Holy See, (e) Oceania: Norfolk Islands, 
Pitcairn Islands. Although some of these dependent territories are statistically included within their main 
countries. See also table A.2.1 in appendix 2 for more information.   
 32
Table 2.8 Marital Systems by geographical region 
Geographical Marital Proportion of countries Old 
Region System 1/ Mo OP Po na World 2/
Northern Africa Po2 28.6 42.9 28.6 0.0 100.0 
Western Africa Po2 6.3 0.0 81.3 12.5 93.8 
Eastern Africa Po2 38.9 0.0 61.1 0.0 83.3 
Middle Africa Po2 0.0 11.1 77.8 11.1 100.0 
Southern Africa Po2 20.0 40.0 40.0 0.0 100.0 
Western Asia Mo2 38.9 27.8 5.6 27.8 100.0 
Central Asia Po1 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Eastern Asia Mo1 62.5 0.0 0.0 37.5 100.0 
Southern Asia Mo2 11.1 55.6 22.2 11.1 100.0 
South-Eastern Asia Mo2 72.7 0.0 0.0 27.3 100.0 
Northern America (*) Mo2 75.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 25.0 
Central America (*) Mo1 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Caribbean (*) Mo2 62.5 12.5 0.0 25.0 0.0 
South America Mo2 84.6 7.7 0.0 7.7 0.0 
Eastern Europe Mo1 90.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 100.0 
Northern Europe Mo1 69.2 0.0 0.0 30.8 100.0 
Southern Europe Mo1 60.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 100.0 
Western Europe Mo1 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Australia and New Zealand (*) Po1 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Melanesia Mo2 20.0 60.0 20.0 0.0 80.0 
Micronesia Mo1 71.4 0.0 0.0 28.6 100.0 
Polynesia Mo2 33.3 11.1 0.0 55.6 100.0 
TOTAL Mo2 53.8 10.7 17.3 18.2 75.6 
 
Source: Dorjhan (1959), Chamie (1986), United Nations (1990), United Nations (2000a), Demographic and 
Health Surveys (1985-2005) 
Notes:  Values are proportions. The asterisk denotes those regions described as New World. 
1/ Marital Systems refer to the Ethnographic Atlas classification illustrated in table 2.5. Mo1 stands 
for Monogamy 1 or perfect monogamy, Mo2 stands for Monogamy 2 or monogamy with occasional 
polygyny, Po1 stands for Polygyny 1 where co-wives live in the same dwelling, and Po2 stands for 
Polygyny 2 where co-wives live in separate dwellings. We use ethnographic evidence to test the 
robustness of our results. 
2/ Old World refers to the proportion of countries classified as Old World  
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Table 2.8 summarises our main findings. Geographical regions are presented with the 
proportions of countries in each category. Moreover, we also included the dominant 
marital system, under the same title, derived with ethnographic evidence from Table 2.5. 
To test for robustness we provide in the following sub-sections a discussion of our main 
results by continent. William Goode pointed out that “Polygyny will, without question, eventually 
almost completely disappear as a pattern of behaviour. The new legal codes are gradually moving towards its 
abolition, women will avoid it where they can, and men will no generally be able to afford it”39. Whether 
polygyny was legally approved or culturally accepted and observed may be a rich source of 
evidence to understand to what degree polygyny was prevalent within a society. In this way 
and with the aim to supplement the ethnographic evidence and data, we review some 
ancient legal codes and historical records in the next sub-sections and discuss our findings.  
 
2.5.1 Africa 
 
There are reasonably good ethnographic evidence for Africa. In Northern Africa we did 
not find significant evidence of polygyny, either Polygyny 1 or Polygyny 2, except for Sudan 
and Libya. Overall monogamy with occasional polygyny was relatively common in Algeria, 
Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. This would imply a low incidence of polygynous unions. Our 
estimates support this view. Only Sudan and Western Sahara are polygynous, while Libya, 
Morocco and Tunisia show some degree of polygynous behaviour, yet not enough to be 
considered highly prevalent. Algeria and Egypt are mainly monogamous.  
 
The expansion of Islam in Northern Africa, mainly during the 9-13th centuries brought not 
only a new religious belief, but Islamic laws which also sanctioned marital unions. Sharia or 
Islamic Law is a legal system based on interpretations of the teachings of the Qur'an. The 
                                                 
39 Goode (1970: 188) 
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Qur’an allowed men to marry up to four women: “If you fear that you shall not be able to deal 
justly with the orphans; marry women of your choice, two, or three, or four, but if you fear that you shall not 
be able to deal justly (with them), then only one, or (a captive) that your right hands possess that will be 
more suitable, to prevent you from doing injustice” 40. Islamic law has been gradually given way to 
modern family laws, particularly in the last decades. Nevertheless polygyny was only 
banned in Tunisia in 1956. In the rest of Northern Africa, polygyny is lawful although the 
incidence appears to be very low.  
 
In sub-Saharan Africa, ethnographic evidence is rather conclusive, and supports the 
scenario with a high incidence of polygynous unions for nearly all countries with available 
data. We find that our estimates fully confirm the ethnographic evidence for Middle Africa, 
where polygyny is culturally and legally accepted41. In Western Africa and Eastern Africa 
we also find that most countries culturally described as polygynous are also statistically 
polygynous with very few exceptions. Notably, Mali and Mauritania are classified as 
polygynous, although ethnographic evidence is not as conclusive. In this regard, polygyny is 
lawful in Mali and Mauritania since family laws follow Islamic laws. On the other hand, 
Burundi and Madagascar classified as monogamous, present ethnographic evidence of a 
high incidence of polygyny. In Burundi, reforms were made in 1993 to officially abolished 
polygamy. Polygyny is prohibited in Madagascar too, and is somewhat infrequent (OECD, 
2006).  
 
Finally, Southern Africa presents substantial differences between ethnographic evidence 
and our country values. Only Swaziland and Namibia remain polygynous for us, while 
Botswana and Lesotho are classified as occasional polygynous, and South Africa is included 
                                                 
40 The Qur’an: Surah 4:3 
41 For Sao Tome and Principe ethnographic evidence was not available and was classified as Occasional 
Polyyny (OP).  
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with the monogamous countries. Legally, polygyny is lawful for all countries in Southern 
Africa. More importantly, direct measures on the percentage of married women in 
polygynous unions support our estimates42 and the view that polygynous unions have 
decreased sharply in Southern Africa.   
 
2.5.2  Asia 
 
In Asia, we found ample evidence of polygynous behaviour, dating back to the code of 
Hammurabi, circa third millennium BC. Then, marriage was already a binding agreement 
involving transfers of money or assets between the families of the spouses. Marital systems 
were not fully described, although the taking of a second wife was allowed in case of 
barrenness, “If a man has espoused a votary, and she has not granted him children and he has set his face 
to take a concubine, that man shall take a concubine, he shall cause her to enter into his house. That 
concubine shall not put on an equality with the wife” 43 or sickness, “If a man has married a wife and a 
sickness has seized her, he has set his face to marry a second wife, he may marry her, his wife whom the 
sickness has seized he shall not put her away, in the home she shall dwell, and as long as she lives he shall 
sustain her.” 44 
 
Herodotus described Babylonian marriage as the object of transaction, where rich men 
who wanted wives could have them45. On the other hand, the Massagetae, who also 
inhabited parts of modern Iran, had one wife46, as the Egyptians or Greeks47, although 
                                                 
42 The Demographic and Health Surveys estimate that only 7.2 percent of married women are in polygynous 
unions. Data for Lesotho illustrates that only 5 percent of married men are in polygynous unions.  
43 Code of Hammurabi: Section 145 
44 Code of Hammurabi: Section 148 
45 Herodotus (Book I: 196). Translated by Aubrey de Sélincourt (1954). Penguin Books. 
46 Herodotus (Book I: 216). Translated by Aubrey de Sélincourt (1954). Penguin Books. 
47 Herodotus (Book II: 92). Translated by Aubrey de Sélincourt (1954). Penguin Books.  
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promiscuity among Massagetae women was rather frequent. In the Old Testament, 
Abraham and Esau, two of the founding patriarchs of Israel are also described as having 
more than one concubine or wife, “And Abraham gave all that he had unto Isaac. But unto the 
sons of the concubines Abraham had, Abraham  gave gifts, and sent them away from Isaac his son, while 
he yet lived, eastward, unto the east country” 48 Also, “And Esau took his wives, and his sons, and his 
daughters, and all the persons of his house, and his cattle, and all his beasts, and all his substance, which he 
had got in the land of Canaan; and went into the country from the face of his brother Jacob” 49 
 
In the Indian sub-Continent, polygyny prevailed during the Vedic period (Mitter, 1984) 50. 
The Law Code of Manu, which is a legal text of ancient India, did not explicitly prohibit 
polygyny but regulated certain aspects of marriage and polygynous unions such as whom to 
marry or the seniority between wives51. During the Middle Ages Marco Polo in The Travels 
also described: “…this king (India) has fully 300 wives or more; for here a man is more highly esteemed 
in proportion as he supports more wives”. 52 References to harems are also found in the literature, 
particularly among the Ottomans (Pierce, 1993; Wheatcroft, 1996). Nevertheless, harems 
appeared to be the exception, not the norm.   
 
Finally, in the Far East, the Sung Code, c. AD 900-1200, stated: ‘Anyone who has a wife and 
then takes another wife is subject to one year penal servitude. The woman’s side is subject to a penalty one 
degree lower. In cases of deception, those taking the wife are subject to a year and a half of penal servitude, 
but the woman’s family is not implicated’ 53 Bigamy was punishable in ancient China, and men 
                                                 
48 The Bible; Genesis 25: 5-6 
49 The Bible; Genesis 36: 6 
50 The Vedic period normally span between the second and first millennium BC 
51 The Law Code of Manu: Chapter IX (85): “If twice-born men marry women of their own class as well as others, the 
order of their class determines their seniority, as also how they are honoured and where they reside”. 
52 Marco Polo: The Travels pp. 285.  
53 Ebrey (1993): (SHT 13:14b) 
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and women could only remarry if the first marriage ended by death or divorce, but not 
before. Also, concubinage was frequent in China, although the legal status of a concubine 
was not as clearly defined as that of a wife (Ebrey, 1993). Moreover, Buddhism texts do not 
mention or refer to the subject of monogamy, polygyny or polyandry. In general, 
Buddhism regards marriage as entirely a personal, individual concern and not as a religious 
duty. In China, Buddhist ideas, such as celibacy, were confronted by Daoists and 
Confucians who regarded celibacy as a failure to provide their ancestors with an heir 
(Ebrey, 1996).  
 
On the whole, ethnographic evidence for Central Asia, South-Eastern Asia and Eastern 
Asia showed some degree of polygyny, although the incidence of polygyny seems to be 
rather low. Only the Kazak people and scattered societies in Indonesia, Timor-Leste and 
Viet Nam were described as polygynous. Our estimates go in line with the ethnographic 
evidence. All countries in Central Asia, South-Eastern Asia and Eastern Asia were classified 
as monogamous54. Polygyny is legally prohibited in most of these countries or territories 
except in Myanmar, Thailand and those ones with Muslim populations who are allowed to 
follow Islamic laws, e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore (OECD, 2006).  
 
In contrast, polygynous unions in Western Asia and Southern Asia, which covers the 
Indian sub-Continent, are more common. Ethnographic evidence showed that a high 
incidence of polygynous unions is restricted to scattered societies such as the Nuri 
(Afghanistan), Rwala (Syria) and Ma’dan (Iraq), and some indigenous groups within the 
Indian sub-Continent which mainly comprises India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Polygyny is 
                                                 
54 As we stated above, bigamy was already punishable in ancient China, although concubinage have been 
widely observed. Nevertheless, if concubines do not have legal status they will not be statistically reported 
neither in censuses nor in national surveys. In our study, we acknowledge the possible presence of 
concubinage and other unreported unions.   
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legally accepted in nearly all countries, except the Transcaucasia (Armenia, Georgia, 
Azerbaijan) and Nepal. Most of these countries follow Islamic laws, and others allow 
Muslims to exercise polygyny, e.g. India. In any case, our estimates do not classify any 
Asian country as polygynous, although some of them were characterised as occasional 
polygynous.   
 
2.5.3  America 
 
There is little doubt that polygynous unions in America among indigenous people were 
known before the arrival of Europeans. Vaillant (1944) argued that polygyny was prevalent 
among the Aztecs, mainly between the common people, although an Aztec king had only 
one queen, and neither could remarry upon the death of the other. In other parts of 
Central America polygyny was less known, this is indicated in the Ethnographic Atlas. Only 
the Lenca people inhabiting parts of Honduras and El Salvador, the Populuca and the 
Lacandon were described as polygynous.  
 
To the north of Mexico, there was more evidence of polygyny among indigenous groups, 
mostly Polygyny 1, where wives share habitation. The African type was relatively unknown in 
Northern America. Similarly, in South America Polygyny 2 has been known only among four 
societies, Piapoco, Goajiro, Tupinamba and Mapuche. Among the Inca people, having 
many wives was not a crime (Cobo, 1997)55. However, there was usually a principal wife, 
who was the only one who was legitimate. As in Northern America, Polygyny 1 and 
monogamy prevails. Ethnographic evidence for the Caribbean rejects the presence of 
highly prevalent polygyny among indigenous people. Nevertheless, our estimates indicate 
                                                 
55 The Mayan and Aztec Codices, among them the Codex Mendoza, do not provide much detail on marriage  
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that there are three countries classified as occasional polygynous. Lately, colonisation 
brought to the New World the customs, habits and civil codes of the colonisers, generally 
of European origin. This fact is illustrated in our estimates, since only four American 
countries or territories, Cuba, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis and French Guiana were 
classified as non-monogamous.  
  
2.5.4  Europe 
 
In Europe, monogamy has been the preferred marital system since ancient times. 
Nevertheless, Herodotus also pointed that among the Thracians, who inhabited Eastern 
and Southern Europe, it was customary for a man to have more than one wife56. Tacitus 
described the peoples of Germania in the first century AD as “…almost unique among 
barbarians in being content with one wife…” 57 This description followed and hinted that 
Germanic peoples were monogamous, except few who take more than one wife because 
their prestige or reputation brought them many marital offers. In contrast, non-Germanic 
barbarians were essentially polygynous as the Thracians described by Herodotus.  
 
The incidence of that Germanic polygyny58 is fairly unknown. Fonay Wemple (1985) 
studied women in Frankish societies from AD 500-900 and argued that, “Polygyny was less 
frequent in the upper classes than in the royal family….Concubinage, on the other hand, was a common 
occurrence on the upper levels of Merovingian society” 59 In both cases, polygynous unions seemed 
                                                 
56 Herodotus (Book V: 5). Translated by Aubrey de Sélincourt (1954). Penguin Books 
57 Tacitus (Germania: 18). The Agricola and the Germania translated by H. Mattingly (1970). Penguin Classics 
58 Polygynous unions are not described or even mentioned in two of the most important Germanic Codes: 
the Lex Salica and Lex Visigothorum 
59 Fonay Wemple (1985: 40) 
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to be frequent among the ruling elite or upper classes. Unfortunately, there is little evidence 
regarding the incidence of polygyny among the lower classes.  
 
In ancient Greece, a man could not legally be married to more than one wife at a time 
although there was no legal objection to having a concubine (MacDowell, 1978). Similarly, 
polygynous unions were not accepted under Roman law; “Marriage, or matrimony, is a binding 
together of a man and woman to live in an indivisible union” 60 and “…you cannot have two wives at the 
same time” 61 Although concubinage was widely observed among the ruling elites, 
concubines had lower status than wives.  
 
In any case, for long periods of time, most marital unions in Europe were undertaken 
without either a civil or religious ceremony. In ancient Rome, marriage was a matter of 
intention, in particular among the lower classes; if you lived as man and wife, man and wife 
you were (Crook, 1984). Then, marital unions were mostly common-law marriages. 
Common-law unions changed with the advent of Canon Law, a body of laws based on 
ecclesiastical rules and made within some Christian churches e.g. Roman Catholic, Eastern 
Orthodox and Protestant branches62. In this regard, one of the founding fathers of 
Christianity, Saint Augustine of Hippo already advocated for monogamous unions in the 
AD 4-5th centuries:”…just as the sacrament of polygamous marriage of that age was a symbol of the 
plurality of people who would be subject to God in all nations of the earth, so too is the sacrament of 
monogamous marriage of our time is a symbol that in the future we shall all be united and subject to God 
                                                 
60 The Institutes, Book I: Of Persons, Chapter X: Marriage (1) 
61 The Institutes, Book I: Of Persons, Chapter X: Marriage (7) 
62 The canon law of the Eastern and Western churches was similar until the Schism of 1054. In Western 
churches canon law was developed without interruption until the Reformation of the 16th century. Canon 
law was essential in the transmission of Roman law in Europe during the Middle Ages (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 2008). 
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in the one heavenly city. Accordingly, leaving a living husband to marry someone else is like serving two or 
more masters. It was not allowed then, it is not allowed now, and it never will be allowed” 63 
 
Common-law marriages were finally abolished in Roman Catholic countries by the Council 
of Trent (1545–1563). Since then, marriages were required to be celebrated in the presence 
of a priest and two witnesses. Polygynous unions were not permitted, and second marriages 
were only allowed after the dissolution of the first marriage was granted by the appropriate 
ecclesiastical authority. In England, common-law marriages were valid until the Marriage 
Act of 1753, which regulated marital unions and demanded a formal ceremony of marriage. 
Some centuries later, the combination of Roman and Canon Law produced in 1804 one of 
the most relevant legal codes, the French or Napoleonic Civil Code, which explicitly 
prohibited bigamy: “A second marriage cannot be contracted previously to the dissolution of the first” 64 
From that moment, many countries adopted marriage laws based on the Napoleonic Civil 
Code.   
  
On the whole, our estimates are fully consistent with the ethnographic evidence, ancient 
texts, legal codes and historical records, and classify all European countries as 
monogamous. We acknowledge that illegitimate unions, concubinage and isolated 
polygynous behaviour were also part of the European history of marriage. For example, the 
Ethnographic Atlas described Gheg Albanians as polygynous. We could not find available 
data for Albania to compare this evidence. Additionally, while polygyny is prohibited in 
Russia, it remains common within Muslim communities (OECD, 2006)65.   
                                                 
63 Saint Augustine, Chapter I: The Excellence of Marriage (18,21). Marriage and Virginity (1999); New City 
Press.   
64 French Civil Code (1804), Book I, Title V, Chapter I: 147 
65 In this regard, the Ethnographic Atlas illustrates four societies classified as polygynous: the Yakut, 
Chukchee, Cherkess and Chechen peoples.  
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2.5.5 Oceania 
 
For Australia and New Zealand ethnographic evidence was conclusive and associated these 
countries to Polygyny 1. With the arrival of Europeans monogamy overcame polygynous 
unions. On the other hand, Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia present contrasting 
differences. While in Melanesia polygyny appears to be rather frequent, for Micronesia and 
Polynesia we only found ethnographic evidence in the Cook Islands. Our estimates support 
this view. Only Samoa is classified as non-monogamous. On the other hand, out of five 
territories in Melanesia, only Fiji is classified as monogamous. In fact, polygamy is illegal in 
Fiji, while in Papua New Guinea polygyny is legally accepted and widespread, OECD 
(2006). Our estimates confirm Papua New Guinea as a polygynous country and New 
Caledonia, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu as occasional polygynous territories.  
 
 
2.6 Concluding remarks   
Our main objective in this chapter was to classify countries by their incidence of polygyny 
for the period 1950-2000. To do so, we first defined marital systems using qualitative data 
from the Ethnographic Atlas. Then, we developed a new methodology, using marital status 
data from censuses and national surveys, to capture the prevalence of polygyny 
quantitatively. Finally, we presented and discussed a new classification of countries by 
marital system, based on the above mentioned methodology. The main findings confirm 
that highly prevalent polygyny can be mainly associated with sub-Saharan countries, 
although our results will also include in this category other countries, e.g. Papua New 
Guinea or Afghanistan, among others. Ethnographic evidence also suggests that highly 
prevalent polygyny where co-wives share habitation is rarely found in the Old World. Only 
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exceptions we could think of were the harems observed and described in some parts of 
India and the Ottoman Empire.  
 
We have also provided a brief review of peoples and legal codes based on historical sources 
for the New World and the Old World. Under common-law or customary marriages 
polygynous unions have existed in most geographical areas, although the incidence of 
polygyny has been relatively low outside sub-Saharan Africa. In most cases, polygynous 
unions were associated with the ruling elites. As legal codes -among them Roman law, Sung 
Code, Canon law and Civil codes- were introduced, bigamy or polygynous unions became a 
punishable offence. Similarly, monogamy with occasional polygyny sooner became 
“perfect” monogamy. A second marriage could only happen as long as the dissolution of 
the first one was approved by the appropriate ecclesiastical or civil authority. In contrast, in 
other geographical areas, principally the Indian sub-continent, Northern Africa, Southern 
Asia, South-Eastern Asia and Western Asia, legal codes based on tradition or religious 
beliefs did not explicitly prohibit polygyny, as we have stated above. Islamic laws, in fact, 
approved polygynous unions, although the incidence of polygyny found for Muslim 
countries outside sub-Saharan Africa was also very low.  
 
Overall, the introduction of legal codes brought significant changes to the traditional 
customary marriage. Nonetheless, monogamy was already well established as the 
predominant marital system, and polygyny was rarely observed. On the contrary, 
concubinage and prostitution were under these circumstances relatively common, e.g. 
ancient Rome and China. Whether concubinage or prostitution arises whenever polygynous 
unions vanished deserves further attention and research, as well as to what degree 
concubinage or prostitution could coexist with polygyny. Edlund (2002) argued that an 
important opportunity cost of prostitution is forgone marriage opportunities. This, in fact, 
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will be reinforced if women’s labour market opportunities are scarce. In this line of 
thinking, the following chapters will focus on how the distinct economic roles played by 
women across regions and over time have influenced marital systems and other marital 
outcomes such as the spousal age gap.   
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3. Polygyny and Female Labour   
 
“Culture is adaptive or functional sub-serving the basic needs of its carriers and altering through time by a 
sort of mass trial-and-error in a process which is truly evolutionary66” 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Marriage presents stark and contrasting differences across regions and throughout history. 
While polygyny has been a common feature of sub-Saharan marriage, in Eurasia 
monogamy has reigned for centuries. In chapter 2 we introduced, described and discussed 
marital systems. First, ethnographic evidence provided us with three main types of marital 
unions: (i) Monogamy, (ii) Polygyny 1 where co-wives share habitation, and (iii) Polygyny 2 
where co-wives live in separate dwellings67. Furthermore, we observed that Polygyny 2 was 
mainly found in sub-Saharan Africa, thereby African polygyny, whereas Polygyny 1 was 
widespread among some indigenous groups in the New World. Statistically, we showed that 
the incidence of polygyny in Eurasia, Northern Africa and the New World regions has been 
relatively low in recent times. Only, sub-Saharan countries and isolated cases in Western 
Asia, Southern Asia and Melanesia have shown a high incidence of polygynous unions for 
the period 1950-2000.  
 
These differences in marital systems can be regarded as innate, autonomous, independent 
or as the consequence of the social, political and economic environment. The 
Ethnographic Atlas, censuses, national surveys and historical records compiled in chapter 2 
                                                 
66 Murdock (1949) 
67 Polyandrous and polygynandrous unions have been infrequent among humans throughout history, and as a 
consequence we do not include polyandrous unions in our study.  
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-some dating back to the second millennium BC- do not provide much evidence of a 
transition amid marital systems. It seems that polygynous unions have been common in 
sub-Saharan Africa for centuries, while they have been relatively unknown in Eurasia, 
Northern Africa and also among indigenous societies of the New World. Overall, only in 
Southern Africa, Burundi and Madagascar have experienced a rapid decline in the incidence 
of polygyny during the last decades68. Other countries, such as Gabon, Kenya and Ghana 
provide symptoms of a slow decline in the incidence of polygyny. These facts raise two 
major questions. First, if marital systems were culturally autonomous, why then polygynous 
unions have been mainly restricted to sub-Saharan Africa? Second, if marital systems were 
shaped by socio-economic conditions, what makes sub-Saharan Africa different from 
Eurasia, Northern Africa or the New World?  
 
This chapter reflects upon the potential impact that socio-economic conditions have on 
marital systems, leaving aside the randomness of the process. Goody (1976) argued that 
differences in marital systems between Africa and Eurasia could be related to their methods 
of production, that is to say, the level of technology. Consequently, observed polygyny and 
monogamy would imply that those disparities have not been overcome. This, in fact, 
associates marital systems to technological change, and hence economic growth and 
development. If economic development affects the economic role of women (Goldin, 
1994), then marriage -which involves men and women-, will probably be influenced by the 
contribution of women, as wives, to the household. This is our main objective for chapter 
2, to study the relationship between the economic role played by women which is captured 
                                                 
68 Our estimates of the incidence of polygynous unions in Southern Africa confirm this fact. Only Namibia 
and Swaziland were classified as polygynous (Po) countries. South Africa was classified given the available 
data as monogamous, whereas Botswana and Lesotho did not reach the 15 percent cutting point required to 
be grouped as polygynous. Moreover, Burundi and Madagascar which traditionally embraced polygyny do not 
exhibit higher rates of polygynous unions.  
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by female labour and marital systems69. For that purpose, we question whether polygyny, 
and henceforth monogamy, can be partly explained by the role played by women in the 
economy.   
 
Conversely, the consequences of marital systems on certain aspects of economic 
development have brought controversial debates, in particular, whether polygyny should be 
banned to foster growth and development. Tertilt (2005) using a quantitative model, found 
that a ban on polygyny may lower fertility and increase savings and output per capita in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Bride prices, which are often associated with polygynous unions, will 
encourage men to invest in wives and “sell” daughters as an investment strategy that crowd 
out investment in physical assets70. Nevertheless, to suppose that polygyny hinders 
economic development would imply that the assumption of Homo Economicus for those 
polygynous men and women would not hold71. On the contrary, this chapter assumes that 
polygyny is endogenous, and emerges as a consequence of optimal decisions taken by men 
and women given their political, social and economic circumstances. In this way, we hope 
this research may throw light on the subject.  
 
                                                 
69 We define female labour in terms of the total contribution of women to their household. This includes 
household work and market work. Household work leads to the production of household goods, while 
market work implies the production of food in subsistence economies or earning an income. In general, 
household work is less observable than market work, leading in some cases to underestimate the total 
contribution of women to their households. In this regard, the ‘Male breadwinner’ theory assumes that men 
earn a family wage or a wage above their marginal product of labour, which partly mitigates the absence of 
women from market work. We acknowledge this theory, among others, when discussing the effect that 
female labour could have on marital systems.  
70 Out of 358 societies in the Ethnographic Atlas with African polygyny, for 339 of them the main mode of 
marriage was Bride price, Bride service or Bride Token, 94.7 percent.  
71 Homo Economicus captures the economic assumption that individuals are rational and optimise their utility 
given specific constraints, i.e. income or time 
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Thus, the objectives of the present chapter are threefold. First, we will review the literature 
that examines marital systems, essentially polygyny as opposed to monogamy. To do so, we 
will survey different disciplines and discuss the main findings. Secondly, we will introduce a 
simple theoretical approach based on wealth inequality and female labour to analyse the 
economic incentive structure beneath both marital systems. Thirdly, we will empirically 
assess our main theoretical findings. For this purpose, we will use ethnographic evidence, 
censuses and national surveys. Our aim will be to investigate to what degree African 
polygyny, as defined in chapter 2, depends upon women’s contribution to the household, 
wealth inequality and economic development.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides a review of the literature and 
discusses some of the main factors explaining polygyny. Section 3.3 introduces the theory. 
Section 3.4 gives a brief summary of basic concepts, definitions and data sources. The 
empirical strategy is introduced in section 3.5. Section 3.6 present and analyses our main 
findings. Section 3.7 concludes and discusses the main implications. 
 
 
3.2 Related Literature 
The cross-cultural literature finds that marital systems are more highly associated with 
socio-economic factors than with cultural ones (Osmond, 1965)72. In this way, polygynous 
unions are motivated by a wide variety of reasons. This chapter acknowledges that, and 
provides a review of some of the main factors associated with polygyny. Our main 
objective lies with understanding why in some regions or countries individuals prefer 
                                                 
72 In this study we just consider two marital systems, monogamy and polygyny. By explaining the main factors 
that determine polygyny, we will be exploring the main determinants of monogamous unions too. 
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polygynous households instead of monogamous ones. For that reason, we will emphasise 
what has made polygynous regions different throughout history.   
  
Polygyny may be induced by a wide variety of factors. One of these has been post-partum 
sex taboos that forbid sexual intercourse for a period of time after the birth of the infant. 
Whiting (1964) claimed that polygyny will develop in societies where these taboos exist for 
a year or more to provide husbands with socially approved sexual partners. Ember (1974; 
1984) found no significant association once controlling for demographic aspects such as 
male mortality and sex ratios. Post-partum sex taboos would indeed create incentives for 
men to seek out for a legitimate wife or sexual partner. Nonetheless, if taboos last for one 
or two years, it seems unlikely that many polygynous unions would be sustained over 
longer periods of time. The taking of a second wife would also involve marriage transfers, 
among other costs, which in the end would discourage men from doing so. 
 
Barrenness and sickness have also been accounted for. The Code of Hammurabi regulated 
the act of taking a second wife or concubine when the wife was barren or sick73 74. The 
Bible also described the historical episode when Abram took Sarai’s maid Hagar to be his 
second wife, because Sarai was barren75. Once again, barrenness seems to be an exceptional 
reason to induce polygyny. Unfortunately, there is no much empirical evidence on the 
subject. Though, very high proportions of barren and sick women would be required to 
explain the high incidence of polygyny in some regions over time. To our knowledge, there 
are no studies associating barrenness to specific geographical regions throughout history. 
 
                                                 
73 The Code of Hammurabi: Section 145 
74 The Code of Hammurabi: Section 148  
75 The Bible: Genesis (16:3) 
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Levirate, or the practice of a husband marrying the wife of a deceased brother, has also 
been traditionally found in the literature as a popular justification to polygyny76. According 
to Satlow (2001) levirate would have composed a significant percentage of second wives in 
ancient Palestine and Jewish Babylonia. For instance, the Bible recorded historical episodes 
where levirate appeared to be a common practice, “If brethren dwell together, and one of them die, 
and have no child, the wife of the dead shall not be married abroad unto one not of his kin; her husband's 
brother shall go in unto her, and take her to him to wife, and perform the duty of a husband's brother unto 
he” 77. Valliant (1944) also found, among the Aztecs, that divorced women could freely 
remarry, but widows had to marry a brother of her deceased husband or one of his 
clansmen. Regardless, for polygynous unions to be prevalent within a society, high male 
mortality rates would be required. These will heavily imbalance sex ratios, which seems just 
plausible with wars or large scale migrations. On the whole, levirate does not seem to be a 
sufficiently strong reason to explain the high incidence of polygynous unions observed in 
some regions.  
 
Some studies have also focused on the role played by religion. Lesthaeghe et al. (1989) 
found that Christian populations are less polygynous than Muslim ones, while ethnic 
groups with African traditional systems are even more polygynous. Islamic countries have 
conventionally been associated with polygyny. Sharia or Islamic Law allows men to marry 
up to four women78. Although polygyny is lawful in most Islamic countries, our results in 
                                                 
76 Levirate comes from the Latin levir “husband's brother” (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2008)  
77 The Bible: Deuteronomy (25:5) 
78 The Qur’an: Surah (4:3) “If you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans; marry women of your choice, 
two, or three, or four, but if you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly (with them), then only one, or (a captive) that your 
right hands possess that will be more suitable, to prevent you from doing injustice” 
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chapter 2 illustrate that only 6 countries where Islam has been the state religion between 
1970 and 2000 were classified as polygynous (Po)79.  
 
All the same, Hinduism and Buddhism do not explicitly prohibit polygynous unions. In this 
regard, we found no evidence of a high incidence of polygyny in countries where Hinduism 
or Buddhism predominate80. In Europe, though polygyny was known for centuries, the 
incidence of polygynous unions was relatively low before the appearance of Christianity 
and Civil Codes81. Conversely, Betzig (1992a, 1992b, 1995) pointed that Greeks, Romans, 
and Europeans in the Middle Age exhibited strong polygynous tendencies, with wealthy 
men having multiple women as wives, concubines or mistresses82. As a consequence, 
although marriage was monogamous, mating was polygynous. Whether concubines enjoyed 
the same privileges and rights than wives remains debatable. In Ancient Greece, a man 
could not legally be married to more than one wife at a time (MacDowell, 1978). Roman 
law recognized the position of concubines, although men could not have a concubine while 
they have a wife living (Rawson, 1974). Furthermore, concubinage was also frequent in 
                                                 
79 We follow Barro and McLeary (2005) and sort countries according to their state religion in 1970 and 2000. 
For this purpose, we define a dummy variable, Muslim, as 1 for those countries where Islam is the State 
religion in 1970 and 2000, and 0 otherwise. Out of 24 countries with Islam as state religion for the period 
1970-2000, only Afghanistan, United Arab Emirates, the Maldives, Mauritania, Sudan and Somalia presented 
evidence of a high incidence of polygynous unions. In addition, only Tunisia banned polygyny in 1956, while 
Morocco reformed their family laws in 2004 including clauses in the marriage contract that allow married 
women to prohibit polygyny (OECD, 2006). 
80 Thailand and Myanmar allow polygynous unions. Similarly, India permits polygyny among the Muslim and 
Hindu population (OECD, 2006).  
81 In chapter 2 we offered a review of ethnographic evidence and historical records where we did not find 
much evidence to sustain that the incidence of polygyny in Eurasia were comparable to the sub-Saharan case. 
We are inclined to think that polygynous unions were closely substituted by concubinage and prostitution.  
82 Posner (1992) discussed the widespread practice of concubinage in Greece and Rome. 
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Ancient China but the legal status of a concubine was not as clearly defined as that of a 
wife (Ebrey, 1993)83. 
 
Family laws against polygyny have been emphasised as a major factor too. Whether 
exogenous doctrines enforcing monogamy or banning polygynous unions would have the 
desired effect remains to be seen. Becker (1991) argued that doctrines encouraging 
monogamy are attractive only when the demand for polygyny is weak. In this way, the 
decline in the incidence of polygyny would be related to changes in the gains from being 
polygynously married, rather than to the exogenous spread of monogamous doctrines. For 
example, the Council of Trent (1545–1563) introduced the requirement of a priest and two 
witnesses to legitimate a union. Nonetheless, the incidence of polygynous households in 
Europe during the Middle Age appears to be lower than in sub-Saharan Africa during the 
twentieth century. Some polygynous countries have recently reformed their family laws, in 
an attempt to counteract polygynous unions. Côte d’Ivoire officially banned polygynous 
unions84. Guinea and Benin, among others, have reformed family laws. Nonetheless the 
incidence of polygyny remains relatively high in these countries (Tertilt, 2006)85.  
 
Sex ratios have also been widely studied and related to polygyny. Firstly, we distinguish 
between sex ratios at birth and sex ratios at marriageable age. The former appears to be 
                                                 
83 Residential arrangements could in some cases distinguish the position of wives with respect to concubines 
or mistresses. The legitimacy of wives in highly polygynous regions was achieved through marriage transfers, 
essentially Bridewealth.   
84 Polygamy was abolished in Côte d’Ivoire in 1964. Polygynous unions prior to 1964 were recognised. Newly 
formed polygynous unions are punishable by a fine of CFA 50 000 to CFA 500 000 (USD 80 to USD 800) or 
by six months to three years imprisonment (OECD, 2006). Tertilt (2006) provides a list of countries where 
polygyny is illegal, restricted or legal. Overall, the incidence of polygynous unions does not seem to be greatly 
affected by laws enforcing monogamy.  
85 A ban on polygyny does not guarantee monogamy, because of the difficulty of enforcement. Becker (1991) 
and Elster (1989) argued that although laws and social norms may affect behaviour, they rarely evolve and are 
maintained if incentives are very weak to uphold them.  
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reasonably stable and not far from unity. Recent data show that on average sex ratios at 
birth remain fairly constant and stable at 1.07 male per female births for the period 1995-
2000. Only China with 1.18 and the Transcaucasia (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia with 
1.15, 1.10 and 1.11 respectively), show serious imbalances86.  
 
On the other hand, sex ratios at marriageable age or adult sex ratios are subject to a variety 
of factors such as warfare, gender specific migrations, female infanticide and slavery87. 
Ember (1974) showed that in general societies with a high male mortality in warfare are 
likely to have an imbalanced sex ratio in favour of females and, presumably for that reason, 
are likely to practice polygyny. More marriageable women relative to men could induce 
polygynous behaviour88. Nevertheless, wars and large scales migrations have been a 
common phenomenon around the world that has not been exclusive to polygynous 
regions.  
 
Slavery has also been closely associated with imbalanced sex ratios and polygyny. Manning 
(1990) argued that slavery led to imbalance sex ratios at marriageable age in sub-Saharan 
Africa. This, in fact, could have encouraged polygynous unions. Manning (1990) associated 
these imbalances mainly to Central Africa and to a lesser degree the Bight of Biafra and the 
Gold Coast, which in turn are the most polygynous regions today. Whether the incidence 
of polygyny increased during the slave trade remains to be found. Unfortunately, the 
                                                 
86Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, 
World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. 
87 For our study, marriageable age is defined as 15-44 years. Dickerman (1975) argued that infanticide was 
mostly practised by hunter-gatherers and stratified societies both to raise living standards and to maintain the 
social structure. Male infanticide has rarely been observed among sedentary societies. Female infanticide will 
reduce the number of available women, making polygynous unions more problematical.  
88 Becker (1991) also argued that an increase in the ratio of women to men redistributes married output away 
from women and towards men. 
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Ethnographic Atlas only presents evidence for the post slave trade period, while slavery 
was first abolished in British colonies in 180789. Further evidence about pre-slave trade in 
sub-Saharan Africa would be required to asses the impact that slavery had on sex ratios, 
and hence marital systems.  
 
Male migrations -mainly to seek work in the cities or abroad-, are also associated with sex 
ratios and polygynous unions90. Lesthaege et al. (1989) confirms that male migrations and 
the subsequent surplus of young women have been a common feature in some African 
regions. Those imbalances could encourage polygynous unions in the sending area, i.e. rural 
areas, while increase “polyandrous” behaviour in the receiving area, i.e. urban areas. Edlund 
(2002) points to male sex ratios to sustain high levels of prostitution or “polyandry”91. 
Rural polygyny would be compensated by urban “polyandry”. Male migrations can 
encourage polygynous unions. Nonetheless, polygyny appears to have been prevalent in 
sub-Saharan regions well before, while male migrations in Eurasia have also been frequent.   
  
When sex ratios at marriageable age are balanced, high levels of polygyny can only be 
sustained when women married young and men postpone marriage, thus creating a large 
                                                 
89 In sub-Saharan Africa, the first ethnographic evidence dates back to 1830 for the Zulu people in modern 
South Africa, and 1850 for the Bogo and Kru people in modern Sudan and Liberia. Additionally, “The slave 
trade was declared illegal in Venezuela and Mexico in 1810, in Chile in 1811, and in Argentina in 1812. In 1817 Spain 
signed a treaty with Britain agreeing to abolish the slave trade in 1820, but the trade continued to the remaining Spanish colonies 
until 1880. Chile freed its black slaves in 1823; Mexico abolished slavery in 1829, and Peru in 1854” (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 2008). Figure A.2.1 in appendix 2 illustrates a timeline of the existing ethnographic evidence. 
90 In Western Asia, expatriates have caused seriously imbalance sex ratios. The lowest sex ratios, 15-44 years 
old, found in 1980 (women per 100 men) correspond to United Arab Emirates (30), Qatar (46), Bahrain (59), 
Kuwait (63), Saudi Arabia (72) and Oman (73). On the other hand, Yemen, Saint Lucia and Cambodia 
present the highest sex ratios with 132, 125 and 122 women for every 100 men.  
91 If there are more men than women, then some men would struggle to get married. Some of these men 
could prefer to share a woman than to remain single. Polyandry among the lower classes breaks down if 
women prefer to be prostitutes to the whole population rather than wives to a subset of poor men (Edlund, 
2002). 
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spousal age gap (Tertilt, 2005). Consequently, why women would prefer to marry young? A 
common explanation follows; women would marry young to maximise fertility92. Social 
stigma associated with pre-marital sex in some traditional societies can also encourage 
women to marry young. Whether reproduction potential or social stigmas persuade women 
to marry at an early age does not explain why they would prefer a polygynous union. This is 
because women in predominantly monogamous regions also marry young. In this way, age 
at first marriage may be closely associated with the level of economic development. 
Whether a 25 years old person is young or adult is relative. For that reason, we concentrate 
and emphasise the age differences between spouses at marriage93.  
 
Becker (1973) analysed the incidence of polygyny in terms of the relative gains to men and 
women and claimed that polygynous unions could be explained when men or women differ 
greatly in wealth or ability, among other attributes94. If all men were equal, women would 
have no incentives to become the second wife of a man, when they can just be the first 
wife of someone just as good. Kanazawa and Still (2001) developed a theory in which 
                                                 
92 Tertilt (2005) found differential fertility rates between polygynous and monogamous countries in 1980 of 
two-child on average after taking into account infant mortality. Table A.3.1 in appendix 3 presents data for 
polygynous and non polygynous countries for three periods, 1960, 1980 and 2000. The sample have been 
restricted to countries with the lowest human development indices in 1980, hence high developed countries 
(with an index of 0.800 or above) were removed. Our results confirm a differential fertility rate of two-child 
in 1980. Moreover, table A.3.1 illustrates an increase in 2000, but also that differential fertility rates in 1960 
were minor. Josephson (2002) showed that out of 86 studies reviewing polygyny and fertility, 64 concluded 
that monogamous women had higher fertility rates, 7 that polygynous had higher fertility rates and 15 that 
polygyny had no effect on fertility.  
93 Recent data on the singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM) for Honduras, Nepal and Madagascar indicate 
that female age at first marriage is 20.4, 19.6 and 19.8 years respectively, (United Nations, 2000). Moreover, 
historical records have shown that female mean age at marriage were relatively higher in some European 
countries in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, (Hajnal, 1965; Wrigley et al., 1997). In this regard, it 
could be the case that a 21 years old woman was considered very young in Europe during the seventeenth 
century, though old in Nepal in 2000.  
94 Becker (1973) also attributed polygynous unions to sex ratio imbalances. 
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polygyny emerges spontaneously based exclusively on male resource inequality. If male 
resource inequality were sizeable, women would choose to marry or mate polygynously. 
They also found empirical support for this theory with cross-cultural data from a large 
number of countries95. Grossbard (1976) provided the first econometric analysis of African 
polygyny using household-level data, and confirmed that wealthier men took more wives. 
 
Wealth can be composed of labour and non-labour income. Wealth inequalities originated 
by non-labour income would entail a well established system of property rights and 
inheritance rules that allows transfers of wealth across generations. If not, men and women 
would be born equal, and wealth inequalities will be the result of age and innate attributes, 
i.e. ability. Along these lines, White (1988) argued that polygynous unions where co-wives 
share habitation are dependent on the personal ability or productivity of men, i.e. hunters. 
Among hunter-gatherers, the strongest, boldest and most skilful of hunters would be the 
most desired husband.  
 
Alternatively, traditional land tenure systems which have prevailed in many regions, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa, could have an impact on marital systems96. A common 
feature of these systems, popularly known as “communal land”, is that access to land is 
assured to most households (Place and Hazell, 1993). Therefore, if land as main resource is 
                                                 
95 Kanazawa and Still (1999) constructed a polygyny score based on cultural data from the Encyclopaedia of 
World Cultures (Levinson 1991-1995), which contains description of marital systems, among other cultural 
practices. They weighted their cultural scores with the ethnic and cultural group populations for each country. 
We raise doubts about the polygyny scores for two reasons. First, some countries are not fully represented. 
Second, cultural scores do not totally capture the exact incidence of polygyny.  
96 Boserup (1970) stressed that land tenure systems are one of the main factors explaining the contrasting 
marital systems of Eurasia and Africa. 
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accessible, differences in agricultural productivity would also generate inequalities97. 
Moreover, if differences in agricultural productivities are negligible, inequalities would only 
arise between older and younger men, provided that wealth can be accumulated over 
time98. Under these circumstances, a young man would postpone marriage and accumulate 
enough wealth to compete with older men, -who would be already married and better 
established- for a suitable spouse. Women could prefer to be the second wife of a married 
man and hence a member of a wealthier household, than the first one of a newly formed 
household. Women would have incentives to enter a polygynous union99.  
 
In Eurasia and the New World property rights have been well established and known for 
centuries. Wealth inequality in many of these societies has been closely associated with 
male wealth inequality, because land ownership and inheritance rules have conventionally 
followed a patrilineal pattern100. In some cases, disparities in wealth have been commonly 
observed in Eurasia and the New World throughout history (Milanovic et al., 2007)101. Thus, 
if these inequalities have been accounted for, why polygynous unions have not been 
                                                 
97 Male heterogeneity in agricultural productivity is difficult to measure. Nevertheless, a substantial 
heterogeneity would imply that the most efficient men accumulate wealth much faster. Consequently, they 
would be able to marry earlier and form a polygynous union at a younger age.  
98 Wealth accumulation partly differentiates polygyny among hunter-gatherers from the rest, because the 
former can scarcely accumulate wealth. In our study, Polygyny 1 is commonly associated with hunter-gatherers 
in New World regions, whereas Polygyny 2 usually refers to sedentary groups. We will test these implications in 
the empirical analysis.  
99 Polygynous unions can also bring some other benefits. Borgerhoff-Mulder and Milton (1985) observed that 
among the Kipsigis provision of infant care was provided by co-wives.  
100 The Salic Law or Lex Salica, written around the time of Clovis (AD 476-96) for the Salian Franks prohibits 
women to inherit land. Title LIX. Concerning Private Property: 6. But of Salic land no portion of the inheritance 
shall come to a woman: but the whole inheritance of the land shall come to the male sex. In the Ethnographic Atlas, out of 
619 societies with available data, nearly in 70% of the cases inheritance rules were patrilineal. 
101 Table A.3.2 in appendix 3 illustrates recent data on the distribution of land. Although in most polygynous 
countries property rights are not well established and traditional land tenure systems persist, recent data 
shows that the distribution of land for polygynous countries is more even than in non polygynous ones.  
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prevalent? That question would leave us with three possible explanations. First, monogamy 
was socially imposed and even if women were better off in a polygynous union, men would 
not be allowed to take a second wife102. Second, the degree of wealth inequality made just 
few wealthy men attractive marriage prospects in the eyes of women. Third, wives were 
expensive and only few men were able to afford more than one. Whether monogamy was 
socially imposed will also be discussed later on. For the moment we will concentrate on 
wealth inequality and the implicit cost of taking a second wife.  
 
In this regard, we raise another important question, why men would demand more than 
one wife?  The desire for a second wife could be determined by the potential gains that 
another wife could bring to the household. Those gains might be reputational, reproductive 
or economic. In this way, Boserup (1970:50) analysed the position of women in rural 
communities across regions and found two main patterns:  
 
“…the first type is found in regions where shifting cultivation predominates and the major part of 
agricultural work is done by women. In such communities, we can expect to find a high incidence of 
polygamy, and bride wealth being paid by the future husband or his family. The women are hard working 
and have only a limited right of support from their husbands, but they often enjoy considerable freedom of 
movement and some economic independence from the sale of their own crops. 
 
The second group is found where plough cultivation predominates and where women do less agricultural 
work than men. In such communities we may expect to find that only a tiny minority of marriages, if any, 
are polygamous; that a dowry is usually paid by the girl’s family; that a wife is entirely dependent upon her 
                                                 
102 Alexander et al. (1979) introduced the term socially imposed monogamy. As societies grew, they were 
forced to impose rules regarding reproductive opportunities in order to elicit cooperation and solidarity 
within the society. In Eurasia and the New World high polygyny is mostly associated with the elite, i.e. 
Concubinage and Harems.  
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husband for economic support; and that the husband has an obligation to support his wife and children, at 
least as long as the marriage is in force.”  
 
The first type was mainly associated with sub-Saharan Africa and some parts of South East 
Asia, whereas the second one was predominantly observed in India, China and the Middle 
East (Boserup, 1970). Following this line of thinking, the more a wife contributes to the 
household, the higher should be the incidence of polygyny. Boserup (1970) argued that 
women in rural sub-Saharan Africa have a double role as agricultural workers and 
housewives. As a result, if we assume that men have similar reproduction or reputational 
incentives to form a polygynous union across regions103. The costs associated with the 
taking of a second wife would largely influence the desire to form a polygynous household. 
Therefore, the more wives contribute to the wealth of the household, the smaller are the 
costs associated with a polygynous union, and the higher would be the demand for wives104.  
 
Osmond (1965) found a significant positive association between female economic 
contributions and polygyny, but only for rudimentary societies. Grossbard (1976) also 
                                                 
103 Conventionally, African polygyny has been partly explained by the desire of men to maximise fertility. 
Another common explanation lies with prestige and reputation. Nonetheless, these motivations would also 
explain Harems, concubinage and sequential polygyny. In this way, it seems plausible to assume that all men 
have reproduction or reputational incentives to take a second wife.  
104 The costs associated with a second wife mainly refer to daily consumption, not marriage transfers, which 
are in some cases a lump sum. In this way, marriage transfers have been commonly misunderstood in the 
economics literature. Becker (1991) predicted that polygyny is positively associated with bride prices and 
increasing transfers to the bride, while Bergstrom (1994) also claims that the greater the amount of material 
resources available per women in the society, the higher will be the bride prices and the greater the amount of 
resources allocated to each woman. Goody and Tambiah (1973:17) provided a brief description of the role 
played by marriage transfers: “Bridewealth passes from the kin of the groom to those of the bride; it forms a societal fund, a 
circulating pool of resources, the movement of which corresponds to the movement of rights over spouses, usually women. But dowry 
is part of a familial or conjugal fund, which passes by from holder to heir, and usually from the parents to the daughter”. 
Bridewealth usually remains within the wife’s natal family, and in case of divorce or separation, Bridewealth is 
returned. 
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observes a relationship between female contribution to subsistence and more polygyny. 
Pryor (1977) supports the hypothesis that polygyny increases the accumulation of wealth of 
a household, when access to land is not restricted. Lee (1979) notices a positive correlation 
between polygyny and female subsistence contributions for agricultural and gathering 
societies, and a negative correlation between these two variables for fishing hunting, or 
herding societies. White and Burton (1988) provided various tests for polygyny using data 
from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS) and found that the absence of constraints 
on expansion into new lands favours polygyny. White (1988) claims that polygyny is more 
prevalent in societies in which women have more to offer to the household economy. 
Finally, Jacoby (1995), with a large household survey from Côte d’Ivoire, found that 
conditional on wealth, men do have more wives when female labour contributes a larger 
share to household income. Whether wealthy inequality and female labour are good 
predictors of polygynous unions will be subject of analysis in the remaining sections.  
 
 
3.3 Theoretical Model 
In the previous section, we discussed some of the main reasons associated with polygyny. 
Overall, wealth inequality and female labour appear to be the two most important factors. 
For the remainder of the chapter, we will concentrate on these two and present a simple 
theoretical approach to explain polygyny. In this fashion, we introduce in table 3.1 three 
possible cases regarding marital unions. These three scenarios can be characterised as 
follows: (i) Monogamy, when the incidence of polygynous unions is very low and 
monogamous unions prevail, (ii) Harem polygyny, when the incidence of polygynous unions 
is low, most men are monogamous, although many women are polygynously married or 
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mated105, and (iii) African polygyny where the incidence of polygynous unions is high, many 
men and women are in polygynous unions. Table 3.1 describes scenarios that could emerge 
in traditional societies. We define traditional societies as those where, (i) the levels of 
human capital remain low and (ii) all men and women want to get married (universal 
marriage), hence celibacy is possible, but unwanted. 
 
Table 3.1 Marital Systems, Female Labour and Wealth Inequality 
Female labour a 
 
Wealth Inequality b 
(non-labour income) 
High Low 
 
High 
 
 
Harem polygyny 
 and Monogamy c 
 
Harem polygyny and 
Monogamy c 
 
Low 
 
 
African polygyny and/or 
Monogamy c 
 
Monogamy c  
Source: Author’s 
Notes:  a/ Female labour captures female participation in household and market activities.  
b/ Wealth inequality in traditional societies or less developed economies mainly arises from non-
labour income inequalities. Non-labour income refers principally to wealth transmitted across 
generations, i.e. land.  
c/ Monogamy also includes some occasional polygyny that may occur exceptionally  
 
When the contribution of wives is not limited to the production of household goods and 
they participate in other activities, i.e. gathering, producing food or earning income; 
married men would have more incentives to take a second wife. This would be not just for 
reproduction or reputational reasons, but also for economic ones. In scenarios where 
wealth inequality is low, given that non-labour income remains irrelevant, married men 
would still demand a second wife because they would increase their reputation, 
reproductive success and because wives would be inexpensive. In traditional societies, 
                                                 
105 Harem polygyny includes wives, concubines and mistresses who share residence with their husband or 
sexual partner. In sub-Saharan Africa, Bridewealth legitimates the marital union, even if co-wives do no share 
residence. In Eurasia, we are not aware the concubines or mistress living in separate habitation were 
legitimated in any particular way.   
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married men -who are usually older, more experienced and wealthy-, would have an 
advantage. Single men –who are usually younger, less experienced and poor- would 
probably have to postpone marriage to accumulate enough wealth to compete with married 
men for wives. As a result of this competition, women would be highly demanded and 
marry young, creating a spousal age gap required to sustain a high incidence of polygynous 
unions. The equilibrium when many men and women are polygynously married could arise; 
this equilibrium will be denoted as African polygyny106.  
 
Nonetheless, we ought to prove whether or not this is a stable equilibrium. Thus, we 
question, why would women prefer to enter a polygynous household?107 The answer lies 
with the level of economic development. As we stated above, when human capital and 
non-labour income are irrelevant, male wealth inequality is low and greatly determined by 
disparities in labour income108. Households with a married couple and their respective 
children could have amassed more wealth, and thus provides higher levels of consumption 
                                                 
106 Direct measures on the incidence of polygynous unions indicate the existence of this equilibrium in sub-
Saharan Africa. Table A.3.3 in appendix 3 illustrates the percentages of men and women married in 
polygynous unions for a selection of countries. On the whole, the percentages are very high for both, men 
and women, ruling out imbalances associated with the Harem polygyny equilibrium, characterised with few 
polygynous men and many polygynous women.  
107 We acknowledge the vast literature on arranged marriages. Nonetheless, we assume that parents want their 
best for their daughters and sons. Therefore, we will use throughout the paper the terminology men and 
women.  
108 If a well established system of property rights does not exist, land could not be perfectly transmitted across 
generations. Therefore, male wealth inequality would be greatly affected by labour productivity. If labour 
productivities are similar among men and women, household wealth inequality would arise between 
generations. Along these lines, Boserup (1970) observed that wealth inequality in less developed economies is 
normally driven by land ownership. If land is distributed equally among individuals, or access to land is not 
restricted by a well-established system of property rights, then wealth inequality might have a weaker impact 
on marital decisions.  
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for their members109. Women could choose to enter a polygynous or a monogamous 
household based on the levels of consumption or standard of living that they would 
enjoy110.  
 
Let us assume that the levels of consumption that women would enjoy in a polygynous or 
monogamous household are ,P Mc c⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ where the superscripts denote the type of 
household, P for polygynous and M for monogamous, and P Mc c> . We assume that a 
polygynous household could offer a slightly higher level of consumption than a newly 
formed one. This is a plausible assumption for societies where wealth inequality is low and 
largely driven by labour income. Moreover, if access to the factors of production, i.e. land, 
is not restricted, wealth and hence consumption could be determined by labour 
productivities and the size of the household. As a result, women would enter a polygynous 
union when, 
  
 ( ) ( )P MU c U c>     (3.1) 
 
Let also assume that the utility function is the same across regions, and ' 0U > , '' 0U < , 
(0)U = −∞ 111. This simple theory would imply that consumption levels would exclusively 
determine the marital decision. Brown (1981) also points that a monogamous wife could 
encourage her husband to take a second wife to share housework or child care. To simplify 
matters, we will not take into account other potential benefits of entering a polygynous 
                                                 
109 Borgerhoff-Mulder (1988a) described that Kipsigis men made substantial payment, Bridewealth, of livestock, 
and more recently cash, to get married. Therefore it would take some time to accumulate Bridewealth and 
wealth to sustain a newly formed household.  
110 The choice of husband, among Kipsigis women, is influenced by the Bridewealth and the size of his land 
plot (Borgerhoff-Mulder, 1988b). 
111 The theory could also include forward looking behaviour. Nonetheless, at low levels of economic 
development forward looking is not the most appropriate way of modelling.  
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union and assume that households would generally demand a second wife for reproductive 
or reputational reasons.  
 
So far we have assumed that polygynous unions do not entail any specific costs. What 
would happen if they do? Women may get disutility from entering a polygynous household. 
Let us assume that women dislike sharing the husband and habitation with other women112. 
This, in fact, would be a cost associated exclusively with polygynous households. We 
denote this cost as δ . Let us assume that δ is constant across regions too. All women get 
the same disutility from entering a polygynous household, no matter culture, religious 
beliefs or economic development. Then, women would enter a polygynous union when,  
 
 ( ) ( )P MU c U c δ− >     (3.2) 
 
Once we have included δ , monogamy could also arise when the cost of entering the 
polygynous household is greater than the utility gained due to different consumption levels. 
Under these circumstances, even if the demand for wives is high because wives are 
inexpensive, we could end up with the Monogamy equilibrium113. Then, why would women 
prefer polygyny? To answer this question, we need to refer to economic development.  
 
Economic development can be broadly defined as the process whereby regions or 
countries improve their standards of living. These are closely associated with consumption 
levels. Therefore, let us assume there are two traditional societies with Lc  and Hc  standing 
                                                 
112 This has already been noticed in the literature. The Ethnographic Atlas provides evidence that polygynous 
unions in sub-Saharan societies mainly involve co-wives living in separate habitation. Nonetheless, the 
disutility from sharing a husband would persist.  
113 Polygynous behaviour would be associated with a high demand for spouses. However, women would be 
required to accept this polygynous behaviour to form a polygynous union.  
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for their average consumption levels, where L stands for low and H for high, L Hc c< . 
Then, if wives are inexpensive, married men would demand a second wife and single men 
would demand a first wife. Women would value both marriage proposal and enter a 
polygynous household when,  
  
 ( ) ( )P ML LU c U c δ− >      (3.3) 
    
( ) ( )P MH HU c U c δ− >      (3.4) 
 
The average levels of consumption  [ ],L Hc c  are just the weighted average of the 
consumption levels enjoyed by married and single men seeking for a spouse. More 
decisively, the level of consumption will greatly determined the utility gains that 
accompanied different consumption levels offered by a polygynous or a monogamous 
union.      
 ( ) ( )L HU c U c
c c
∂ ∂>∂ ∂     (3.5) 
 
This, in fact, seems rather trivial but turns out to be relevant for our study. At low levels of 
economic development, small differences in consumption will be accompanied by higher 
gains/losses in utility114. If women have to decide whether to enter a polygynous or a 
monogamous household, and household wealth inequality remains low, women’s 
incentives would be affected by the level of economic development. Moreover, at low 
levels of economic development, female labour would be crucial. If wives are limited to 
household work, wives would be very expensive for the household, discouraging married 
                                                 
114 Figure A.3.1 in appendix 3 illustrates graphically the case when average consumption increases and wealth 
inequality remains constant and low.  
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men from taking a second wife.  All men want to get married then single men would seek 
for a suitable spouse. If, on the other hand, wives contribute more to the household, 
married men would not be discouraged from taking a second wife, and women’s incentives 
to enter a polygynous union would be higher if the level of consumption within the society 
is very low. 
     
Consequently, if the average level of consumption increases, women would have less 
incentive to enter a polygynous household, and Monogamy will prevail. African polygyny 
would emerge in less economically developed regions, when female labour is high even if 
wealth inequality is low. If, on the other hand, female labour is low, Monogamy will prevail 
because married men would not have many incentives to take a second wife. These would 
be further reduced at low levels of economic development115.  
 
What would happen when household wealth inequality increases? In this case, women 
would have incentives to be the second wife, concubine or mistress of a wealthy man. The 
level of economic development would determine how sizeable must be these differences in 
wealth that would be closely associated to the level of consumption. At low levels of 
economic development, we could reach the Harem polygyny equilibrium. Wealthy men 
could be encouraged to form a polygynous union. Having more than one wife could 
increase their reputation and reproductive success116. Wealthy men would be less concerned 
                                                 
115 Previously, we discussed that wealth accumulation partly distinguish polygynous behaviour between 
hunter-gatherers and sedentary people. The former will find extremely difficult to accumulate wealth in any 
form. Moreover, the contribution of women is restricted to gathering. Out of 844 societies in the 
Ethnographic Atlas with available data, only in 14 women contribute something to hunting activities. 
Regarding fishing activities, in 79.2 percent of the societies; males fish alone or appreciably more than 
females. On the other hand, gathering activities are predominantly dominated by females, in 80.2 percent of 
societies females gather alone or appreciably more than males. 
116 Polygyny has been closely associated with the elite, Shamans, Chiefs, Sultans, Emperors, and Kings among 
other powerful figures. 
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about the economic contribution of their wives to the household. Women, on the other 
hand, would have incentives to be the second wife, concubine or mistress of a wealthy 
man. Extremely unequal societies could reach the Harem polygyny equilibrium, where few 
wealthy men have many wives, while poor men are monogamous or unmarried117. This 
equilibrium would be sustainable if and only if wealth inequality persists over time, and 
economic development remains steadily low.  
 
Along these lines, Betzig (1986) points that polygynous mating was observed in Ancient 
civilisations, i.e. Roma, Aztec Empire or Ancient China. Betzig (1986) offers an original 
theory to explain this behaviour. Wealthy parents, who are able to transfer resources, will 
invest in sons, whereas poor ones will bias their investment toward daughters. As wealthy 
men grow powerful, more women would be retained in seclusion to maximise their own 
reproduction success, resulting in Harem polygyny118. Nevertheless, even if mating was 
polygynous, as Betzig (1986) described, marriage in those regions was essentially 
monogamous. It seems that polygynous marriage turned into polygynous mating when 
male wealth inequalities became substantially large. By then, property rights were 
established. In the absence of property rights, wealth could not have been amassed across 
generations and male wealth inequality would have stayed low.   
 
                                                 
117 Even if monogamy prevails among poor men, we do not rule out that some occasional polygyny could 
emerge because of exceptional circumstances, i.e. levirate and sororate.  
118 Harems and Purdah are two extreme ways of secluding women to the household. “Harem is the part of a house 
set apart for the women of the family. The harem served as the secure, private quarters of women who nonetheless played various 
roles in public life. Large Harems were common in the wealthy households in Arab countries through the early decades of the 
20th century”; “Purdah  is the practice that involves the seclusion of women from public observation by means of concealing 
clothing (veiling) and by the use of high-walled enclosures, screens, and curtains within the home”, (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
2008) 
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Lagerlöf (2005) proposed a theory that explains the decline of Harem polygyny. If wealthy 
men also tend to have more children, non-labour income would dilute over time, increasing 
male wealth equality and consequently eliminating polygyny. This is a plausible theory to 
explain how the Harem polygyny equilibrium turn into Monogamy with occasional polygyny, 
and finally into Monogamy. However, Lagerlöf (2005) neglects the role played by economic 
development and female labour. In this regard, even if male wealth inequality remains high, 
women could be discouraged to enter a polygynous union if the cost associated, δ , is 
greater than the utility gain. At higher levels of economic development, male wealth 
inequalities need to be considerably high to induce women to join a polygynous union. This 
could be more acute when women work and earn an income. Under these circumstances, 
women could think that: It is better to be the head of a mouse than the tail of a lion. 
  
Finally, Gould et al. (2004) provide an original theory that explains the decline of polygyny 
in modern societies. When inequality is determined by disparities in human capital -as 
opposed to traditional societies where difference in non-labour income are more relevant-, 
wealthy men would value more high quality women who can raise high quality children. As 
a result, high quality women would be more valued and less affordable, and monogamy 
would emerge. Nonetheless, this theory fails to explain why monogamy was prevalent in 
most parts of Eurasia and the New World throughout history, well before the twentieth 
century when human capital became substantially more relevant.  
 
Out of the three possible scenarios: (i) African polygyny, (ii) Harem polygyny and (iii) 
Monogamy, we would concentrate on the African polygyny and Monogamy equilibriums. The 
reason being is that Harem polygyny requires exceptional economic conditions to be stable 
over time. We acknowledge that high wealth inequality within societies has been observed 
across regions. We are not that confident that these differences between wealthy and poor 
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men have increased with economic development. Our theory suggests that an increase in 
the standard of living needs to be accompanied by an increase in male wealth inequality for 
the Harem polygyny equilibrium to remain stable.  
 
Kuznets (1955) hypothesised an inverted U-shaped relationship between income inequality 
and economic development. That is, low levels of economic development are associated 
with low income inequality, then income inequality increases and at some critical point 
starts to decrease over time. This would imply that Harem polygyny equilibrium would have 
occurred at the early stages of economic development, when the standards of living were 
relatively low, but wealth inequality started to increase. Better economic conditions would 
require higher wealth inequality; if not, women’s incentives to enter a polygynous 
household would decrease, and hence Harem polygyny would progressively turn into 
Monogamy with occasional polygyny, and later into the Monogamy equilibrium observed in 
many countries today119.  
 
Kuznets (1955) inverted U-shaped relationship also stresses that at very low levels of 
economic development, income inequality would be low. Under these circumstances, if the 
demand for wives is high -which in turn would be affected by female labour-, the African 
polygyny equilibrium may emerge. Table 3.1 illustrated that high female labour and low 
wealth inequality were the two main prerequisites for the African polygyny and Monogamy 
equilibriums. We will argue that at high levels of economic development, Monogamy would 
                                                 
119 We distinguish between Harem polygyny and Monogamy with occasional polygyny. The former involves 
many women marrying or mating with a man (high intensity), whereas the latter implies that few women are 
in polygynous unions (low intensity). 
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prevail, but at low levels of economic development African polygyny would be favoured. In 
the following sections, we empirically test these implications120 
 
 
3.4 Data Sources and Definitions 
Our empirical strategy involves three different approaches. First, we will use ethnographic 
evidence to empirically test the impact of female contribution to subsistence on marital 
systems across societies. Then, we will use our country estimates of polygyny derived in 
chapter 2 to measure how female labour affects polygyny at different levels of economic 
development. This type of polygyny refers to the African polygyny equilibrium 
aforementioned. For that purpose, we present a cross-section Probit-model, with base year 
1980121. Finally, direct measures on the incidence of polygyny and female employment from 
national surveys would be brought into play to illustrate the robustness of our main results.  
  
3.4.1 Data Sources 
This chapter combines ethnographic evidence, censuses and national surveys. All countries 
with available data were included122. Ethnographic evidence on marital systems, female 
                                                 
120 In chapter 5 we will have a closer look at the long term relationship between economic development and 
female labour. For the moment, we will analyse them independently, though we acknowledge that at low 
levels of economic development it is likely that female labour is high, but this is not always the case (Boserup, 
1970). 
121 Our country values in chapter 2 were derived for the period 1950-2000. For this chapter, we take 1980 as a 
base year for the cross-section.   
122 The term “country” refers also to territories or areas, irrespective of their legal status or delimitation of 
their frontiers or boundaries. There are 192 independent countries recognised by the United Nations and 46 
dependent territories, see table 2.1 and A.2.1 for a detailed classification of societies and countries by 
geographical regions.  
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contribution to subsistence activities, settlement patterns and size of the community come 
from the Ethnographic Atlas introduced and described in chapter 2.  
 
Country data on marital systems are taken from our estimates of polygynous and 
monogamous countries derived in chapter 2. Table A.2.4 in appendix 2 presents data for 
184 countries and territories. There are 39 polygynous (Po), 121 monogamous (Mo) and 39 
occasional polygynous (OP). Direct measures on the incidence of polygyny were collected 
from three main sources. First, Chamie (1986) provides data on Arab countries. Data on 
sub-Saharan Africa, Northern Africa and parts of Asia ranging from 1947-1982 were 
published by Patterns of First Marriage (United Nations, 1990)123. Finally, recent estimates 
on the percentage of married men and women in polygynous unions were obtained from 
the Demographic and Health Surveys (1985-2005)124.  
 
Data on female participation are collected from the “Population, Policies, Resources, 
Environment and Development Databank” or PRED Bank, Version 3.0125. Population data 
come from, estimates and projections of populations by sex and five-year age groups, 
1950-2050, The 1998 Revision, Demographic Yearbook and World Population Prospects, 
The 1998 Revision, Volume I: Comprehensive Tables126. The Human Development Indices 
                                                 
123 Patterns of First Marriage: Timing and Prevalence (United Nations, 1990) was prepared by the Population 
Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations.  
124 Data collected Demographic and Health Surveys were extracted from the STATcompiler 
(http://www.statcompiler.com/) Data presented in this chapter are usually the average of all the available 
surveys for each country for the period 1985-2005. Otherwise, it will be indicated appropriately.  
125 The PRED Bank, Version 3.0 was published by the Population Division of the Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat.  
126 These data were extracted from the Women's Indicators and Statistics Database Version 4 (CD-ROM) 
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come from the Human Development Reports 2007/2008, United Nations (2007)127. 
Urbanisation rates are taken from PRED Bank, Version 3.0. Moreover, data on religion are 
extracted from two main sources, Barro and McLeary (2005) and Laporta et al. (1999).  
 
3.4.2 Variable Definitions 
3.4.2.1 Ethnographic Atlas 
Marital systems can be illustrated in several forms. First, the Ethnographic Atlas defines 
marital systems under variable 9: Marital Composition: Monogamy and Polygamy. Based 
on this codification, we distinguished three different types of marital unions: monogamous 
(codes 1 and 2), polygynous (codes 3 to 6) and polyandrous (code 7). As stated in chapter 
2, we concentrate on polygynous and monogamous unions, leaving aside polyandry.  
 
Additionally, residential arrangements and sororate were fully described for polygynous 
unions. In this way, we classified marital systems into three main groups: (i) Monogamy, (ii) 
Polygyny 1, where co-wives live under the same dwelling, and (iii) Polygyny 2, where co-wives 
live in separate dwellings. Table 2.3 introduced this classification in chapter 2. For the main 
purpose of this chapter, we assume that Monogamy 1, henceforth perfect monogamy, and 
Monogamy 2, henceforth monogamy with occasional polygyny, are just one marital system, 
Monogamy, and deal with occasional polygyny as the exception, not the rule.   
 
To compute female contribution to subsistence activities from the Ethnographic Atlas, we 
use the following methodology. First, values on economic dependence by activity were 
                                                 
127 These values were revised and updated with the latest revision from the Human Development Report. We 
managed to add three countries to the original data set of 116 countries or territories. These were Brunei 
Darussalam, Liberia and Libya.  
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taken from variables 1-5. There are five main subsistence activities described for each 
society: gathering, hunting, fishing, animal husbandry and agriculture. These values range 
from 0 to 9. Table A.3.4 in appendix 3 shows the codification. Variables 50-54 describe 
gender specific differences or sex differences in participation for each activity. To obtain a 
measure of female contribution, we first assign arbitrarily percentages to the codified values 
of variables 50-54. Table A.3.5 in appendix 3 illustrates the procedure128. For example, code 
1 implies that “Males only, or almost alone” participate in a particular activity, i.e. hunting. 
Therefore, female participation in hunting activities will be 0 percent. Once we have 
converted codes into percentages, we computed a weighted average with the values of 
economic dependence by activity. We computed female participation rates for 379 
societies. The variable will be denoted as Female Contribution, and is a percentage.   
 
Furthermore, settlement patterns, Settlement, are described under variable 30: Settlement 
Patterns. Table A.3.6 in appendix 3 illustrates the codification. We have grouped categories 
using a new code. In this way, there are three categories, (i) nomadic (code 1), (ii) semi-
sedentary (codes 2-4) and (iii) sedentary (codes 5-8). Finally, we have also taken values 
regarding the size of the community for each society, Size of community, given under variable 
33: Mean size of local communities. These values range from 1 to 8. Table A.3.7 in 
appendix 3 provides the Ethnographic Atlas codification.  
 
                                                 
128 All societies present values for economic dependence by activity, variables 1-5. Societies who did not 
present values for gender differences in participation for all activities were removed. Moreover, code 7: 
“Irrelevance of gender, especially industrialized production” and code 8: “Activity present: Sex participation 
unspecified” were also removed. We found zero societies under code 7 and only 7 under code 8. Finally code 
9: Absent or unimportant activity, are associated with zero dependence.  
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3.4.2.2 Censuses and National Surveys 
To measure the incidence of polygyny, we use a binary variable, polygyny, based on the 
country estimates derived in table A.2.4 in appendix 2. This variable takes the value of 1 if 
the country was described as polygynous (Po) and 0 otherwise. Therefore non-polygynous 
countries include monogamous (Mo) and occasional polygynous (OP). To control for 
cultural continuity, we also include the dummy variable Old World (as opposed to New 
World) which takes the value of 1 for those countries or geographical regions where more 
than 50 percent of the population have an indigenous language as mother tongue, and 0 
otherwise129. 
 
Female participation in the labour market is measured with the ratio of women 
economically active per 100 men (WEA)130. The projected economic activity rate for male 
and female for the year 1980 covered ages of 15 years and over. Activity rate is the 
proportion of the population who are economically active, expressed as a percentage. The 
estimates take into account information on the economically active population obtained 
mainly from national censuses and labour force sample surveys131. These data have been 
                                                 
129 To construct the dummy variable Old World, we used data from Alesina et al (2003) and Lewis (2009). 
First, we classified languages by family. Then, we verified which languages and families were indigenous. We 
define a language or a family as indigenous if it was widely spoken in the continent where the country 
belongs. Finally, the percentage of the population speaking an indigenous or non-indigenous language was 
computed. See table A.2.4 in appendix 2.  
130 WEA captures gender differences in participation. Conventionally, male participation rates have been 
relatively high and constant across countries. On the other hand, female participation rates have shown 
striking differences. In this study, we use gender differences to better capture the role played by women in the 
labour market. Figure A.3.2 in appendix 3 illustrates a scattered graph and a linear prediction of our main 
variable of interest WEA against the percentage of women economically active (economic activity rate) both 
for 1980. [R2 = 0.9511].  
131 The International Labour Office defines persons as economically active, if they are working for pay or 
profit at any time during a specified reference period or are seeking such work.  This definition was 
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adjusted by the International Labour Office so as to arrive at a consistent set of data. WEA 
can be understood as the number of economically active women for every 100 
economically active men.  
 
Economic development is captured with the Human Development Indices (HDI). The 
Human Development Indices are based on three dimensions of human and economic 
development: (i) Longevity (Life expectancy), (ii) Knowledge (Literacy and Enrolment 
ratios) and (iii) Standards of Living (GDP per capita)132. The HDI were first derived in 
1975. Subsequent revisions for some or all of the components of the HDI, changes in 
methodology, or variations in the country coverage suggest that HDI are not directly 
comparable over time. Nonetheless, HDI remain to be widely used as cross-country 
indicator of the level of human development. We prefer HDI over GDP per capita, because 
the latter only reflects average national income. GDP per capita does not capture how 
income is distributed, and our theory requires a reliable measure of human and economic 
development. Moreover, other control variables included in the cross section are URBAN 
or the rate of urban population (percentage), Sex ratio 15--44 (number of women per 100 
men aged 15-44 years old) and Muslim80 or the percentage of Muslim population within a 
country.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
broadened in 1982 to include, if appropriate, persons available for work but not necessarily actively seeking 
work 
132 Data on life expectancy come from World Population Prospects 1950-2050: The 2006 Revision, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, New York, United Nations; Data on adult 
literacy rates from UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) Institute for 
Statistics. 2003. Data on combined gross enrolment ratios from UNESCO (United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization) Institute for Statistics. 1999. Statistical yearbook. Data on GDP per 
capita (2000 PPP US$) and GDP per capita (PPP US$) come from World Bank, World Development 
Indicators 2007. 
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3.4.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 3.2 reports summary statistics for our main variables by marital systems using 
ethnographic evidence for 379 societies. We observe that societies under Polygyny 2, that is 
to say co-wives live in separate dwellings, are characterized by higher levels of female 
contribution to subsistence (nearly 45 per cent). This marital system typically refers to the 
African polygyny, as we noticed in chapter 2, table 2.5.  
 
Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics. Female Contribution by Marital System 
Variables Monogamy Polygyny 1  Polygyny 2 
  Obs. Mean St. Dev Obs. Mean St. Dev Obs. Mean St. Dev
Female Contribution (%) 242 34.58 17.4 66 37.20 15.1 71 44.75 11.9 
                
Size of community (1-8) 242 3.51 2.3 66 2.38 1.3 71 3.93 1.7 
                
Settlement [dummy] 242 0.59 0.4 66 0.33 0.48 71 0.87 0.3 
Source: Ethnographic Atlas.  
Notes: Observations refer to societies as described in the Ethnographic Atlas. Out of 1,240 societies there 
were 379 with available data. Settlement patterns are captured with the dummy variable sedentary, which takes 
the value of 1 if societies are sedentary, and 0 if societies are nomadic or semi-sedentary.  
 
Additionally, Polygyny 1 which involves co-wives sharing habitation, was usually found in 
New World regions, mainly among hunter-gatherers. This is reflected in table 3.2.  Small 
communities are mostly associated with these societies. This pattern is also supported by 
the fact that only 33 percent of Polygyny 1 societies were sedentary. Conversely, the 
sedentary pattern of settlement among Polygyny 2 societies appears in 87 percent of the 
cases. This is a very important fact. Polygyny 2 is rarely found among nomads or semi-
sedentary societies, who are more inclined towards the other two marital systems. Certainly, 
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separate habitation for co-wives can be very costly for nomads, especially if female 
contribution to subsistence plays a lesser role. 
 
In this way, societies described as Monogamy present the lowest percentage of female 
contribution to subsistence (below 35 percent). These societies also present a wider 
variation regarding Size of community. Table A.3.8 in appendix 3 illustrates the number of 
societies by marital system and Size of community. While Monogamy appears to be within small 
and large communities, Polygyny 2 and mainly Polygyny 1 societies are relatively small 
communities133. This implies that either type of polygyny has mostly occurred within small 
communities. Furthermore, we could not say that as communities grew in size Monogamy 
arose, since monogamous unions are widely observed in small or large communities alike. 
The ethnographic evidence supports our view that as communities grew, wealth inequality 
probably increased, and polygynous unions became less prevalent. In this regard, either 
type of polygyny requires unique socio-economic conditions134.     
 
Table 3.3 shows descriptive statistics for the main variables by countries (polygyny=1 or 
polygyny=0). These data come mainly from censuses and national surveys. The table offers 
data for a total of 112 countries and territories. Additionally, we provide summary statistics 
for three sub-samples that will be used later on. First, countries classified as New World 
were removed from the sample, leaving Old World countries alone. Second, countries 
classified as high developed (with a HDI of 0.800 or above in 1980) were also removed. 
                                                 
133 Only one Polygyny 1 society out of 66, the Egba in Nigeria, was described to be larger than 1,000.  
Moreover, 11 Polygyny 2 societies out of 77 were described larger than 1,000, among them some well known 
ones in sub-Saharan Africa, i.e. Bambara (Mali), Fon (Benin), Mossi (Burkina Faso). 
134 Figure A.3.3 in appendix 3 provides further evidence. After removing nomadic and semi-sedentary 
societies we compare the levels of female contribution to Agriculture and total subsistence by marital system. 
Overall, female contribution to Agriculture is substantially higher in Polygyny 2 societies. This is partly due to 
the fact that pastoralist societies are usually monogamous.  
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Finally, we present summary statistics only for Old World countries classified as medium and 
low developed135. The reason being is that all of our polygynous countries are Old World and 
medium or low developed countries. 
 
Out of 112 countries included in the main sample, we have 27 classified as polygynous 
(Po), while the remaining 85 will fit in the category of non polygynous. Noticeably, 
substantial differences are observed between them. First, as observed previously with 
ethnographic evidence in table 3.2, polygynous countries possess higher rates of female 
participation in market activities for the whole sample and sub-samples (71 women are 
economically active for every 100 men in polygynous countries vis-à-vis 50 in 
monogamous ones). In this way, gender differences in labour participation are much 
smaller in polygynous countries. This gap is larger when we compare polygynous countries 
with other medium or low developed ones. 
 
Other striking differences lie with the rate of urbanization (while only 25.4 percent of 
people live in urban areas in polygynous countries, this percentage more than doubles in 
the case of monogamous countries, up to a 55.6 percent). These differences are maintained 
in Old World countries, and became smaller though relevant in the other sub-samples. 
Regarding human development, the average HDI for polygynous countries is 0.422, 
whereas for monogamous countries is 0.708. These vast differences are reduced once we 
remove countries in the subsequent sub-samples. There are no significant differences in 
terms of the sex ratio; on average there is a perfectly balanced sex ratio aged 15-44 years 
old in polygynous countries, while it ranges from 96 to 98 women for every 100 men in the 
                                                 
135 All countries with available Human Development Indices are classified into three clusters by achievement 
in human development: high human development (with an HDI of 0.800 or above), medium human 
development (HDI of 0.500–0.799) and low human development (HDI of less than 0.500), Human 
Development Report (United Nations, 2007). 
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monogamous ones. Finally, data on the percentage of Muslims provides an interesting fact. 
Polygynous countries have on average larger Muslim populations, except when we remove 
New World and high developed countries.  
 
Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics. WEA by Marital System, 1980  
 Total sample 
 polygyny=1 polygyny=0 
 Mean St. Dev N Mean St. Dev N 
WEA 71 19 27 50 20 85 
Sex ratio 15-44 100 15 27 98 7 85 
URBAN 25.4 13.6 27 55.6 23.4 85 
Muslim80 34.2 36.0 27 18.1 34.4 85 
HDI 0.422 0.112 27 0.708 0.148 85 
 Excluding New World  countries 
 polygyny=1 polygyny=0 
 Mean St. Dev N Mean St. Dev N 
WEA 71 19 27 54 21 57 
Sex ratio 15-44 100 15 27 96 8 57 
URBAN 25.4 13.6 27 54.4 25.4 57 
Muslim80 34.2 36.0 27 26.3 39.6 57 
HDI 0.422 0.112 27 0.707 0.165 57 
 Excluding high developed countries (HDI > 0.800) 
 polygyny=1 polygyny=0 
 Mean St. Dev N Mean St. Dev N 
WEA 71 19 27 46 21 55 
Sex ratio 15-44 100 15 27 98 8 55 
URBAN 25.4 13.6 27 46.1 21.5 55 
Muslim80 34.2 36.0 27 26.1 39.8 55 
HDI 0.422 0.112 27 0.628 0.122 55 
 Excluding New World  and high developed countries (HDI > 0.800) 
 polygyny=1 polygyny=0 
 Mean St. Dev N Mean St. Dev N 
WEA 71 19 27 51 24 33 
Sex ratio 15-44 100 15 27 97 10 33 
URBAN 25.4 13.6 27 41.9 23.6 33 
Muslim80 34.2 36.0 27 42.4 44.4 33 
HDI 0.422 0.112 27 0.598 0.134 33 
Sources: Authors’; Laporta et al. (1999); PRED Bank, Version 3.0; United Nations (2000a); Human 
Development Reports 2007/2008 (United Nations, 2007) 
Notes: Data on women economically active for Micronesia and Polynesia regions are not available, and 
hence these regions were removed from the sample. Human Development Indices for SFR Yugoslavia and 
the USSR republics were not reported, hence they were excluded from the sample. Base year is 1980.  
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Finally, we present the percentage of ever married men and women aged 45-49 in table 3.4. 
We stated previously that in traditional societies marriage was almost universal, and celibacy 
was rare and mostly unwanted. Table 3.4 shows that more than 96 and 98 percent of men 
and women, aged 45-49 years old, married at least once in 1980. Similarly, more than 90 
percent of men and women, aged 45-49 years old, married in monogamous countries. Even 
if polygyny leaves poor or younger men with dim marriage prospects, because they have to 
compete with wealthy and older men for wives, recent statistics show that most men 
tended to get married at least once.    
 
Table 3.4 Percentage Ever Married aged 45-49 years old by Marital System, 1980 
 polygyny=1 polygyny=0 
Statistics Men Women Men Women 
Mean 96.25 98.07 90.29 90.68 
Std. Dev. 2.00 1.63 9.10 9.51 
N 23 23 76 76 
Sources: United Nations (1990) Demographic Yearbook (United Nations, 1984) 
 
 
 
 
3.5 Empirical Model 
3.5.1 Female Contribution and Polygyny 
To analyse the factors that determine whether polygyny or monogamy are predominant 
within a society, we estimate both a Probit and a Multinomial Probit (MNP) model. We 
begin with the standard bivariate Probit model. In this case, we estimate the probability 
that in society i, Polygyny 2 or African polygyny is the prevalent marital system. Under these 
circumstances, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a society is described as 
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Polygyny 2 and 0 if Monogamy prevailed. This model leaves Polygyny 1 aside and tests our two 
main reference groups136.  
 
Having explored Monogamy and Polygyny 2, we enrich our analysis by including the third 
marital system, Polygyny 1. Therefore, we attempt to determine whether society i follows a 
specific marital system from all the potential alternatives. Because these choices belong to 
unordered categories, we use a Multinomial Probit (MNP) model as an alternative to the 
frequently used Multinomial Logit (MNL). The main advantage of the MNP model is that 
allows for correlations between the errors and does not impose the independence of 
irrelevance alternatives as the MNL does. The idea is that when comparing two 
alternatives, the ordinal ranking of these alternatives should not be affected by the addition 
or subtraction of other alternatives from the choice set.  
 
The dependent variable Marital System in the MNP has three categories, one for each 
marital arrangement option (i.e. Monogamy, Polygyny 1 and Polygyny 2). For this purpose, we 
define the probability that the ith society will choose the jth marital system as,  
 
 Pr( ), , 1, 2,3.ij ij ikP U U for k j j= > ≠ =    (3.6) 
 
with Uij being the maximum utility attainable for society i  if they choose the jth marital 
system, and 
'
ij j ij ijU X= β + ε     (3.7) 
                                                 
136 Chapter 2 offers an explanation regarding Polygyny 1. On the whole, Polygyny 1 has been rarely found in the 
Old World. Co-wives sharing habitation have been strongly associated with this specific type of marital system 
and with nomadic societies of the New World (White and Burton, 1988).  
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where βj  is a vector of coefficients of each of the explanatory variables. In particular, 
vector Xij stands for variables which according to previous literature affect the choice by a 
society of following predominantly a specific marital system. In this case, our variable of 
interest is female contribution to subsistence, Female Contribution, which we assume is 
required to sustain African polygyny. We also control for the size of the community, Size of 
community, and the settlement pattern. For that purpose, we create a dummy variable, 
Sedentary, that takes the value of 1 if the society is described as sedentary, 0 otherwise. We 
expect African polygyny to be positively associated with female contribution to subsistence 
and with a sedentary settlement pattern, and negatively associated with the size of the 
community.   
 
Furthermore, the MNP assumes that the stochastic terms ε’s have a multivariate normal 
distribution. As a result, the probabilities can be expressed as, 
 
 
**
11
* * * *
1 1 1 1( , , ) , ,
jXX
ij i ij i ijP f
−ββ
− −
−∞ −∞
= ε ε ∂ε ∂ε∫ ∫? ? ?  (3.8) 
 
Where f(.) is the probability density function of the multivariate normal distribution.  
 
 
3.5.2 WEA and Polygyny 
This section introduces a Probit model to examine the relationship between female labour, 
captured with the ratio of women economically active per 100 men (WEA), and the 
prevalence of polygynous unions. In this case, we replace societies for countries, base year 
1980. The Probit model, which estimates the probability that a country i is polygynous, is 
given by: 
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 * '0 1i i i iy WEA Z= β +β + γ + ε   (3.9) 
Where 
 
 *
0i
1 if country i is polygynous (Po)
y
if country i is not (Mo;OP)
⎧= ⎨⎩  (3.10) 
 
 
WEAi captures gender differences in labour participation. The vector Zi represents a vector 
of controls, among them, the Sex ratio 15-44 (number of women for every 100 men aged 
15-44 years), the percentage of urban population, URBAN; and the percentage of Muslims 
in the population, Muslim80; and itε  is the heteroskedasticity-consistent error term.  
 
As a robustness analysis in the Probit regression results, we further analyze the role of 
WEA on marital choices, by focusing on three subsamples. First, we estimate the model 
for the subsample of countries classified as Old World. The arrival of Europeans produced a 
substantial social, cultural, institutional and economic change in the New World. For that 
reason, we aim at preserving cultural continuity with the variable oldworld, which takes the 
value of 1 if a country is Old World, 0 otherwise137. Second, we place special emphasis on 
the level of economic development. Our theoretical approach hypothesises that African 
polygyny would be sustainable at low levels of economic development. Thus, we created 
three interaction variables: WEA (low), WEA (medium-high) and WEA (medium). 
Countries were classified by the level of economic development following their Human 
Development Indices in 1980. Then, we created dummy variables for countries classified as 
low, medium and high developed and these dummies were interacted with WEA.  The 
interaction variables attempt to capture the moderator effect that development has on the 
                                                 
137 Table A.2.4 in appendix 2 presents a list of countries and territories classified as Old World.  
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relationship between WEA and polygyny. Finally, we estimate the model for the subsample 
created by the interaction of countries classified as Old World and low, medium-high 
developed.  
 
3.6 Results 
3.6.1 Ethnographic Evidence  
This section discusses our empirical results. In Table 3.5 we present the Probit and 
Multinomial Probit results with data from the Ethnographical Atlas. The aim is to analyse 
whether female contribution is a good predictor of polygyny. In column (1) the marginal 
effects of the bivariate Probit model are displayed. The results indicate that female 
contribution to subsistence activities is positively and significantly associated to African 
polygyny, and that a sedentary pattern of settlement has a substantial effect too. On 
average, sedentary societies are 21 percent more likely to practice African polygyny. 
Moreover, we do not observe that Size of community has a significant effect.  
 
In columns (2)-(4) of table 3.5 we report the marginal effects of changes in explanatory 
variables on probabilities of choosing Monogamy, Polygyny 1 or African polygyny, obtained 
from the MNP model. The marginal effects are calculated using average values of all 
independent variables. As the table reveals, a higher contribution of women to subsistence 
activities increases the probability of African polygyny while decreases the probability of 
Monogamy and has no significant impact on the probability of Polygyny 1. Additionally, 
Sedentary is, as otherwise expected, a very strong predictor of African polygyny. 
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Table 3.5. Female Contribution and Marital Systems 
 Probit Multinomial Probit 
 Polygyny 2=1 
Monogamy=0 
Monogamy Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 
or African 
 (1) a/ (2) (3) (4) 
Female Contribution 0.007*** -0.005*** -0.000 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Size of community -0.003 0.024* -0.028** 0.005 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.009) 
     
Sedentary (d) 0.218*** -0.076 -0.116** 0.194*** 
 (0.046) (0.058) (0.049) (0.039) 
Observations 313 379 
Chi-square 44.8 60.8 
Log-Likelihood -145.1 -305.6 
Notes:  Marginal effects are shown in table. Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** 
p<.01); (d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
a/ Polygyny 1 societies were removed from the sample, a total of 66 societies.  
 
Regarding the size effects, an increase in Size of community by one unit increases the 
probability of Monogamy by 2.4 percentage points, and correspondingly reduces the 
probability of Polygyny 1 by 2.8 percentage points. As societies grow up in size, Polygyny 1, 
which involves many men and women married polygynously and co-wives sharing 
habitation, would vanish. Larger communities are strongly associated with sedentary 
patterns of settlement. Polygyny 1 is closely related to nomads and semi-sedentary peoples. 
Therefore, once hunter-gatherers abandon their nomadic lifestyle with a nearly perfect 
specialisation within the household -men hunt and fish, whereas women gather food-, for a 
sedentary life would leave us with only two major marital systems to discuss, Monogamy and 
African polygyny138. 
                                                 
138 Removing nomadic and semi-sedentary societies would leave us with two main marital systems. Figure 
A.3.3 in appendix 3 illustrated the differences in female contribution. Moreover, we also run a Probit model 
similar to the one in column (1) of table 3.2 only for sedentary societies. The results remain consistent and 
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The transition from a nomadic lifestyle to a sedentary one raises a fundamental question to 
understand marital systems and economic development139. If hunting-gathering is the first 
stage of economic development and human beings have all gone through that stage across 
regions at a point in time, why polygynous unions have been predominantly observed in 
sub-Saharan Africa? That question would leave us with two possible answers. First, African 
polygyny occurred in Eurasia, but was not observed and reported140. This could also imply 
that the levels of economic development required to maintain the African polygyny 
equilibrium have not been observed in Eurasia for millennia. Second, the transition from 
hunting-gathering to a sedentary lifestyle took different routes in sub-Saharan Africa and 
Eurasia. Again, we do not know much about marital systems and economic conditions in 
sub-Saharan Africa for the pre-slave trade period141. Consequently, we also do not know 
when the transition to a sedentary lifestyle occurred. Regardless, and under the assumption 
of rational economic agents, this would imply different economic conditions and 
constraints.  
 
Diamond (1997) proposed three possible factors that could have encouraged hunter-
gatherers to become sedentary: (i) The decline in the availability of wild foods, (ii) Climate 
change that made certain crops (wheat, barley) available in more areas, (iii) Absence of 
                                                                                                                                               
robust, and the marginal effect of Female Contribution is higher 0.008, and the coefficient statistically 
significant at 1 percent.  
139 Malthus (1798) described three main stages of economic development: (i) Hunting and Gathering, (ii) 
Pastoralism or Animal husbandry and (iii) Agriculture, farmers, tradesmen and craftsmen.  
140 The Ethnographic Atlas offers evidence for Ancient Civilisations in Eurasia dating back to BC 2000, see 
table A.3.9 in appendix 3. Unfortunately, ethnographic and archaeological evidence mainly refer to large 
civilisations, “……..histories of mankind that we possess are histories only of the higher classes…” (Malthus, 1798)   
141 In the New World, mainly America, Australia and New Zealand, more than 65 percent of societies found 
were described as nomadic or semi-sedentary, whereas 85 percent of societies found in the Old World were 
described as sedentary including sub-Saharan Africa, Eurasia, Melanesia and Polynesia.  This implies that few 
societies in the New World had made the transition to a sedentary life before the arrival of the Europeans. The 
main exceptions were, among others, the Inca and Aztec peoples.  
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geographic boundaries that restricted the transmission of knowledge and technologies, e.g. 
the Sahara desert, or the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Certainly, climatic and geographic 
conditions are like chalk and cheese in sub-Saharan Africa and Eurasia. Perhaps, hunter-
gatherers were already more polygynous in sub-Saharan Africa than in Eurasia. If gathering 
prevails as economic activity over hunting or fishing, the contribution of women, as wives, 
to the household may be higher. This is because gathering, in contrast to hunting or 
fishing, does not require as much physical strength where men usually have a competitive 
advantage. Under these circumstances if women contribute more to increase the wealth of 
the household, we will expect a higher incidence of polygynous unions. Nonetheless, 
whether hunter-gatherers became straightaway monogamous or remained highly 
polygynous in Eurasia, remains a mystery that deserves further analysis and research.   
 
3.6.2 Censuses and National Surveys 
In Table 3.6 we present the result from estimating the Probit model (3.13) using different 
specifications. The objective is to assess the relationship between WEA and polygyny at a 
country level. All columns display the marginal effects calculated using mean values of all 
independent variables. In column (1) we present the basic model in which only WEA 
enters in the specification explaining the probability of a society having a high incidence of 
polygynous unions. An increase in the number of women economically active for every 100 
men (WEA) increases the probability of being polygynous in 0.9 percent. Columns (2) to 
(4) add further controls to test for the robustness of this relationship. In any case the sign 
and the significance of WEA remain stable.  
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Table 3.6 WEA and Polygyny  
Base year=1980 Probit Probit Probit Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
WEA 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Sex ratio 15-44  -0.005 -0.009** -0.006* 
  (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
     
URBAN   -0.008*** -0.007*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Muslim80    0.002** 
    (0.001) 
Observations 112 112 112 112 
pseudo-R2 0.168 0.179 0.388 0.415 
Chi-square 13.6 21.8 37.5 37.3 
Log-Likelihood -51.5 -50.8 -37.9 -36.2 
Notes:  Dependent variable is polygyny, taking the value of 1 if Polygyny (Po), 0 otherwise. Table A.2.4 in 
appendix 2 provides a list of countries by predominant marital system.    
Marginal effects are shown in table.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01) 
 
 
Regarding the results in columns (3) and (4), while WEA has a positive effect on the 
probability of a country being polygynous, the sex ratio and the rate of urbanisation have a 
negative and significant impact. Urbanisation rates have been conventionally associated 
with a decline in the incidence of polygyny, Lesthaeghe et al. (1989)142. Urban areas could 
raise the standard of living of households, because dense populations could better afford 
investments in water access, electricity and other public goods. Moreover, urban areas may 
offer distinct economic and employment opportunities for men and women. Boserup 
(1970) argued that economic opportunities for women were restricted or illicit in urban 
areas. Whether urban life secluded wives to the household could be a main factor in the 
decline of polygyny across regions.  
 
                                                 
142 In table A.3.3 in appendix 3 we present a selection of countries where the incidence of polygyny has been 
measured. On the whole, rural polygyny is more prevalent than urban polygyny, except in Eritrea, Mauritania, 
Nepal and Pakistan, where the incidence of polygynous unions is very small.   
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A major observation from table 3.6 is that by adding control variables the WEA coefficient 
is affected. This suggests that we may have an endogeneity problem with our main 
independent variable. Causality between WEA and polygyny might be an issue of concern. 
An instrumental variable approach may be used to tackle endogeneity. However, when 
endogeneity is a problem to find appropriate instruments is a challenge. First, we use the 
potential endogenous variable WEA in 1950 (lagged 30 years) as an instrument for WEA. 
The results go in line with table 3.6 and WEA remains statistically significant and 
positive143.  
 
Furthermore, polygyny would be expected when number of women exceeds the number of 
men (Becker, 1973). Results in columns (3) and (4) do not support this view for a cross 
section of countries in 1980. In this regard, we recall that polygyny may arise even if sex 
ratios are perfectly balanced. Men postpone their first marriage and women marry young, 
hence the spousal age gap conventionally associated with polygynous countries that 
guarantees the availability of wives. Statistically this result would not be robust once we 
control for New World countries. Finally, the percentage of Muslims within a society have a 
higher probability of being polygynous vis-à-vis other religious beliefs. Nonetheless, we will 
show that once controlling for the level of economic development the presence or absence 
of Muslims become statistically insignificant.  
 
Column (4) in table 3.6 provides with our most preferred specification. Nonetheless, we 
have just empirically estimated the effect of WEA on polygyny for all available countries. 
                                                 
143 We use an ivprobit Two-Stage (Instrumental Variable Probit) where WEA1980 is instrumented with 
WEA1950. The Wald test of exogeneity: [0.0793]. We also instrument WEA1980 with GDP per capita. 
Although signs remain unchanged, WEA1980 became statistically insignificant. The Wald test of exogeneity: 
[0.0546]. This latter result can be partly explained by some unobserved effects caused by economic 
development.  
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To capture the role that economic development may play on the relationship between 
WEA and polygyny, we have created three interacted variables: WEA (low), WEA 
(medium-high) and WEA (medium). Countries were classified by the level of economic 
development following their Human Development Indices in 1980. Then, we created 
dummy variables for countries classified as low, medium and high human development. 
Finally, these dummy variables are interacted with WEA.  
 
Table 3.7 illustrates the main results. Column (1) presents the baseline results obtained 
previously, which we will use as benchmark. In columns (2) and (5), we provide the results 
obtained by analyzing the role that human and economic development plays as a 
moderator of the relationship between WEA and polygyny. The estimated coefficient on the 
interaction of the low developed countries with WEA is positive and larger than the 
estimated coefficient for medium-high and medium developed countries. As we theorise 
before, female contributions to the household would greatly determined the demand for 
wives, especially at low levels of economic development. This is particularly acute when we 
remove high developed and New World countries or territories from our sample. Additionally, 
the difference between the two coefficients is statistically significant at 1%, as shown by 
the t-test reported in table 3.7144.  
 
                                                 
144 To what degree economic development have an impact on marital systems can be addressed by examining 
the relationship between GDP per capita and polygyny. Table A.3.10 in appendix 3 illustrates a model where 
GDP per capita is the independent variable. Results in columns (2) and (4) indicate a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between GDP per capita and the probability of being polygynous (Po). Additionally, 
figure A.3.4 in appendix 3 illustrates the relationship between the predicted values obtained from our baseline 
model and economic development which is captured by GDP per capita, 1980. From figure A.3.4 we observe 
the negative relationship between polygyny and economic development. We have discussed and observed 
that African polygyny emerges at low levels of economic development. Nonetheless, this is a necessary yet not 
a sufficient condition for African polygyny. Income distribution, institutions will also have an impact on 
marital systems.  
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Table 3.7 Economic Development, WEA and Polygyny 
Base year=1980 Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit 
 All All Old World 1/ All 2/ Old World 1/2/ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
WEA 0.006***     
 (0.002)     
      
WEA  0.007*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 
(low)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
      
WEA  0.003 0.003   
(medium-high)  (0.002) (0.004)   
      
WEA    0.006* 0.004 
(medium)    (0.003) (0.005) 
      
Sex ratio 15-44 -0.006* -0.007* -0.009 -0.010* -0.010 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
      
URBAN -0.007*** -0.005** -0.006** -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
      
Muslim80 0.002** 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 112 112 84 82 60 
pseudo-R2 0.415 0.489 0.441 0.416 0.330 
Chi-square 37.3 40.9 32.4 33.4 21.4 
Log-Likelihood -36.2 -31.6 -29.5 -30.3 -27.6 
Ho: WEA (low) = WEA (medium-high) 7.62 [0.00] 8.82 [0.00] - - 
Ho: WEA (low) = WEA (medium) - - 7.31 [0.00] 8.80 [0.00] 
Notes:  Dependent variable is polygyny, taking the value of 1 if Polygyny (Po), 0 otherwise. See table A.2.4 
in appendix 2.   
Marginal effects are shown in table.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01) 
1/ Sample restricted for those countries classified as Old World 
2/ Sample is restricted to medium and low development countries 
 
Once we include the interaction variables, our results appear to be more consistent with 
our theoretical approach. The percentage of Muslims within a population is statistically 
insignificant in all specifications, columns (2)-(5). Sex ratios are only significant when New 
World countries are not excluded from the sample. This can be explained due to the fact 
that all New World countries are monogamous. When the number of polygynous and 
monogamous countries are more balanced, small sex ratio imbalances have no impact 
predicting polygyny. Urbanisation rates remain negative and statistically significant in 
columns (2) and (3). When high developed countries are removed from the sample in columns 
(4) and (5), urbanisation rates become statistically insignificant.  
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Figure 3.1 Predicted values (polygyny) and WEA by level of economic development.  
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On the whole, at low levels of economic development, an increase in the ratio of women 
economically active for every 100 men increases the probability of having a high incidence 
of polygyny by 1.2 percent for low and medium developed countries. The marginal effect for 
low and medium developed countries in the Old World is 1.3 percent. Figure 3.1 illustrates 
how the level of economic development moderates the effect that female labour would 
have predicting polygyny.  
 
3.6.3 Main Discussion 
Sustainable and prevalent levels of polygyny have been observed and reported in sub-
Saharan Africa for, at least, the last two centuries. Boserup (1970) claimed that African 
polygyny was due to the fact that women contribute greatly to family income. In these 
regions, women have a double role as agricultural workers and housewives. Under 
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traditional land tenure systems, most, if not all households have access to land, and hence 
wealth and consumption would be greatly determined by the size of the household, wives 
and children. 
 
At low levels of economic development, small changes in consumption will generate larger 
changes in the utility derived from consumption. Therefore, a well-established household 
with a husband, wife or wives with their respective children, could be the best marriage 
prospect for young women. On the other hand, households would have a strong incentive 
to take a second wife if and only if they are inexpensive. Bridewealth, as Goody and 
Tambiah (1973:17) pointed out, would be a circulating pool of resources associated with the 
movement of women. Bridewealth would not be the real cost of taking a wife. The 
contribution of wives to the household wealth would above all determine how expensive or 
inexpensive wives are. Thus, the demand for wives would be greatly determined by female 
labour. If women do not have any restrictions and contribute greatly to the wealth of the 
household, men could take a second wife for reproductive, reputational or simply 
economic reasons. The African polygyny equilibrium would be stable under these economic 
circumstances.    
 
Our empirical results support this view. Female labour is, indeed, a very good predictor of 
African polygyny. Murdock (1949), Heath (1958), and Boserup (1970) already viewed high 
female contribution as a predictor of polygyny. Schlegel and Barry III (1986), among 
others, confirm these views with cross-cultural analysis. In this chapter, we supplemented 
the existing literature with a cross-country empirical analysis that, once again, provides 
evidence of the strong relationship between African polygyny and female labour. In this 
regard, if economic development brings into play lower female participation rates -as 
Goldin (1995) hypothesised-, then African polygyny would gradually vanished. The African 
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polygyny equilibrium may not be stable, and the incidence of polygynous unions would 
depend on the degree of wealth inequality. If societies are extremely unequal, we may 
observe Harem polygyny, or monogamy with occasional polygynous unions would prevail.   
 
 
Finally, figures 3.2a and 3.2b show the linear prediction between female labour and the 
incidence of polygynous unions. For that, we use direct measures for all the available 
geographical regions and countries145. In both cases, we observe a positive relationship 
between female labour participation and the incidence of polygynous unions, confirming 
our empirical results.  
 
In figure 3.2.a only Eastern Africa deviates from the main trend. As we stated above, if the 
incidence of polygynous unions have decreased, but female labour remains high, the level 
of economic development would have increased to explain the lower rates of polygyny. In 
this regard, while all Western Africa and Middle Africa countries are classified as low 
developed in 1980, Kenya and Zimbabwe were classified as medium and Zambia and Comoros 
were on the verge of becoming medium developed.  Regarding figure 3.2.b, mostly Muslim 
countries (Chad, Niger and Mali), and Benin and Togo, seem to be deviating to the right of 
the trend. The countries of the Sahel show three of the lowest Human Development 
Indices in 1980. To the left of the trend, we find mainly Eastern African countries as 
before.  
                                                 
145 Figures A.3.5a and A.3.5b in appendix 3 illustrates the predicted values of our main dependent variable, 
polygyny for Old World countries. On the whole, our model predicts relatively well those countries where 
incidence of polygyny is has been considerably high in the last decades.  
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Figure 3.2a WEA and Polygyny by geographical region  
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Figure 3.2b Percentage of Women Employed and Polygyny   
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Sources: PRED Bank, Version 3.0, United Nations (1990), Demographic and Health Surveys (1985-2005) 
Notes: The incidence of polygyny by geographical region was computed using a weighted average 
(weight=population in 1995; Source: PRED Bank, Version 3.0). Data combined measures published in 
Patterns of First Marriage (United Nations, 1990) with recent estimates provided by Demographic and Health 
Surveys (1985-2005). The percentage of married women in polygynous unions refers to married women aged 
15-49 years old. The percentage of women employed was computed by subtracting from one hundred the 
percentage of women aged 25-44 years old who answered “No work in the last twelve months” in the 
Demographic and Health Surveys. 
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Along these lines, female labour and also wealth inequality have been closely associated 
with economic development. Goldin (1995) and Kuznets (1955) respectively pioneered 
these relationships. As we stated previously, the African polygyny equilibrium, where many 
men and women are married polygynously, would not be sustainable as wealth inequality 
grows. Ethnographic evidence for Southern Africa in chapter 2 illustrated that polygyny 
was the predominant marital system in more than 70 percent of societies. However, recent 
data collected on the incidence of polygynous unions made us to classify Botswana and 
Lesotho as occasional polygynous, while South Africa as monogamous. These countries 
have rapidly moved from their traditional African polygyny equilibrium observed in the 
Ethnographic Atlas to a Monogamy one. This change, induced by an increase in economic 
development, has also been accompanied by a swift increase in wealth inequality and a 
decrease in female participation rates146. Few polygynous unions have recently been 
reported, and it is likely that given the new economic circumstances, just a small number of 
wealthy men would be able to take a second wife, as it was described in Eurasia.   
 
Additionally, female participation rates in polygynous countries have not been observed 
anywhere else. Among the most developed countries, female participation rates have 
steadily increased over the last 40 years. Nonetheless, historical data for these countries in 
the nineteenth century showed substantially lower rates147. Whether female labour is related 
                                                 
146 Not one of these countries was classified as low developed in 1980. Additionally, latest available Gini indices 
for Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa were 60.5, 63.2 and 57.8. A value of 0 represents absolute equality, 
and a value of 100 for absolute inequality. Source: World Bank (2007), World Development Indicators 2007 
CD-ROM. Washington, D.C. In Botswana and Lesotho WEA decreased from 92 women economically 
active for every 100 men in 1950 to 77 in 2000, and from 61 to 56 respectively, while in South Africa has 
slightly increased.  
147 Bairoch (1968) presents data of the percentage of women economically active in the nineteenth century for 
a selection of countries, e.g. Belgium in 1856 provides a rate of female participation of 42 percent, while 
France and Great Britain had 30.8 and 30.2 percent in 1866 and 1851 respectively. These rates are distant 
from the ones observed in most polygynous countries for the period 1950-2000.    
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to economic development, as Goldin (1995) proposed, would deserve further analysis148. 
Our theoretical approach stressed that the African polygyny equilibrium would require 
women to contribute largely to the household wealth, if not, the demand for wives would 
decrease because wives would be expensive. Few households would compete with single 
men for wives and the equilibrium would break down. Monogamous unions would become 
more prevalent, and the spousal age gap would be gradually reduced.  
 
Finally, we briefly discussed the Harem polygyny equilibrium. As wealth inequality grows, 
few wealthy men could be encouraged to take more than one wife, concubines or 
mistresses. Under these circumstances, the victims of Harem polygyny would be poor men 
who may struggle to find a spouse if they have to compete with wealthy men in the 
marriage market. Becker (1991) already pointed out that women would not be the ones 
primarily harmed by polygyny. Nonetheless, wealthy men in traditional and non-democratic 
societies usually exercise the political and social power. Whether laws forbidding polygyny 
or enforcing monogamy are motivated by concessions of wealthy men to avoid social 
conflict is the basis of the socially imposed monogamy theory (Alexander, 1987; Alexander et al., 
1979; and Betzig, 1986). Nevertheless, by the time wealth inequality grows and some men 
become wealthy and powerful individuals the incidence of polygynous unions could have 
been swiftly reduced. As Becker (1991) argued, doctrines encouraging monogamy would be 
attractive only when the demand for polygyny is weak.  
 
 
                                                 
148 In this regard, Boserup (1970) claimed that population pressure would eventually lead to agricultural 
intensification, and hence a declining role for women in agriculture.  
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3.7 Concluding Remarks  
 
The main objective of this chapter was to theoretically understand why African polygyny 
has been prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa. To do so, we developed a simple theoretical 
model where wealth inequality and female labour determine the preferred marital system. 
In this way, the African polygyny equilibrium required high rates of female labour, low 
wealth inequality and very low levels of economic development. Under these conditions, 
the equilibrium would be stable. Then, we empirically assess the relationship between 
female contribution to subsistence or female labour and polygyny with ethnographic 
evidence and country data. Our main findings reveal, in both cases, that female labour is a 
strong predictor of African polygyny. This is more acute once we moderate for economic 
development.  
 
Evidence from this chapter supports the view that the high incidence of polygynous unions 
observed in some regions throughout history need unique economic conditions. Only if 
these conditions are met, we would observe those levels of polygyny. Van der Klaauwe 
(1996) showed that marital status cannot be considered exogenous with respect to the 
participation decision. In this chapter, we illustrated that African polygyny cannot be 
considered exogenous with respect to the participation decision and the level of economic 
development. Cultural practices and social norms can be understandably assumed to be 
exogenous in the short term. Nonetheless, there is little reason to assume that marital 
systems have not been shaped by distinct economic environment in the long run.  
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Figure 3.3 Marital Systems and Economic Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, we also question whether the African polygyny equilibrium, sometime and 
somewhere, was predominant in other parts of the World, i.e. Eurasia. Figure 3.3 illustrates 
the possible routes regarding marital systems over time. As societies grew, and hunter-
gatherers replaced their nomadic lifestyles for a more sedentary existence, marital systems 
evolved. Whether hunter-gatherers took one route towards African polygyny or another one 
towards Monogamy would throw light on the subject of marriage and economic 
development. At a first glance, we would say that a shortcut would be unlikely. In this 
regard, Tacitus described the peoples of Germania in the first century AD as “…almost 
unique among barbarians in being content with one wife…”149. If the rest of the “barbarians” in 
Eurasia were also highly polygynous, we would have more evidence to assert that women 
and men are alike across regions, or at least under similar economic circumstances. For 
                                                 
149 Tacitus (Germania: 18). The Agricola and the Germania translated by H. Mattingly (1970). Penguin 
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that, it would be encouraging to find more data and evidence, and we are hopeful that this 
chapter would encourage further research on the subject 
 
Our theory also suggested that Harem polygyny would emerge as wealth inequality 
increased. The degree of inequality would determine the size of the Harem. For that, a 
society would be required to have a system of property rights and inheritance rules that 
allows the transmission of wealth across generations. The stability of Harem polygyny 
would require persistent and sizeable wealth inequalities. In this way, inequality may 
increase socio-political instability (Alesina and Perotti, 1996). As a result, we would expect 
Harem polygyny to swiftly turn into monogamy with occasional polygyny, where only few 
women are married polygynously. Economic development accompanied by lower 
inequality and higher female labour would eventually bring us the Monogamy equilibrium.  
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4. Spousal Age Gap and Female Labour  
 
4.1 Introduction  
The decision to marry, cohabit or remain single has captured the attention of social 
scientists for its potential implications on the rate of population growth, fertility, labour 
supply, consumption or investment (Becker, 1981). This chapter carries on with the 
analysis performed in the previous one, and maintains the focus on the relationship 
between female labour and marriage150. In this case, we explore the association, correlation 
or potential causality between gender differences in labour participation and age differences 
between spouses at first marriage, namely the spousal age gap. To empirically test this 
relationship, we introduce a novel cross-country panel for the period 1950-2000.  
 
While female’ age at first marriage has often been the subject of continuous debate and 
numerous theoretical and empirical analysis, the spousal age gap has not been fully 
exploited yet. This is partly explained because, (i) data on males’ age at first marriage have 
received less attention; (ii) time-variation of marriage patterns are barely captured in the 
short term, hence long term studies are required and; (iii) data on marriage have somewhat 
been poor or insufficient across countries or regions to carry out an appropriate long term 
empirical analysis. In this regard, this chapter offers various extensions to the existing 
empirical literature. First, we compile a panel dataset for all countries where data are 
available and reliable over a long time period, 1950-2000. Second, the dataset will allow us 
to examine the relationship between female labour participation and the spousal age gap in 
                                                 
150 Marriage is defined as a partnership or commitment for the purpose of production and reproduction. As a 
result marriage includes legitimate and de facto unions where data were available, e.g. consensual unions. For 
the purpose of this study the term ‘marriages’ denotes ‘first marriages’ unless otherwise stated.  
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the long run. Third, the panel nature of the dataset will provide us with the opportunity to 
explore other relevant aspects regarding cross-sectional variation of the spousal age gap151.  
 
The spousal age gap has a considerable interest in the literature. Widowhood is closely 
associated with large age differences at marriage (Goldman and Lord, 1983). A widow will 
face a choice between remarriage, returning to her natal family or remain on her own with 
her wealth, the help of her children, the State or some charitable institution. Goody (1976) 
argued that the greater the difference in the marriage age of males and females, the more 
property will fall under the control of the surviving spouse, i.e. the widow. This would be 
particularly important in societies where class and kinship are highly valued and where 
widows may be restricted from remarriage. For example, in traditional China and India 
widows were less likely to remarry in the upper groups (Goody, 1990).  
 
Additionally, a higher proportion of widows could increase the number of dependants. 
This, in fact, may increase the costs of living for either family, own or natal. In some cases, 
widows may depend upon the ability of their children to earn income. If age differences at 
marriage are considerably large, and as a result widowhood is likely to happen, women 
could have further incentives to provide and care for their children as an investment. 
Furthermore, the age difference can also affect the personal relations between the spouses 
and the resulting impact on issues such as marital stability and marital satisfaction (Presser, 
1975). Marital dissatisfaction could increase the likelihood of divorce.  
 
Although the literature on age differences is smaller relative to that on specific male and 
female age at marriage, we think that the former, on its own, is a very relevant subject. 
                                                 
151 There are certainly other general studies exploring regional cross-country variations in age at marriage (see 
Dixon, 1971; Casterline et al., 1986). Goode (1963) provides a general discussion about family patterns and 
social change.  
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Certainly, male or female age at marriage can probably help us more in understanding 
issues related to life cycle decisions, such as fertility. Nonetheless, age differences appear to 
be a reasonable indicator of the economic conditions of men and women or gender 
differences. In this regard, the age difference between spouses differs greatly within and 
between countries, and provides us with the opportunity to exploit cross-sectional 
variation, analyse past and present marriage patterns and study gender aspects of marriage 
and the family.  
 
One of the most debated subjects in the history of marriage and the family has been the 
contrasting marriage patterns observed across countries and throughout history. Whether 
the spousal age gap is due to individual specific preferences or socio-economic factors 
deserves further attention. By exploring the relationship between gender differences in 
labour participation and the spousal age gap we expect to provide additional discussion and 
analysis. If gender differences in the labour market reflect on gender differences in the 
marriage market, then we have further evidence that marriage patterns are, above all, a 
result of the economic environment. Furthermore, by exploring these differences we will 
be less concern about data collection and comparability within and across countries 
respectively152. Figure 4.1 illustrates the spousal age gap for a selection of countries with 
available data for the period of study153. Over time, we observe a decrease in the age gap at 
first marriage for both groups: OECD and non-OECD countries. Whether age at first 
                                                 
152 Country data on marital status are usually collected from national censuses or surveys. The data collection 
varies widely across countries. Some countries statistically consider de facto unions as legitimate ones whereas 
other countries do not. This fact may have potential implications when we compare age at first marriage for 
men or women independently. In this regard, gender differences seem an appropriate way of using marital 
data and make cross-country comparisons.  
153 For robustness, figure 4.1 illustrates data for a balanced panel. For the remainder of the empirical analysis, 
we would like to remind that the panel is unbalanced. All the countries included in figure 4.1 are 
monogamous. 
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marriage has increased more rapidly for women than for men, or age at first marriage for 
men has decreased or remained fairly stable over a long time periods will deserve further 
analysis throughout the chapter154. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Spousal Age Gap, 1950-2000 (Selection of countries) 
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Sources: Patterns of First Marriage (United Nations, 1990), Demographic Yearbooks (United Nations, 1977; 
1979; 1984; 1997), World Marriage Patterns (United Nations, 2000b), World Fertility Report (United Nations, 
2004), Demographic and Health Surveys (1985-2005), PRED Bank, Version 3.0. 
 
The decreasing trend in the age gap will be at the core of this chapter, and we will attempt 
to explain the nature of such phenomena. In this regard, the objectives of the present 
chapter are twofold. First, we introduce a basic empirical model to examine the age gap 
                                                 
154 In appendix 4, figures A.4.1a and A.4.1b show the age gap decomposition by gender for both groups of 
countries. Whereas in OECD countries the patterns observed for men and women follow a similar increasing 
trend, non-OECD countries exhibit an increasing trend for women’s age at first marriage, but a fairly stable 
trend for men.  
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patterns observed across countries for the period of study. Then, we present estimates and 
discuss our main hypothesis: i.e. whether gender differences in labour markets are 
negatively related to gender differences in the age gap. Finally, robustness and sensitivity 
analyses are carried out to check the validity of our findings. One of the challenges in 
estimating our model will be the potential endogeneity between our main variables. The age 
difference between spouses may influence female participation in market activities, while at 
the same time female participation may be a factor which affects the decision of when to 
marry. The two causalities are difficult to disentangle, however we attempt to overcome 
this problem using an instrumental variable approach in our sensitivity analysis.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.2 we review and discuss 
the theoretical literature related to the spousal age gap. This is followed by a description 
and discussion of the data sources, main variables and summary statistics in section 4.3. 
Section 4.4 introduces and discusses the main empirical model. Additionally, based on the 
estimation technique, we discuss the validity of our hypothesis, and main findings in 
section 4.5. Section 4.6 provides some concluding remarks.      
 
 
4.2 Related Literature  
Variations across countries or regions in the spousal age gap have been widely 
acknowledged in the literature. Hajnal (1982) drew a broad historical distinction based in 
part on these variations between the “Northwest European” pattern or simple household 
family system and the “Eastern” pattern or joint household family system associated mainly 
with India and China. Hajnal (1982) observed that men and women married relatively late 
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in some Northwest European countries during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
whereas in India and China men married relatively earlier and women rather earlier than in 
Northwest Europe155. The problem with these two contrasting patterns is that age 
differences between spouses at marriage are not fully described, although we could infer 
from the literature that the “Northwest European” pattern might imply a smaller age gap.  
 
Since then, these two patterns have been refined with the introduction of a third one, 
namely the “Mediterranean” pattern (Parkin, 1992; Bagnall and Frier, 1994). The latter is 
characterised by a considerable spousal age gap, because men tend to marry for the first 
time in their late twenties or even thirties, a decade or so later than women. Roth (1987) 
provides evidence of this pattern for ancient Babylonia and Assyria in the first millennium 
BC. In ancient Rome, Shaw (1987) also observes that Roman women tended to marry on 
average in their late teens, while men used to marry in their mid to late twenties, leading to 
a considerable age gap of ten or more years. A close examination of funerary inscriptions 
also led Saller (1987) to support the hypothesis of the large spousal age gap within the 
Roman Empire. Bagnall and Frier (1994) confirmed this pattern with census returns from 
Roman Egypt. Haines (1996) also observed notable differences between colonial North 
America and the “Northwest European” pattern of late marriage, since women had a 
tendency to marry earlier like in the “Mediterranean” type.  
 
                                                 
155 Hajnal (1982: 452): “Single household system associated…A) Late marriage for both sexes (mean ages at first marriage 
are, say over 26 for men and over 23 for women), B) After marriage a couple are in charge of their household (the husband is 
head of household), C) Before marriage young people often circulate between households as servants.” …“Joint household 
systems…a) Earlier marriage for men and rather early marriage for women (mean ages at first marriage are under about 26 for 
men and under 21 for women), b) A young married couple often start life together either in a household of which an older couple 
is and remains in charge or in a household of which an unmarried older person (such as a widower or a widow) continues to be the 
head. Usually the young wife joins her husband in the household of which he is a member. c) Households with several married 
couples may split to form two or more households, each containing one or more couples”. 
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Goody (1990) provides an excellent review of marital patterns in the major ancient cultures 
of Asia and the Mediterranean, which confirms substantial variation across regions and 
over time. Nevertheless, the patterns of marriage were described according to several other 
parameters such as marital transactions, widow re-marriage, hierarchy and the frequency 
and societal approval of divorce. In this study, we elaborate a classification of marriage 
patterns in relation to the age differences between spouses leaving aside other aspects of 
marriage.   
 
Table 4.1 presents all the possible scenarios. First, we consider the case where men and 
women marry early in their lives, which has been ambiguously described or captured in the 
literature. Hajnal’s (1982) description of the “Eastern” pattern seems inconclusive with 
respect to age differences at marriage156. Nevertheless, and for the remaining of the chapter 
we will denote this first pattern of marriage as “Eastern”. Second, the “Mediterranean” 
pattern that leads to considerable age differences between spouses is introduced. Third, we 
take into account the “Northwest European” pattern of late marriage discussed by Hajnal 
(1982). Finally, we bring in the case where women married younger men. The latter case is 
rarely observed at the macro level; hence our focus in the remaining of the chapter will 
remain on the first three157. 
 
                                                 
156 Hajnal’s (1982) data for traditional China (1929-1931) reveals a singulate mean age at marriage of 21.3 
years for men and 17.5 years for women which implies a difference of 3.8 years. This fact will associate Pattern 
1 with the “Eastern” pattern. However, evidence from other neighbouring countries, e.g. Bangladesh in 1972 
Census provides a singulate mean age at marriage of 24.0 years for men and 16.4 which implies a difference 
of 7.6 years. If 24.0 years is considered late marriage in Bangladesh, we will closely associate this case to the 
“Mediterranean” pattern.  Data on age at marriage for India also reveals a considerable age gap.  
157 At the micro level, we are aware that women marry younger men. However, there is no strong statistical 
evidence at the macro level where women on average marry later than men. We have compared measures of 
the singulate mean age at marriage across countries for the 1990s and there was only exception, San Marino (-
0.1 years) in 1995. Source: World Marriage Patterns (United Nations, 2000b).  
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Table 4.1 Age at First Marriage and the Spousal Age Gap 
 1 or 
“Eastern” 
2 or “Mediterranean” 3 or “Northwest 
European” 
4 
Men Early Late Late Early 
Women Early Early Late Late 
Age Gap  SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE
Source: Author’s.  
Notes: For the purpose of this study, SMALL age differences round 0-3 years, while LARGE will be those 
greater than 3 years.  
 
In the literature “Early” generally refers to marriages below 25 years old, and “Late” to 
those above 25 years old. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that economic and social 
conditions across countries differ widely. Therefore, it is difficult to agree on a reference 
age that determines “Early” or “Late” marriages. For example, countries or regions where 
life expectancy is short would most likely consider 22-23 years as already “Late” marriage. 
For this reason, our main focus will remain with age differences between spouses instead 
of the exact timing of marriage. Based on historical evidence for Northwest European 
countries, we shall define SMALL age differences round 0-3 years while LARGE will be 
those greater than 3 years158.  
 
In table 4.1 we narrow down these patterns to two diverse cases according to the age gap. 
First, the SMALL gap scenario that occurs when, both men and women marry relatively 
early or late in their lives. On the other hand, we observe a second case in which there are 
                                                 
158 Between 1500 and 1800, the two basic characteristics of the “Northwest European” pattern of marriage 
were a high age at marriage (on average 27–29 years old for men, 24–26 years old for women) and a high 
proportion of never-married (roughly 10–25%). This pattern persisted in Western Europe until approximately 
the mid-19th century, when men and women started to marry much younger (Matthjis, 2003). Hajnal (1953) 
reports age differences of less than 4 years for most Northwest European countries. The LARGE gap should 
not be compared to the spousal gap observed in polygynous countries, because we will be referring only to 
monogamous regions.   
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substantial age differences or a LARGE gap which, as we discussed previously, might 
potentially be associated with an increase in widowhood, marital instability, and marital 
dissatisfaction. We will question throughout the chapter whether these two distinct 
scenarios are encouraged by changes in the economic role played by women within a 
society or female labour159.  
 
The transition from SMALL to LARGE or from LARGE to SMALL would have 
required time and significant changes in the modus operandi of men and women within 
their communities. In this line of thinking, Goody (1983) questioned: how was it that after 
c. AD 300 certain general features of European patterns of marriage came to take a 
different shape from those of ancient Rome, Greece, Israel and Egypt, and from those of 
the societies of the Mediterranean shores of the Middle East and North Africa that 
succeeded them? We may also question: how is it that after about 1970, age differences 
came to take a different shape in some countries? Whether age differences have changed 
over time, or cultures and countries shifted away from LARGE gap scenarios will be 
instigated by internal or external forces; among them, we will consider that female labour 
plays a significant role. Nevertheless, we need first to review what are, according to 
previous studies, the main factors driving age differences at marriage.  
 
For this purpose, we review the classical theory of marriage, which states that marriage 
takes place if, and only if, the gains from it outbalance the costs (Becker, 1973; 1974). The 
benefits from marriage will be greater when differences between men and women are more 
acute. For example, low wage women will spend more time in household production than 
high wage men since the opportunity cost of low wage women will be lower. On the other 
                                                 
159 We define female labour in terms of the total contribution of women to their household. This includes 
household work and market work. Household work leads to the production of household goods, while 
market work implies the production of food in subsistence economies or earning an income.  
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hand, uncertainty about the traits of the potential spouse and how the gains from marriage 
are distributed will induce men and women to spend time and other resources searching 
for the most appropriate partner.  
 
As a result, the age at marriage may depend both on the expected gains from the union and 
on the costs that involve finding a suitable spouse. Keeley (1977) follows the classical 
theory of marriage and finds evidence that if wage rates are higher for men than for 
women, the optimal marriage age for men decreases with his wage rate, while the optimal 
marriage age for women increases with her wage rate. Zhang (1995) considers men with 
non-working wives and men with working wives, and also finds a negative relationship 
between the wage rate of a husband and his age at marriage if his wife does not work, while 
the opposite is found if his wife works. Using data from Israel, Danziger and Neuman 
(1999) also find evidence that the age at marriage for both spouses decrease in the 
husband’s wage rate and increases in the wife’s wage rate.  
 
The classical theory provides a sound framework to analyse the incentives of men and 
women to get married. Nevertheless, in the absence of gender wage inequalities and costs 
of marriage, the decision of whom to marry could be exclusively determined by individual 
preferences over personal traits, e.g. height or beauty.160 Whether men or women prefer to 
marry partners of a similar age -positive assortive mating in age- is certainly a relevant and 
interesting research subject. However if this hypothesis were on average truthful, age 
differences between spouses at a macro level might show convergence towards a SMALL 
gap scenario. In this regard, the optimal age at marriage for men and women may vary 
                                                 
160 Becker (1973) also points that men differing in intelligence, height, race, or other personal traits will tend 
to marry women with like values of these traits (positive assortive mating), whereas relationship between 
partners for traits that are close substitutes in household production will tend to be negative. Burdett and 
Coles (1997) provides a simple proof of why class marriage may arise with heterogeneous men and women.  
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depending upon the desired size of the family, number of children, or the economic ability 
of men and women to set up an independent household, among others. On the other 
hand, if gender differences in wages were considerably large, women may not have many 
incentives to participate in labour market activities, and hence marry early. The costs of 
living will accrue on women’s parents which under stringent economic conditions may not 
be prepared to sustain their daughters while they search for a suitable husband161.  
 
An alternative explanation to the classical theory of marriage follows with Bergstrom and 
Bagnoli (1993). They focus on the costs of marriage and argue that it takes a considerable 
time before the earnings ability of men is revealed. Then, men who do not expect they will 
be economically successful later in life choose to marry young, whereas men who believe 
they will be economically successful in the future delay their marriage. Bergstrom and 
Bagnoli (1993) assume that in traditional societies women earn no income and hence marry 
early because they do not have much additional information about their earnings ability. In 
this way, the optimal marriage age for men increases with his wage rate. Bergstrom and 
Schoeni (1996) using data from the 1980 US Census, find that male age at marriage 
increases with his annual wage earnings if he marries before the age of 30, while there is 
only a weak relation between the female age at marriage and her annual wage earnings.  
 
                                                 
161 Pre-marital sex is an important social stigma in certain societies, in particular when marriage is registered 
or sanctioned by law. Men and particularly women will prefer to minimise the risks associated with pre-
marital sex. Early marriage for women will consequently be preferred when pre-marital sex is not well 
accepted. Saint Augustine sanctioned pre-marital sex long time ago (AD 400): “If a man makes use of a woman for 
a time, until he finds someone else more suited to his wealth and social standing to take as his partner, that state of mind makes 
him an adulterer, not with regard to the woman he is on the lookout for but with regard to the one he is sleeping with without 
being married to her. As a consequence, if the woman is aware of this and still consents to it, then she too is unchaste in her 
relationship with the man with whom she is not united in marriage. Nevertheless, if she is faithful to him, and when he takes a 
wife she does not also think about marrying, but sets herself entirely against such a course of action, then I would not dare to call 
her an adulteress, easy enough though it might be to do so”. Nevertheless, pre-marital sex attitudes have been changing 
over time (Singh, 1980). 
 112
The main problem with Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) is their assumption about traditional 
societies. It can be argued that in traditional societies, human capital is low, skilled labour is 
not highly demanded, and wealth inequality is mainly determined by non-labour income. 
Therefore, whether unskilled men delay marriage because they believe they will be 
economically successful later in life remains debatable, because the economic success of 
unskilled men in traditional societies may not vary much over time. In this chapter we 
follow a different theoretical approach.  
 
When labour is mostly unskilled, the opportunity costs of men and women in the labour 
market should not be very different. However, while male labour participation rates have 
been fairly similar across regions and throughout history, female participation rates have 
fluctuated162. Goldin (1994) claims, that the decline in female participation rates has been 
motivated by the movement of production from the household and family farm to the 
market163. In traditional societies, unskilled labour outside the home and the family is 
mainly manual labour intensive work, against which a strong social stigma exists (Goldin, 
1994).  
 
Therefore, if women earn no income, as Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) also assume, they 
would not be able to spend time and resources to reduce uncertainty about the traits of a 
                                                 
162 Boserup (1970: 50) observed that in some regions, “…a wife is entirely dependant upon her husband for economic 
support”.  
163 Goldin (1994) argues that when incomes are extremely low, women are usually in the labour force either as 
paid labourers, but above all as unpaid family workers. As incomes rose, female participation rates fell. 
Families implicitly buy women’s work, and women then retreat into the home. The decline in female 
participation rates is partly due to the income effect. Moreover, even if women have incentives to work, they 
may be barred from manual labour intensive work by social custom or by employer preference. In this way, 
Goldin and Katz (2002) also showed that the diffusion of the birth control pill decreased the cost to women 
of remaining unmarried and raised their age at first marriage.  
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potential spouse164 165. In addition, the costs associated with pre-marital sex, and a great 
desire for children in traditional societies could further discourage women from delaying 
marriage. As a result, women would marry relatively young, and would not be able to marry 
their ‘preferred’ man. Conversely, men would be the only “breadwinners” in the newly 
formed household166. Because women do not earn any income, men would be required to 
accumulate wealth to provide the household with, at least, the level of wealth women 
would have enjoyed as daughters with their parents167. This could be achieved if (i) men 
postpone marriage to acquire wealth (labour income); and/or (ii) parents provide their sons 
with a pre-mortem inheritance (non-labour income)168; and/or (iii) parents provide their 
daughters with a pre-mortem inheritance or dowry169. Under these circumstances, wealthy 
men and women would be highly regarded as marriage prospects, and they would marry 
their most ‘preferred’ woman or man respectively. This is because they would be able to 
                                                 
164 Uncertainty can be closely associated to the size of the community where men and women live. In small 
communities, i.e. village, uncertainty about the personal traits of a man or woman would be minimal, while in 
large areas, cities, uncertainty would increase.  
165 If household specialisation occurs because women have lower opportunity costs in the labour market than 
men, it would be appropriate to think that searching will be more costly for women than men. Under the 
assumption that women do not work (Bergstrom and Bagnoli, 1993), searching for a suitable partner will be 
very costly for women and their families.  
166 In this chapter, we assume neolocal residence where men and women set up their own household. We 
acknowledge that in some societies, men move to the bride’s kin household (uxorilocal), or women move to 
the groom’s kin household (virilocal). Neolocal residence would imply higher costs for the married couple.  
167 The expected gains from marriage would be closely associated with the level of wealth daughters would 
have enjoyed with their parents. If not, women would not have incentives to accept a marriage proposal. This 
is consistent with the fact that in some societies unmarried daughters could remain with their natal family to 
look after her father and mother when they became old (Goody, 1976). 
168 Goode (1963) reports that in China (Ting Hsien), the larger the amount of land owned by the family, the 
lower the age at marriage for males. Emigh (1997) studies the effects that land tenure had on age at marriage 
in Fifteenth-Century Tuscany, and finds that by restricting access to land marriage was usually delayed.  
169 Goody and Tambiah (1973:17) described dowry as “…part of a familial or conjugal fund, which passes by from 
holder to heir, and usually from the parents to the daughter”. Alternatively, Botticini and Siow (2003) proposed a 
theory where altruistic parents provide dowries for their daughters and bequests for sons in order to mitigate 
a free riding problem between their married sons and daughters within their natal household. However, if we 
assume that women do not work, parents would not be as concerned about the free riding problem.  
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spend resources and time to find a suitable spouse. Conversely, if parents could not 
provide their sons and daughters with an adequate amount of wealth, men would have to 
postpone marriage to acquire some, and hence the LARGE gap170.  
 
Furthermore, when women earn no income and parents observe that their daughters could 
be exposed later in life because of divorce, parents would have more incentives to spend 
time and resources to find a suitable spouse for them171. Moreover, they would also have 
more incentives to provide their daughters with a pre-mortem inheritance or dowry. By 
providing a dowry parents could, to some extent, mitigate the threat of divorce internally. 
In this way, the absence or presence of dowry may be a good indicator of the economic 
role played by women in traditional societies172. Sadly, cross-country data on marriage 
transfers are relatively scarce. Finally, custom or family laws may also be used to mitigate 
the threat of divorce. Parents would have incentives to advocate for a marriage contract 
that guarantees the future of their daughters173.  
                                                 
170 Even in societies where monogamous unions prevail, men would have to provide an adequate level of 
wealth, if not their marriage proposal would be rejected. Women may have incentives to remain with their 
family, or become the concubine or mistress of a wealthy man. To reduce uncertainty, men would spend time 
and resources to find a suitable spouse, and propose once they have acquired a minimal level of wealth.  
171 The institution of ‘arranged’ marriages attempts to mitigate the problem of uncertainty. North (1991) 
defines institutions as the humanly devised constraints that structure political and economic and social 
interaction. The set of institutions can be informal such as sanctions, taboos and customs or formal, laws or 
property rights. North (1991: 97) describes that “…throughout history institutions have been devised by 
human beings to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange”.  
172 Anderson (2007) suggests that modernisation, which in turn increases inequality across men, leads dowries 
to replace their role as pre-mortem inheritance for a direct transfer to the groom, or Groom price. Marriage 
transfers have conventionally been related to the different marital patterns observed in Eurasia and sub-
Saharan Africa (Goody, 1976) 
173 The Lex Visigothorum already stated in the seventh century the relevance of dowry to enter marriage. 
Article I. “Marriage shall not be Entered Into without a Dowry. Marriage is recognized to have greater dignity and honor, 
where the dowry is given before the nuptial contract has been entered into in writing. For where the dowry has been neither given, 
nor stated in writing, what expectation can there be of future conjugal dignity, when propriety does not confirm the celebration of 
 115
When, on the contrary, women work and earn an income, they might be able to spend 
resources and time to find a suitable spouse or ‘preferred’ man. It could be reasonable to 
assume positive assortive mating in age. Moreover, women would contribute to the newly 
formed household with their income. As a result of all these circumstances, the spousal gap 
would decrease, SMALL gap. Similarly, in modern societies, where skilled labour is highly 
demanded, we would expect an increase in female participation rates. As Goldin (1994) 
stated, no social stigma exists with skilled labour. In addition, women could be exposed 
later in life in the labour market if they do not participate as young adults, i.e. accumulation 
of skills. Thus, women would have further incentives to participate in the labour market. 
As a result of gender equality in labour participation, the SMALL gap would arise.   
 
Overall, we argue that gender differences in labour participation will have a significant and 
negative impact on the spousal gap. We acknowledge that in certain societies, family and 
kin or “culture” determine the demand for labour. Also, social stigmas regarding women’s 
work could be subject to specific cultural or religious beliefs. We will control for them as 
long as data are available. Alternatively, Gould and Paserman (2003) find that women wait 
longer to get married when they face higher male wage inequality. This, in fact, increases 
female age at first marriage, and holding constant male age at first marriage will also reduce 
the spousal age gap174. We recognize the theoretical relevance that male wealth inequality 
may play, though cross-country data on wage inequality remain inadequate for the period 
of study.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
the marriage, nor the honorable obligation of the written contract accompany it?” The indissolubility of marriage may also 
be enforced.  
174 Loughran (2002) also provides evidence that female age at first marriage is positively associated with male 
wage inequality. In particular, rising male wage inequality increases the return to marital search, thereby 
increasing search duration and decreasing age-specific propensities to marry.   
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Therefore, the remaining sections of this chapter will focus on the relationship between 
gender differences in labour participation and age differences at first marriage. For that 
purpose, we will empirically test whether spousal gaps observed across monogamous 
countries are partly determined by observed gender differences in labour participation.  
 
 
4.3 Data Description and Sources 
This study combines country data at a decade frequency for the period 1950 to 2000. Data 
are grouped into decades due to the lack of consistent annual evidence on marital status 
across countries. The main sources of marital data are national censuses and surveys175. All 
available countries are in the panel, including some dependent territories not classified as 
independent countries176. The panel is unbalanced and the size of the cross-section is 
limited by the available data on marital status. Observations range from a minimum of 38 
countries in 1950 to a maximum of 91 in 1990.  
 
The data used were drawn from several sources. First, data on marital status for the period 
1950-1980 were obtained mainly from Patterns of First Marriage (United Nations, 1990)177 
and Demographic Yearbooks (United Nations, 1977; 1984). Data for the period 1990-2000 
were collected from the Demographic Yearbook (United Nations, 1997), World Marriage 
                                                 
175 Data correspond mainly to each census round prepared by the United Nations for the period 1950-2000 
176 The term “country” refers also to territories or regions, irrespective of their legal status or delimitation of 
their frontiers or boundaries. There are 192 independent countries recognised by the United Nations and 46 
dependent territories. 
177 Patterns of First Marriage: Timing and Prevalence (United Nations 1990) was prepared by the Population 
Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations. 
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Patterns (United Nations, 2000b)178, World Fertility Report (United Nations, 2004)179 and 
the Demographic and Health Surveys (1985-2005)180. Second, female labour data are 
collected from the “Population, Policies, Resources, Environment and Development 
Databank” or PRED Bank, Version 3.0181. Third, population data for the period 1950-1960 
were collected from United Nations (1997): Demographic Yearbook, Historical 
supplement, Table 3. Population by age, sex, and urban/rural residence, each census: 1948-
1997. Population data for the period 1970-2000 come from estimates and projections of 
populations by sex and five-year age groups, 1950-2050, The 1998 Revision, Demographic 
Yearbook and World Population Prospects, The 1998 Revision, Volume I: Comprehensive 
Tables182. 
 
4.3.1 Variable Definitions 
Data on marital status, in particular the timing of marriage, can be presented in several 
forms. First, though the mean age at marriage would be the ideal measure, we would 
require information about the number of marriages and the specific ages at marriage of 
each spouse, which is rarely available. Second, there is the median age at marriage that also 
requires information about the specific age at marriage. To overcome this problem, Hajnal 
(1953) derived an indirect measure called the singulate mean age at marriage, SMAM. The 
                                                 
178 World Marriage Patterns (United Nations, 2000b) was prepared by the Population Division, Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations. 
179 The World Fertility Report 2003 (United Nations, 2004) was prepared by the Population Division, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations 
180 Data collected Demographic and Health Surveys were extracted from the STATcompiler 
(http://www.statcompiler.com/) 
181 The PRED Bank, Version 3.0 was published by the Population Division of the Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat.   
182 These data were extracted from the Women's Indicators and Statistics Database Version 4 (CD-ROM), 
Wistat 4 (United Nations, 2000a). 
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SMAM can be defined as the number of years an individual lives as single among those 
who ever married at the age of 50. Hajnal (1953) developed a method to estimate the 
singulate mean age at marriage using the proportions of never-married men and women 
aged 15-49 years old. Although it might not be the most appropriate measure, we think that 
using SMAM is a convenient and practical way to evaluate age differences at first marriage. 
For that reason, we define GAP as the difference between male and female singulate mean 
age at marriage.  
 
There are two important limitations with the SMAM values. As we stated previously, the 
SMAM values are computed from the proportions of never-married men and women aged 
15-49 years old. Therefore, if we allow polygynous unions, the proportions of never-
married women will be lower because more women aged 15 years old and over will be 
required to be married to sustain polygyny. Tertilt (2008) stressed that the age at first 
marriage is a wrong measure for computing the average age gap in a polygynous society. To 
overcome this problem, we will use the dummy variable monogamy which takes the value of 
1 if the country was classified in table A.2.4 in appendix 2 as monogamous (Mo), 0 
otherwise. In this way, we exclude from our sample those countries which are potentially 
polygynous183. Secondly, even in the case of perfectly monogamous countries, re-marriage 
between a divorced, separated or widowed with a never-married could also affect our 
SMAM values. Widow re-marriage requires exceptional circumstances to occur, while re-
marriage after separation or divorce appears to be more common. In particular, if divorce 
or separation rates are high, then the probability of a divorcee or separated to marry a 
never-married one would increase. Whether this is common trend across countries present 
                                                 
183 Table A.2.4 in appendix 2 illustrates three types of countries: polygynous (Po), occasional polygynous (OP) 
and monogamous countries (Mo). We focus on monogamous countries, although data would also be 
presented for the polygynous and occasional polygynous countries in appendix 4.    
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us with a new statistical challenge. Nonetheless, high divorce/separation rates have only 
been observed in high developed countries in recent times.  
 
The SMAM values for men and women were already estimated for most of the countries in 
the dataset, except for countries which data were collected from the Demographic and 
Health Surveys (1985-2005). For those countries, data were available on the proportions 
never married for the five-year cohorts, and therefore we derive the singulate mean age at 
marriage following Hajnal’s (1953) methodology. Data on the proportions never married 
for the extreme age cohorts (15-19) and (45-49) are also available for most of the countries. 
In Figure A.4.2 in appendix 4 we provide Hajnal’s (1953) formulae to compute the 
singulate mean age at marriage. Data on age-specific marital status remain scarce in 
developing countries, whereas they are usually available for most developed countries since 
1950. In the 1970s, data on the percentage ever married, and hence the SMAM, were 
available for 80 percent of all countries; in the 1990s the coverage had increased to 90 
percent (United Nations, 2004).  
 
Coverage and quality of data constitute a limitation that needs to be acknowledged. In 
some countries, few censuses were available and the existing surveys covered only a part of 
the country, e.g. the Demographic and Health Surveys. It is not always known how 
accurately unions are recorded. Formal religious, customary and civil marriages are usually 
reported as marriages in censuses. Nevertheless, consensual and visiting unions, or 
concubinage are a major feature in some cultures. Consensual unions are traditionally 
associated with Latin America and the Caribbean, although most censuses in these 
countries reported them for the period of study. Visiting unions are also a common feature 
in the Anglophone and Francophone Caribbean countries. Even though they are 
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recognized as marriage forms, some of these unions are not always reported as marital 
unions (United Nations, 1990)184.  
 
Cohabitation is also an expression used to define the current concept of consensual union 
for developed countries, and has not been reported in the data until very recently185. Finally, 
concubinage refers more specifically to sexual partnerships and is not usually reported. We 
also need to take into account countries where boundaries have changed after the Second 
World War. As stated previously, country data on marital status are not usually reported 
annually. To overcome this limitation, we have grouped data by decades starting with 1950. 
We took the closest observation on a plus-minus five years round the decade e.g. if there is 
a unique observation for 1965, it will show as 1970.   
 
Figure 4.2 shows the percentage of ever married men and women aged 45-49 years old. In 
this figure we illustrate a selection of countries with available data for all decades. Countries 
were classified as OECD and non-OECD to provide further information about their level 
of economic development. Although marriage may not be universal, percentages of ever 
married men and women are considerably high, above 80 percent in most cases. 
Unreported marital data, in particular for women, appears to be a more relevant issue for 
non-OECD countries in 1950 and 1960. We will take this on board and run robustness 
tests accordingly. 
 
                                                 
184 “In the Caribbean, much higher SMAMs are recorded, plausibly as a result of misreporting and un-
reporting of consensual and visiting unions.” Patterns of First Marriage (United Nations, 1990: 156-157) 
185 Cohabitation has recently been a common practice in some European countries (Kiernan, 2002). Figure 
A.4.3 in appendix 4 shows that percentage differences between men and women are relatively small. We think 
that cohabitation, as well as consensual or visiting unions represent a serious problem to make comparisons 
of gender specific age at marriage. Therefore, by taking the spousal age gap we partly mitigate this problem.  
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Figure 4.2: Percentage Ever Married by Sex, 1950-2000 
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Sources: Patterns of First Marriage (United Nations, 1990), Demographic Yearbooks (United Nations, 1977; 
1979; 1984; 1997), World Marriage Patterns (United Nations, 2000b), World Fertility Report (United Nations, 
2004), Demographic and Health Surveys (1985-2005), PRED Bank, Version 3.0. 
 
With regards to female participation in the labour market, we use two different proxies. 
First, we construct the ratio of women economically active per 100 men (WEA). To do so, 
we divide the rate of economically active women by the rate of economically active men. 
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Second, we use the percentage of women in the labour force (WLF)186. Both variables are 
annual estimates from the PRED Bank, Version 3.0. The projected economic activity rates 
cover male and female aged 15 years old and over for the period 1950-2000. Activity rate is 
the proportion of the population who are economically active, expressed as a percentage. 
The estimates take into account information on the economically active population 
obtained mainly from national censuses and labour force sample surveys187. These data 
have been adjusted by the International Labour Office so as to arrive at a consistent set of 
data.  
 
Banerjee (1998) points that censuses of British India frequently neglected to document the 
extent of unpaid family labour, or the activities of women and children, who were reduced 
to the status of dependents because of their invisibility in public spheres. Country specific 
characteristics such as minimum hours of work or the extent to which family workers are 
included among economically active population, may affect the measurement of women’s 
participation in economic activity. In this way women’s economic activity is often 
understated188. Furthermore, other control variables have been included in the panel data, 
the sex ratio aged 15-44 years old (women per 100 men), and the rate of urban population, 
URBAN (percentage).  
 
                                                 
186 Both variables are interrelated since WLF is simply the number of economically active women divided by 
the number of economically active men and women. Throughout the study we will use both variables for our 
empirical tests. Nonetheless, we think that WEA better captures gender differences and consequently will be 
preferred over WLF.  
187 The International Labour Office defines persons as economically active, if they are working for pay or 
profit at any time during a specified reference period or are seeking such work.  This definition was 
broadened in 1982 to include, if appropriate, persons available for work but not necessarily actively seeking 
work 
188 Volume 5 of Sources and Methods: Labour Statistics is an updated version of the 2nd edition issued in 
1996 which presented methodological descriptions of population censuses carried out during the period 
1989-94 in 115 countries, areas and territories. The 1st edition issued in 1990 covered the period 1945-89. 
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4.3.2 Summary Statistics  
 
The panel dataset is a decade country panel covering the period 1950-2000. More than 150 
countries have reported at least one observation on age differences at marriage over this 
period. There are typically more than 70 observations per decade in the dataset, except for 
1950 and 1960 for which we only have 38 and 60 respectively. Table 4.2 provides summary 
statistics for our main variables sorted by geographical regions. We present average values 
alongside standard deviations and number of observations across geographical regions for 
the variables of interest: age differences at marriage (Gap) in years; the ratio of women 
economically active per 100 men (WEA); the number of women per 100 men aged 15-44 
years old (Sex ratio 15-44) and the percentage of population living in urban areas (URBAN). 
As we stated previously, data from polygynous (Po) and occasional polygynous (OP) 
countries have been removed189. 
 
By restricting the sample to monogamous countries, we expect to have more robust and 
consistent results. In this way, we may observe from table 4.2 that Middle Africa has been 
completely removed. Similarly, Western Africa, Southern Africa, Southern Asia and 
Melanesia only present data for one country. These are Cape Verde, South Africa, Nepal 
and Fiji. Data for Central Asia correspond to the 1990 census round, which was the only 
available and reliable observation for the former USSR republics. The remaining regions 
present well balanced and consistent data for the period of study.  
 
                                                 
189 In appendix 4, tables A.4.1 and A.4.2 present descriptive statistics by regions for those countries classified 
as polygynous (Po) or occasional polygynous (OP). Also, we include in table A.4.3 descriptive statistics for 
Micronesia and Polynesia, for which data on the ratio of women economically active per 100 men were not 
available.  
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Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics by geographical region [Monogamous (Mo)] 
Geographical region Statistics Gap WEA (+15) Sex ratio (15-44) URBAN
    (years) Women/100 Men Women/100 Men (%) 
Northern Africa Mean 5.3 29 99 41.1 
 St. Dev 0.8 8.6 5.8 10.0 
 N 9 12 9 12 
Western Africa Mean 2.4 40 119 29.0 
 St. Dev . 9.1 8.4 20.3 
  N 1 6 4 6 
Eastern Africa Mean 3.6 67 102 32.1 
 St. Dev 1.3 26.8 3.5 23.2 
 N 20 30 27 42 
Southern Africa Mean 3.0 49 98 47.5 
 St. Dev 1.1 9.2 2.7 2.5 
  N 5 6 6 6 
Western Asia Mean 3.1 48 88 63.3 
 St. Dev 0.9 26.2 21.6 19.8 
 N 24 42 31 42 
Central Asia Mean 2.3 74 100 40.1 
 St. Dev 0.5 8.6 1.5 8.0 
  N 7 30 20 30 
Eastern Asia Mean 3.1 61 96 65.8 
 St. Dev 1.4 18.1 7.1 30.9 
 N 21 30 23 30 
Southern Asia Mean 3.5 64 102 6.1 
 St. Dev 0.1 1.7 4.9 3.7 
  N 4 6 5 6 
South-Eastern Asia Mean 3.2 59 99 38.8 
 St. Dev 1.1 22.3 5.6 28.1 
 N 37 48 38 48 
Northern America Mean 2.4 57 98 81.6 
 St. Dev 0.6 19.0 4.0 14.1 
  N 13 12 15 18 
Central America Mean 4.0 31 101 44.8 
 St. Dev 1.5 11.9 3.8 11.4 
 N 33 48 43 48 
Caribbean Mean 3.2 60 106 49.9 
 St. Dev 1.3 16.3 5.9 21.8 
  N 47 54 53 84 
South America Mean 3.6 36 101 59.3 
 St. Dev 1.3 11.2 3.2 19.5 
 N 52 66 59 66 
Eastern Europe Mean 3.3 72 100 52.9 
 St. Dev 0.5 12.2 3.3 14.2 
  N 34 54 41 54 
Northern Europe Mean 2.8 63 98 68.1 
 St. Dev 1.0 19.4 3.4 16.5 
 N 41 54 47 54 
Southern Europe Mean 3.4 47 100 53.1 
 St. Dev 1.0 19.1 4.6 20.2 
  N 37 48 40 54 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics by geographical region (continued) 
Geographical Statistics Gap WEA (+15) Sex ratio (15-44) URBAN
Region   (years) Women/100 Men Women/100 Men (%) 
Western Europe Mean 3.0 53 99 71.7 
 St. Dev 0.6 13.9 5.6 23.5 
 N 44 42 41 54 
Australia and New Zealand Mean 2.9 51 97 81.7 
 St. Dev 0.9 18.7 2.3 4.7 
  N 12 12 12 12 
Melanesia Mean 3.1 20 97 36.3 
 St. Dev 0.3 16.0 1.7 8.8 
  N 4 6 4 6 
Total Mean 3.3 54 100 53.9 
 St. Dev 1.2 21.8 7.9 23.9 
  N 445 606 518 672 
Sources: Patterns of First Marriage (United Nations, 1990), Demographic Yearbooks (United Nations, 1977; 
1979; 1984; 1997), World Marriage Patterns (United Nations, 2000b), World Fertility Report (United Nations, 
2004), Demographic and Health Surveys (1985-2005), PRED Bank, Version 3.0. 
Notes: The geographical regions refer to the United Nations classification. Data on women economically 
active for Micronesia and Polynesia regions are not available, and hence they are removed from table 4.2. In 
the appendix 4, table A.4.3 presents descriptive statistics for these two regions.  
 
 
Overall, age differences at marriage vary noticeably across countries and geographical 
regions. In table 4.2 we observe that on average, there is a gap of over 5 years in Northern 
Africa and 4 years in Central America. This is what we previously refer to as LARGE gap. 
On the other hand, Northern America, Northern Europe, Australia and New Zealand are 
the regions with the lowest average age differences between spouses or SMALL gap, just 
below 3 years. In Europe, the largest gap observed corresponds to Southern Europe, while 
the smaller corresponds to Northern Europe, which goes in line with the “Mediterranean” 
and “Northwest European” patterns discussed above.  
 
Alternatively, we also notice large variations in labour participation across regions. 
Northern Africa with just 29 women economically active per 100 men, Central America 
and South America with 31 and 36 present the lowest ratios. On the contrary, in Central 
Asia and Eastern Europe there are 74 and 72 women economically active per 100 men. 
This, again, provides remarkable insights about the data, as both geographical regions 
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include countries that were mostly centrally planned economies for a considerable time 
during the period of study190.  
 
Differences in sex ratios aged 15-44 years old are less pronounced. Most geographical 
regions present a well balanced ratio. The main exceptions are Western Asia, with 88 
women per 100 men, and Western Africa (Cape Verde with 119 per 100 men). Western 
Asia includes countries such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar or United Arab Emirates where sex 
ratios are seriously imbalanced. The number of male expatriates may considerably skewed 
sex ratios. Nonetheless, variations in sex ratios tend to be a short term phenomenon. 
Figures A.4.4a and A.4.4.b in appendix 4 show -for those countries with available data for 
all census rounds-, the sex ratios aged 15-44 years old for the period 1950-2000. On the 
whole, sex ratios are stable and well balanced. Colonisation, wars and gender specific 
migrations may alter temporarily the sex ratios, i.e. European countries exhibit considerable 
changes in the sex ratios for the post-war years. In any case, we will also measure to what 
extent sex ratios had an impact on age differences at marriage. 
  
Table 4.2 also provides statistics for the rate of urbanisation. The average values show also 
considerable disparities across regions. Among the most urbanised regions we have 
Northern America, Australia and New Zealand with over 80 percent of their population 
living in urban areas, and Western Europe with 72 percent. At the other end of the 
spectrum, we find Southern Asia with rates of urbanisation below the 10 percent. It is not 
striking to find that high rates of urbanisation correspond to New World regions such as 
                                                 
190 After the Second World War, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was composed of 15 
republics. Five of them are in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan), three in Western Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), three in Northern Europe (Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania), and the remaining four in Eastern Europe (Belarus, Republic of Moldova, Russian 
Federation and Ukraine) 
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United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as opposed to Old World ones. In this 
way, we would attempt to capture these effects too.  
 
Finally, table A.4.4 in appendix 4 shows descriptive statistics by marital system, that is to 
say, whether countries are classified as monogamous (Mo), occasional polygynous (OP) or 
polygynous (Po). The results in this table confirm that age differences at marriage are on 
average substantially higher in polygynous countries, 6.1 years, relative to monogamous 
ones, 3.3 years. Countries classified as non-monogamous and non-polygynous provide an 
average gap of 4.6 years. Variations in labour participation of women in market activities 
are also significant. Polygynous countries show that on average 72 women are economically 
active per 100 men, whereas the figure is considerable smaller for monogamous countries, 
54, and even smaller for the occasional polygynous, 42. Sex ratios do not present 
considerably differences, and urbanisation rates are higher for monogamous than for 
polygynous countries, as otherwise expected.   
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4.4 Empirical Model  
In this section, we test the impact that gender differences in labour participation might 
potentially have on gender differences in age at marriage. For this purpose, our basic model 
will be the following,  
 
 '0 1it it it itGap WEA Zβ β γ ε= + + +  (4.1) 
  
where the subscripts refer to country i  and decade t . Our dependent variable Gapit stands 
for the age gap at first marriage, and WEAit captures gender differences in labour 
participation. The vector Zit  represents a vector of controls, among them, the sex ratio 15-
44 years, the percentage of urban population, URBAN, and a time-dummy variable, 
CEDAW ; itε  is an error term. To our knowledge there are no empirical studies evaluating 
the impact of gender differences in the labour market on the spousal gap in the long term. 
The rest of the control variables will attempt to capture variations in the availability of adult 
women relative to men, community size effects and the impact that the introduction of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW, had on country specific 
family laws, and hence age differences at marriage.  
 
A sudden decrease in the relative number of women at marriageable age implies fewer 
alternatives for men. If personal traits for men and women are evenly distributed, some 
men will be unsuccessful in their search for a partner, and will have to wait, leading on 
average to increase their age at marriage. Also, men will face a more competitive marriage 
market, and consequently they will need to be more efficient (Becker, 1981). On the other 
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hand, women who expect to marry could also benefit191. Fewer women relative to men 
could improve their bargaining position in the marriage market and within the 
household192. The likelihood of a future divorce could be less significant, given that there 
are fewer marriageable alternatives for men. This, in fact, could induce some women to 
worry less about developing a career. Additionally, if gender differences in wages are 
noticeable, these women would have lesser incentives to participate in market activities, 
and hence accept a marriage proposal early in life. A LARGE gap could emerge under 
these circumstances.  
 
Although sex ratios have been a very popular subject at micro level, we observe that 
changes of aggregate sex ratios in the long run do not vary much across countries. 
Regardless, we will control for potential heterogeneity in the number of women relative to 
men; and for this purpose we have collected data for men and women aged 15-44 years 
old193. Additionally, urbanisation rates attempt to capture community size effects and 
cultural or social stigma attributed to smaller communities. The size of the community may 
be closely associated with the degree of uncertainty about a potential spouse. In this way, 
uncertainty would be lower in rural areas, and hence the costs associated with finding a 
suitable spouse would be smaller. Moreover, social stigmas associated with pre-marital sex, 
                                                 
191 In our model we expect that all women and men want to get married. Figure 4.2 confirms for OECD and 
Non-OECD countries that on average more than 80 percent of men and women have married at least once 
aged 45-49 years old. Although we do not reach universal marriage, the proportions are sufficiently high to 
accept this assumption.  
192 Angrist (2001) and Chiapporti et al. (2001) find evidence to support the view that a relative undersupply of 
women improves the bargaining position of women in the marriage market and within households. Also, Rao 
(1993) studies the consequences of changing sex ratios in the developing world, and finds that “marriage 
squeeze” or the imbalance between the number of males and females has played a significant role in the rise 
in dowries over time, that is to say, in the bargaining power of men and women in the marriage market. 
193 SMAM is derived from marital status data, in particular the proportions of singles or never-married for 
each 5-years cohort, 15-49. See appendix 4, Figure A.4.2 for Hajnal (1953) formulae. For that reason, we 
decide to select similar age specific sex ratios.   
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fertility and gender roles, which in turn may affect the marital decisions of men and women 
may also be captured by urbanisation rates.  
 
Finally, the time-dummy variable CEDAW splits the dataset into two periods, 1950-1980 
and 1990-2000, taking the value of 1 for the decades 1990 and 2000, and 0 otherwise. In 
1979, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, it entered into force as 
an international treaty on 3 September 1981194. The Convention establishes an international 
bill of rights for women, periodical meetings with the member states to guarantee the 
completion of those rights, and an agenda for equality. The agenda is specified in fourteen 
articles, covering three dimensions: civil rights, human reproduction and cultural factors on 
gender relations. Article 16 of the agenda, Marriage and Family Life, covers different 
aspects of marriage, in particular, the right to freely choose a spouse, the rights after 
dissolution of marriage and property ownership within marriage. Part 2 of Article 16, 
condemns betrothal and the marriage of a child and recommend countries to take all 
necessary action to specify a minimum age for marriage and to make the registration of 
marriages compulsory. In this way, we test whether the introduction of an International 
Convention as CEDAW had an impact on countries family laws and consequently in the 
spousal gap.  
 
                                                 
194 By the thirtieth anniversary in 2009 there are 186 country members. There are only six United Nations 
member states, Iran, Somalia, Sudan, Nauru, Palau and Tonga who have not signed the convention. Sudan 
and Somalia are polygynous countries (Po); Iran is occasional polygynous (OP); while Nauru, Palau and 
Tonga are Micronesian and Polynesian countries which have been excluded from the sample. Niue and the 
Vatican City have also not signed, and the United States have signed, yet not ratified.    
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Figure 4.3 Spousal Age Gap and WEA, 1950-2000 
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Sources: Patterns of First Marriage (United Nations, 1990), Demographic Yearbooks (United Nations, 1977; 
1979; 1984; 1997), World Marriage Patterns (United Nations, 2000b), World Fertility Report (United Nations, 
2004), Demographic and Health Surveys (1985-2005), PRED Bank, Version 3.0. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 introduces the long term pattern of age differences at marriage and the ratio of 
women economically active for every 100 men, with data from all available countries and 
for the period of study, 1950-2000. In Figure 4.3 we observe that while female participation 
rates on average have increased over time, the spousal gap have decreased from a LARGE 
to a SMALL gap. Figures A.4.5a and A.4.5b in appendix 4, illustrate the scattered plot of 
Gap and WEA by decades for the whole sample (unbalanced panel) and a selection of 
countries (balanced panel). From those figures we also observe a gradual move towards a 
SMALL gap.  
 
There are a variety of techniques that could be used to estimate our empirical model. To 
evaluate which technique is optimal, it is necessary to consider two factors: the relationship 
between the unobserved country specific effects, and the potential endogeneity between 
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our main variables, Gapit and WEAit. Estimates of model (1) are obtained using pooled 
ordinary least squares (Pooled OLS) and the standard methods of panel data estimation: 
fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) models. Both fixed and random effects models 
control for unmeasured heterogeneity that pooled OLS ignores. The pooled regression 
model assumes that any two country/years can be compared, whether across time or across 
space. The potential advantage of a pooled estimator is that it considers all of the variation 
in the independent variables. However, the pooled OLS omits unobserved heterogeneity 
that may impose biases on parameter estimates (Wooldridge, 2002).  
 
The fixed effects model treats differences in the unobserved specific effects as due to 
deterministic factors. On the other hand, the random effects model treats those differences 
as being due to stochastic factors. Yet if the country effects are correlated with the 
independent variables, in our case WEA and the control variables Sex ratio, URBAN and 
CEDAW, the estimates of the random effects model are biased and inconsistent, while the 
within estimator remains unbiased and consistent. Most applications in economics since 
the 1980s have made the choice between the random effects and fixed effects estimators 
based upon the standard Hausman test (Baltagi et. al., 2003). Consequently, in order to 
check for unbiasedness and consistency, Hausman tests will be conducted when comparing 
estimates from the fixed and random effects models, Hausman (1978). It is also important 
to know that there is a limitation with our data due to the complex nature of the 
independent variable and the limited sources available. Measurement error will cause 
estimates to be biased and inconsistent. In this way, we acknowledge that the measurement 
error bias is likely to be more exaggerated in the fixed effects estimates.   
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4.5 Main Findings  
4.5.1 Results  
 
From the above empirical model, we test whether gender differences in labour 
participation have an effect of gender differences at marriage, which in turn is our main 
hypothesis. For this purpose, the model specification will be,  
  
0 1 1 2 3it it it it t itGap WEA Sex Ratio URBAN CEDAWβ β γ γ γ ε= + + + + +  (4.2) 
 
Table 4.3 displays the results of estimating the model. Our aim throughout the chapter is to 
explore the long term relationship between gender differences in labour participation and 
the age gap at marriage. We provide results according to different specifications. Columns 
(1) and (2) present the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), columns (3) and (4) present the 
fixed (FE) and random effects195 (RE) models respectively.  The dependent variable is the 
age gap at first marriage: Gap. The OLS estimation in columns (1) and (2) provide a 
baseline for exploring the relationship between the number of women economically active 
per 100 men, WEA, and the age gap at marriage, Gap. After incorporating the control 
variables: sex ratio aged 15-44 years old, the rate of urbanisation, URBAN, and CEDAW, 
we observe that WEA remains statistically significant and with a negative sign. Both results 
go in line with our main hypothesis which says that on average WEA has a negative and 
significant impact on Gap.  
                                                 
195 The random effects model is estimated by Generalised Least Squares (GLS).  
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Table 4.3 Panel Data Estimates for the Spousal Age Gap, 1950-2000 
Independent variables Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Fixed effects Random effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
WEA -0.023*** -0.018*** -0.025*** -0.021*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) 
     
Sex ratio (15-44)  -0.023** -0.039** -0.024** 
  (0.009) (0.016) (0.010) 
     
URBAN  -0.013*** -0.024** -0.016*** 
  (0.002) (0.011) (0.004) 
     
CEDAW  -0.308** -0.068 -0.215* 
  (0.128) (0.146) (0.117) 
     
Constant 4.521*** 7.350*** 9.922*** 7.789*** 
 (0.173) (0.986) (1.902) (1.086) 
Observations 426 421 421 421 
2R  0.167 0.237  0.235 
within- 2R    0.309  
Log-Likelihood -627.2 -598.1 -412.9  
( 0 )iF α =    4.46 [0.000]  
Breusch-Pagan LM    140.7 [0.000] 
Hausman test    7.83 [0.100] 
Notes:   1. Dependent variable is age gap at marriage  
2. Robust standard errors are denoted in parentheses. 
3. * , **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively.  
 
 
An initial consideration is determining which of the models is the most appropriate. 
Homogeneity of the country effects is rejected for both panel data models (fixed effects: 
F=4.46; random effects: LM=140.7), suggesting pooled OLS estimates are inefficient at 
best. In column (3) we include the country specific effects, whereas column (4) extends the 
previous analysis with a random effects model. In addition, since the Hausman statistic fails 
to reject the null hypothesis of orthogonality at conventional levels of significance, the 
more efficient random effects estimates remain consistent and unbiased. Thus, from the 
statistical test the random effects model appears to be the adequate specification. 
Therefore, our preferred and baseline model for the remaining of the chapter is the one 
described in column (4).  
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The results under column (4) reveal that WEA, Sex ratio (15-44), URBAN and CEDAW 
are statistically significant. Furthermore, all of them show a negative sign, which confirm 
our expectations. On average an increase in female labour participation will accompany a 
decrease in the age gap at marriage. Therefore, LARGE gap scenarios will most likely 
occur when gender differences in labour participation are severely imbalanced.  Second, an 
increase in the number of women relative to men (15-44) will also reduce the age gap. 
Third, a smaller proportion of the population living in urban areas will increase age 
differences at marriage. Even if uncertainty about the traits of a potential spouse is higher 
in urban areas, social stigmas regarding pre-marital sex or gender specific roles, which are 
closely associated with rural areas, may induce women to marry younger. Fourth, the 
results also show that the impact of CEDAW is negative and statistically significant. The 
presence of the Committee could be accompanied with country specific amendments to 
their family and property laws that may potentially change the economic environment.   
 
On the whole, results in column (4) imply that gender equality in labour participation may 
reduce age differences at marriage between spouses by 2.1 years. Gender equality entails 
that for every 100 economically active men there are equal number of economically active 
women. Similarly, sex ratio imbalances have a rather significant effect. A decrease in the 
number of women relative to men, aged 15-44 years old, may increase the age gap. For 
example, a sudden reduction from a perfectly balanced sex ratio to 50 women for every 100 
men could increase the age gap by 1.2 years. The effect of urbanisation rates and CEDAW 
on the spousal gap appear to be less sizeable.  
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4.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis  
 
We acknowledged that causality between WEAit and Gapit might be an issue of concern. It 
can be argued that marital decisions might potentially affect labour choices. When 
endogeneity is a problem, to find appropriate instruments is a challenge, i.e. instruments 
that are correlated with the endogenous variable, WEA, and uncorrelated with the error 
term in the main equation, εit. To choose our instruments, we follow Goldin (1994) who, as 
we illustrated above, associated economic development and female labour participation. 
Goldin (1994) argued for a U-shaped relationship between female labour participation and 
economic development. Goldin (1994) used a sample that included most countries, except 
centrally planned economies and Muslim ones. In our study, we have removed polygynous 
(Po) and occasional polygynous (OP) countries from the sample. Polygynous countries are 
less developed and present higher rates of female labour participation196. In this way, these 
countries will be mostly placed in the upper part of the left hand-side of the U-shaped 
relationship. As a result of the exclusion of these countries, we are partly converting the U-
shaped relationship into a linear and increasing one, especially for the last decades, 1990 
and 2000.   
 
For that reason, we will instrument WEA with two different approaches that attempt to 
capture economic development in this way. First, we use as instruments for WEA: gross 
domestic product per capita, GDP per capita, and two geographic variables, distance from 
the equator and the length of a country coastline divided by its area197. The geographical 
                                                 
196 Table A.4.4 in appendix 4 shows the average values for WEA by marital system. WEA values for 
polygynous countries are far greater on average than for monogamous ones.  
197 GDP per capita come from the Heston et. al (2002) Penn World Table Version 6.1; Distance from the 
equator is the difference between countries latitude and the equator in absolute value (degrees of latitude), 
The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency (2008). The length of coastline divided by the country area 
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variables are also included as instruments for two reasons. First, GDP per capita may not 
fully capture some dimensions of economic development. In this way, geography has also 
been associated with economic development (Gallup et al., 1999). More importantly, 
distance from the equator and the length of a country coastline divided by its area, are two 
of the most exogenous variables. Moreover, there may be concerns regarding the 
exogeneity of GDP per capita, even if statistical tests suggest its appropriateness as 
instrument. To overcome this, we use a second instrumentation where we replace GDP per 
capita by population relative to potential land, which is a quality adjusted measure of 
population density198. Boserup (1981) argued that population density stimulates 
technological change, and hence economic development. The validity of the instruments is 
tested using a Sargan-Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions, as seems from the 
bottom of table 4.4 the null hypothesis of valid instruments cannot be rejected. 
 
Results of the Instrumental Variable-random effects are illustrated in table 4.4199. Column 
(1) and column (2) present the IV-random effects coefficients with the two sets of 
instruments respectively. The Sargan-Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, which 
evaluates the overall validity of the instruments, does seem to indicate the appropriateness 
of our sets of instruments in both specifications. In columns (1) and (2), we observe that 
the relationship between WEA and Gap remain fairly stable. Additionally, we also include 
the potential endogenous variable WEAt-1 in lagged values, and the results presented in 
column (3) once again confirm the negative and significant relationship between them.  
                                                                                                                                               
(metre/square kilometre) comes from The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency (2008); and United 
Nations (2008).  
198 Land is "Equivalent Potential arable land" or potential arable land adjusted for its suitability for rainfed 
crop production for any of the 21 major world crops (Bot et al., 2000). Population comes from PRED Bank, 
Version 3.0. Population density measured as population per square kilometre.  
199 The IV random effect estimation was performed using the xtivreg procedures in STATA version 10.0 
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Table 4.4 Sensitivity Analysis for the Spousal Age Gap (1950-2000)  
Independent variables IV- Random 
effects 
IV- Random 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Random 
effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
WEA -0.020** -0.025***  -0.020*** 
 (0.009) (0.006)  (0.004) 
     
WEAt-1   -0.015***  
   (0.004)  
     
Sex ratio (15-44) -0.033** -0.023* -0.023**  
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.011)  
     
Sex ratio    -0.012 
    (0.012) 
     
URBAN -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.013*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
     
CEDAW -0.199 -0.086 -0.258** -0.207* 
 (0.185) (0.178) (0.116) (0.119) 
     
Constant 8.814*** 7.765*** 7.241*** 6.383*** 
 (1.560) (1.404) (1.171) (1.190) 
Observations 334 371 383 421 
2R  0.266 0.233 0.196 0.226 
Sargan-Hansen test 0.25[0.88] 2.60 [0.27]   
Notes:   1. Dependent variable is age gap at marriage  
2. Robust standard errors are denoted in parentheses. 
3. * , **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
4. Sargan test or Sargan-Hanses where the null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated 
with the residuals  
 
As a further robustness check, we are concerned with the potential variability of the Sex 
ratio (15-44), and run a new specification using the sex ratio for all ages instead. Column (4) 
presents the results. Once again, we confirm our previous expectations and find that all the 
independent variables are statistically significant and with a negative sign, with the only 
exception of the sex ratio that appears not statistically significant200. To test for the 
robustness of the results we have also run our baseline model excluding 1950 and 1960 
observations, where data might be less reliable and consistent. In appendix 4, table A.4.5 
                                                 
200 Further robustness tests have been carried out with other age-specific sex ratios (15-24 years) and (15-64 
years) without finding significant differences.  
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illustrates the main results. Overall, WEA is negative and statistically significant, although 
the size of the coefficient is, as expected, smaller. By 1970, female participation rates in 
some developed countries have substantially increased. This is partly reflected in the value 
of the intercept. While for the period 1950-2000 the constant term was 7.789, between 
1970 and 2000 was 6.707. 
 
4.5.3 Religion, Institutions and Economic Development 
 
In this section, we test our baseline model for different sub-samples of countries, to 
evaluate whether our variables of interest are stable. Countries will be grouped according to 
religion, culture, institutions and economic development. Thus, we seek to account for 
heterogeneity based on specific country characteristic rather than by estimating country 
specific parameters.  
 
A) Religion  
 
As regards as religion, we understand that some religious beliefs can influence marital 
outcomes, specially, when family laws are based on them. For that reason, we will first test 
in our empirical model the effect that the percentages of Muslims and Roman Catholics in 
1980, Muslim80 and Catho80 henceforth, have on our main results. We selected these two 
religions because they are widespread across geographical regions. Percentages come from 
Laporta et al. (1999).  
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Table 4.5 Sensitivity Analysis: Spousal Age Gap and Religion 
 Random effects Random effects Random effects
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
    
WEA -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.018*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
    
Sex ratio (15-44) -0.024** -0.024** -0.022** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
    
URBAN -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.015*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
    
CEDAW -0.215* -0.199 -0.261** 
 (0.117) (0.122) (0.123) 
    
Muslim80  -0.001  
  (0.004)  
    
Catho80  -0.002  
  (0.002)  
    
Muslim   0.343 
   (0.424) 
    
Roman Catholic   0.367 
   (0.262) 
    
Constant 7.789*** 7.902*** 7.294*** 
 (1.086) (1.150) (1.183) 
Observations 421 421 421 
2R  0.235 0.235 0.262 
Notes:   1. Dependent variable is age gap at marriage 
2. Robust standard errors are denoted in parentheses. 
3. * , **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
Furthermore, we follow Barro and McLeary (2005) and sort countries according to their 
state religion in 1970 and 2000. In this way, we attempt to capture whether State religions 
influence marital decisions through family and marriage laws. For this purpose, we define a 
dummy variable, Muslim, as 1 for those countries where Islam is the State religion in 1970 
and 2000, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we define a second dummy variable, Roman Catholic, as 
1 for those countries where Roman Catholicism was the State religion in 1970 and 2000, 
and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 4.5 shows the results. Column (1) provides the baseline model, which is our 
preferred specification obtained in table 4.3. In Column (2), we observe that Muslim80 and 
Catho80 are not statistically significant and that WEA remains fairly stable, negative and 
statistically significant. Column (3) presents similar results. Whether Islam or Roman 
Catholicism, as State religions, impact age differences at marriage remain uncertain. On the 
whole, neither proportions of Muslim and Catholics, nor Islam and Roman Catholicism 
appear to be statistically significant. An increase in women labour participation relative to 
men will accompany a decrease in the age gap at marriage. The results are rather consistent 
and similar to our baseline model, in which an increase in labour participation reduces on 
average age differences at marriage between spouses by approximately 2 years.  
 
B) Institutions  
 
In this sub-section we test whether institutional differences impact upon our main results. 
For this purpose, we divided the sample into two new sub-samples. First, we question 
whether New World countries, as opposed to Old World ones, would change our main 
results. Previously, we observed that New World countries have on average higher 
urbanisation rates. Moreover, Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) argue that in most New World 
economies, inequalities in the distribution of wealth and political power during 
Colonisation encouraged the development of institutional structures that greatly 
advantaged small elites. In this way, we construct a new variable, Oldworld, for those 
countries where more than 50 percent of the current population speaks as mother tongue a 
language indigenous to the continent where the country is located201. This variable will 
allow us to split the sample between New World countries and Old World countries.  
                                                 
201 To construct the dummy variable Old World, we used data from Alesina et al. (2003) and Lewis (2009). 
First, we classified languages by family. Then, we verified which languages and families were indigenous. We 
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Furthermore, we have also observed in the summary statistics that many former USSR 
republics exhibit high levels of female labour participation. Whether this is a true fact, 
misreporting of data in these countries, or the rest of the world are under-reporting the 
participation of women in market activities deserve further analysis. For that reason, we 
define a new variable, Socialaw, for those countries where Socialist/Communist laws have 
been predominant during the period 1950-2000 (La Porta et al., 1999).  
 
Table 4.6 Sensitivity Analysis: Spousal Age Gap and Institutions 
Independent variables Total Old World New 
World 
Socialist Non-
Socialist 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
WEA -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.020** -0.016* -0.022*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) 
      
Sex ratio (15-44) -0.024** -0.028** 0.001 -0.032 -0.026** 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.023) (0.022) (0.010) 
      
URBAN -0.016*** -0.010*** -0.025*** 0.016** -0.019*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) 
      
CEDAW -0.215* -0.216 -0.267 -0.604*** -0.170 
 (0.117) (0.132) (0.231) (0.182) (0.135) 
      
Constant 7.789*** 7.638*** 5.755** 6.884*** 8.152*** 
 (1.086) (1.279) (2.606) (2.455) (1.132) 
Observations 421 264 157 67 354 
2R  0.235 0.176 0.304 0.434 0.244 
Notes:   1. Dependent variable is age gap at marriage  
2. Robust standard errors are denoted in parentheses. 
3. * , **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
Table 4.6 illustrates the results. Column (1) reports the results of our baseline model as 
usual. Columns (2) and (3) provide the coefficients for Old World and New World. As we can 
observe from table 4.6, these coefficients appear to be fairly stable, except for the Sex ratio 
which looses statistical significance for New World countries. Columns (4) and (5) focus on 
                                                                                                                                               
define a language or a family as indigenous if it was widely spoken in the continent where the country belongs 
in 1500. Finally, the percentage of the population speaking an indigenous or non-indigenous language was 
computed. 
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Socialist or centrally planned economies. Overall, we accept our main hypothesis for each 
sub-sample. The sex ratio is also statistically insignificant for Socialist countries, although 
WEA continues to show a negative relationship for all sub-samples.  
 
We understand that inequalities in the distribution of land or the collectivisation of 
agriculture could have a significant impact on the participation of women in labour market 
activities. The results illustrated in table 4.6 imply that gender equality in labour 
participation has a lower impact, particularly in Socialist countries, reducing the gap by 
approximately 1.6 years on average. In the former USSR, in 1965 family laws were 
reformed making divorces easier (Moskoff, 1983). This, in fact, could have an impact on 
marital decisions too. As we stated above, if divorce is a credible threat and easy to obtain, 
women will have more incentives to participate in market activities, and following our line 
of reasoning, reduce gender differences at marriage. Mincer (1985) showed that labour 
force rates of women reached the level of men after 1970 in the USSR. As a result, the 
spousal gap would be a SMALL gap202.  
 
C) Economic Development  
 
Finally, we consider the level of economic development across countries. In this way, we 
divide the sample into two new sub-samples: OECD and non-OECD countries. The 
results are presented in table 4.7.  
 
                                                 
202 The highest spousal gap observed within Socialist countries corresponds to Albania in 1955 with 4.7 years. 
Among non-Socialist countries, Greece in 1981 or Norway in 1960 exhibited higher spousal gaps with 5.1 
and 4.8 respectively.  
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Table 4.7 Sensitivity Analysis: Spousal Age Gap and Economic Development 
Independent variables Total OECD non-OECD 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
WEA -0.021*** -0.017*** -0.024*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
    
Sex ratio (15-44) -0.024** -0.041*** -0.017 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) 
    
URBAN -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
    
CEDAW -0.215* -0.194 -0.267 
 (0.117) (0.135) (0.175) 
    
Constant 7.789*** 9.085*** 7.201*** 
 (1.086) (1.711) (1.251) 
Observations 421 161 260 
2R  0.235 0.244 0.221 
Notes:   1. Dependent variable is age gap at marriage  
2. Robust standard errors are denoted in parentheses. 
3. * , **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
 
Independently of the degree of economic development, an increase in women labour 
participation relative to men will be accompanied by a decrease in the age gap at marriage. 
However, while in OECD countries gender equality in labour participation may reduce age 
differences at marriage between spouses by approximately 1.7 years, in non-OECD 
countries the age gap may be reduced by 2.4 years. These results confirm that an increase in 
the participation of women in the labour market relative to men will have a greater impact 
in less economically developed countries. Many of these countries exhibit significant 
gender inequalities in labour participation, which may induce women to marry early.  
 
Finally, figure A.4.6 in appendix 4 illustrates the long term patterns of Gap and WEA by 
major sub-sample. Overall, female participation rates have increased more rapidly in 
OECD countries than in non-OECD countries. While the spousal gap has gradually 
decreased in OECD countries, non-OECD countries have moved from a LARGE gap to 
a SMALL one in less than forty years. New World countries present, on the other hand, 
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very low female participation rates in 1950 accompanied by a spousal gap way above 4 
years. The New World countries include some OECD ones, such as United States, Canada, 
Mexico, Australia and New Zealand, which if excluded, would decrease (increase) female 
participation rates (spousal gap) even further. Conversely, Socialist countries present very 
high rates of female participation for the period of study accompanied by a spousal gap 
around 4 years. Having a closer look at the economic environment of men and women in 
Socialist and New World countries would throw more light on the subject. Nonetheless, we 
regard this study as the first step to answer the following question: to what extent gender 
equality in labour participation rates have reflected on marriage patterns across regions and 
over time? 
 
 
4.6 Conclusion   
The main objective of this chapter was to empirically assess the long term relationship 
between gender differences in labour participation and age differences at marriage. To do 
so, we construct a panel dataset from several sources for all the countries with available 
data that spans from 1950-2000. Our main findings reveal that there is a negative and 
statistically significant association between our two main variables. This is robust to the 
inclusion of some control variables such as the sex ratio and the rate of urbanisation; to 
different estimation methods; and to different sample sets.  
 
Evidence from this chapter supports the view that gender equality in labour participation 
rates may induce a SMALL gap. We argue that if women earn no income, they would not 
be able to spend time and resources to reduce uncertainty about the traits of a potential 
spouse. In this way, they would not be able to marry their ‘preferred’ man. The costs of 
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living, and other costs associated with pre-marital sex or social norms regarding gender 
specific roles, would further encourage women to marry young. Men, on the other hand, 
would postpone marriage to acquire wealth for the newly formed household, which in turn, 
would lead to a LARGE gap. If, on the other hand, women earn an income, they would be 
able to spend resources and time to find their ‘preferred’ man. In addition, women would 
jointly contribute with men to the newly formed household with their income. As a result, 
the spousal gap may decrease, SMALL gap.  
 
Therefore, if gender equality in labour participation rates is strongly associated with a 
SMALL gap, this would imply (on average) positive assortive mating in age. Conversely, if 
the ‘preferred’ man of women is of a similar age, then observed LARGE gaps would imply 
substantial gender inequalities in labour participation. Whether convergence in age 
differences between spouses is achieved across regions, would also imply that, given similar 
economic environments men and women behave pretty much alike.   
 
Marriage in colonial North America was notable for being early for women, rather different 
from the Northwest European pattern of late marriage for men and women (Haines, 1996). 
Both regions had a very similar, if not the same, neolocal residential pattern and cultural 
traits. Although American men married earlier than most of the Northwest Europeans, the 
spousal age gap was still higher. The special economic environment of colonial North 
America with abundant resources and imbalance sex ratios could have led to this spousal 
age gap in the early years of colonisation. Nonetheless, once sex ratios were more balanced, 
age differences at marriage remained relatively larger than the Northwest European pattern 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries for a considerable period of time.  
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Figure A.4.7 in appendix 4 illustrates the above discussion with data for Great Britain and 
the United States for the period of time 1850-2000. The long term patterns of gender 
inequalities in labour participation of Great Britain and the United States followed a rather 
similar trend, although the levels were substantially higher in Great Britain in the 
nineteenth century. Goldin (1994) would have claimed that abundant resources could have 
led families to implicitly buy women’s work, which in turn would explain the larger spousal 
gap. Alexis de Tocqueville, a Northwest European, described the economic environment 
and role of American women in the nineteenth century203,  
 
“As for myself, I do not hesitate to avow that although the women of the United States are confined within 
the narrow circle of domestic life, and their situation is in some respects of one extreme dependence, I have 
nowhere seen woman occupying a loftier position; and if I were asked, now that I am drawing to the close of 
this work, in which I have spoken of so many important things done by the Americans, to what the 
singular prosperity and growing strength of that people ought mainly to be attributed, I should reply: to the 
superiority of their women.”  
 
Regarding “Northwest European” women, Ivy Pinchbeck described the economic 
environment and role of English women in the eighteenth century204,  
 
“In the mid-eighteenth century the population of England was mainly rural, and women were largely 
engaged in productive work in their homes and in some form of domestic industry. In the town, the 
industrial woman wage earner was not unknown and a large number of women were engaged in some form 
of trade; but here again, women more often shared the activities of their husbands and acted as partners in 
the industrial, as in the agricultural sphere…” 
                                                 
203 Alexis de Tocqueville (1865: 299). 
204 Ivy Pinchbeck (1930: 306). 
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To conclude, notwithstanding the relevance of other major factors that could determine 
the spousal gap such as sex ratios, wealth inequality, the desire for children, education and 
human capital, we find that the participation of women in the labour market plays a 
decisive role. Nonetheless we advocate for further research on the factors that have driven 
female labour participation throughout history. If Malthus (1798) argued that scarcity 
discourages marriage and the rearing of the family; perhaps, we should think if abundance 
and scarcity have shaped our marriage customs too.  
 149
5. Marriage and Economic Development 
5.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapters, we have introduced two main relationships. Chapter 3 focused on 
the relationship between female labour participation and marital systems. Overall, we 
found that at low levels of economic development, female labour participation is a strong 
predictor of the incidence of polygyny, which has been highly prevalent in sub-Saharan 
Africa for centuries205. The high incidence of polygynous unions observed in some 
countries may be explained when the contribution of wives to the household wealth is 
relatively high. Moreover, we also discussed that as economies grow and inequality 
increases, the African polygyny equilibrium would break down206. As a result, Harem 
polygyny would emerge, but eventually would give way to the Monogamy equilibrium 
observed in modern economies.   
 
In chapter 4, on the other hand, we argued that gender equality in labour participation may 
induce a SMALL spousal gap within monogamous countries. In this way, if women earn 
no income, they would not be able to spend time and resources to reduce uncertainty 
about the traits of a potential spouse. As a consequence, they would not be able to marry 
their ‘preferred’ man. The costs of living, and other costs associated with pre-marital sex or 
social norms regarding gender specific roles, would further encourage women to marry 
young. In these circumstances, men would postpone marriage to acquire wealth for the 
                                                 
205 In chapter 2 we also found a high incidence of polygyny unions in other countries or territories such as 
Afghanistan, the Maldives and Papua New Guinea, among others. In this regard, polygynous unions in 
Melanesia have been frequently recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas.  
206 At early stages of economic development, the relationship between the level of income per capita and 
income inequality tends to be positive (Kuznets, 1955). 
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newly formed household, which in turn, would lead to a LARGE gap207. If women earn an 
income, they would be able to spend resources and time to find their ‘preferred’ man. 
Moreover, women would jointly contribute with men to the household wealth. Then, the 
spousal gap may decrease, and hence the SMALL gap.  
 
In both chapters, gender differences in female labour participation were closely associated 
with marital patterns: (i) marital systems, and (ii) the spousal age gap. Chapter 3 also 
discussed that changes in the distribution of wealth may also have an impact on the 
evolution of marital systems. Additionally, male wage inequality may induce women to 
postpone marriage, and hence the spousal age gap decreases208. On the whole, we observe 
that female labour and wealth inequality have an impact of marriage patterns209. 
Nonetheless, whether marriage patterns have been shaped throughout history by cross-
sectional variations in female labour participation and income inequality deserves further 
discussion.  
 North (1991) defined institutions as “…humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, 
                                                 
207 This would not be the case for wealthy men, whose decision of marriage would be independent of 
economic constraints. Nonetheless, wealthy men have been far from being the average man throughout 
history. If this was the case, we would have more equal societies which, given the Kuznets curve, would occur 
among hunter-gatherers or advanced economies.  
208 Loughran (2002) and Gould and Paserman (2003)  
209 Previously, we defined female labour in terms of the total contribution of women to their household. This 
includes household work and market work. Household work leads to the production of household goods, 
while market work implies the production of food in subsistence economies or earning an income. Wealth 
inequality, on the other hand, can be composed of labour income (wage) or non-labour income. We have 
assumed throughout the study that in traditional societies wealth inequality is mainly caused by non-labour 
income. Milanovic et al. (2007) found that inequality in pre-industrial times was largely driven by the 
differences between the rural poor and the landed elite. Piketty (2003) concludes that in France and possibly 
among other countries in the twentieth century, wage inequality has actually been extremely stable in the long 
run, and the decline in income inequality is for the most part a capital income phenomenon.  
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traditions and codes of conduct) and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)” 210. As the 
economic environment evolves, we would expect institutions to reflect on these changes. 
Marriage is no exception and throughout history, gender differences in labour participation 
and wealth inequality have fluctuated. Then, the degree of gender equality in labour 
participation may be a strong predictor of marital patterns. Additionally, income inequality 
may affect the incentives structure of bachelors and spinsters. 
  
In this way, our next objective will be to analyse gender differences in labour participation 
and income inequality over time. For that purpose, if we may see “a little further it is by 
standing on the shoulders of giants”. Thus, section 5.2 will discuss the Goldin curve, which 
associates female labour participation and economic development (Goldin, 1994). Section 
5.3 will explore the relationship between the income distribution and economic 
development or Kuznets curve (Kuznets, 1955), while section 5.4 will provide some 
concluding remarks.   
 
 
5.2 The Goldin curve and Marriage 
In chapter 3, we explored the relationship between gender equality in labour participation 
and marital systems. Goldin (1994) studied the relationship between economic 
development and gender equality, and argued that the labour participation rates of married 
women first declines and then rises as countries develop, hence the U-shaped relationship 
or Goldin curve211. Goldin (1994) explained that the resulting U-shaped relationship may be 
                                                 
210 North (1991: 97) 
211 Goldin (1994) distinguished between married and unmarried women. In our study, we do not make such 
distinction and assume gender differences in labour participation irrespective of the marital status. To do so, 
we use the ratio of women economically active per 100 men, denoted as WEA. 
 152
the result of a strong income effect and a weak substitution effect accompanied by a 
change in the location of production, from home to the factory212. As income rose, female 
labour participation decreased because families often implicitly bought women’s work, and 
as a result women retreated into the home213. The decrease in the demand for women’s 
labour in agriculture, and social stigmas associated with manual labour-intensive work, 
could have led to this situation. As traditional societies transform into modern ones, and 
skilled labour is highly demanded, the opportunity cost of staying at home increases and 
women move back into the labour force, which is captured by the move along the rising 
portion of the U-shaped relationship214.  
 
The Goldin curve turns out to be a relevant concept for the understanding of the 
relationship between gender equality in labour participation and marital systems. In chapter 
3, we found that female contribution to subsistence was a strong predictor of African 
polygyny. Moreover, African polygyny was also strongly associated with sedentary patterns 
of settlement. Similarly, gender equality in labour participation was closely related with 
countries with a high incidence of polygynous unions. This was more significant, once we 
controlled for the level of economic development. Overall, our results in chapter 3 would 
support the view that African polygyny may exist if and only if wives contribute largely to 
the wealth of the household.  
 
                                                 
212 The substitution effect would depend on the price of market and household labour.  
213 As Goldin (1994) explains income may rise as a result of the expansion of the market (Internal) or the 
introduction of new technology (external)  
214 The process suggests an initially strong income effect combined with a small own-substitution effect. At 
some point the substitution effect increases while the income effect may decline. During the falling portion of 
the U the income effect dominates, but during the rising portion of the U the substitution effect dominates 
(Goldin, 1994).  
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Figure 5.1 Female Contribution to Subsistence and Intensity of Agriculture 
30
35
40
45
Fe
m
ale
 C
on
tri
bu
tio
n 
to
 S
ub
sis
te
nc
e 
(%
)
No Agriculture Casual Extensive Horticulture Intensive Intensive*
Intensity of Agriculture
 
Source: Ethnographic Atlas (Obs. = 616 societies) 
Notes: (i) No Agriculture; (ii) Casual: Casual agriculture, incidental to other subsistence modes; (iii) 
Extensive: Extensive or shifting agriculture, long fallow, and new fields cleared annually; (iv) Horticulture: 
Horticulture, vegetal gardens or groves of fruit trees; (v) Intensive: Intensive agriculture, using fertilization, 
crop rotation, or other techniques to shorten or eliminate fallow period; (vi) Intensive*: Intensive irrigated 
agriculture (World Cultures, 1999)  
 
Along these lines, Boserup (1970) observed that women did most of the agricultural work 
in sparsely populated regions, where extensive agriculture was predominant. In this regard, 
the Ethnographic Atlas may throw more light on the subject. Figure 5.1 illustrates female 
contribution to subsistence and intensity of agriculture215. We have computed the average 
of Female Contribution by the type of agriculture, which is described in the Ethnographic 
Atlas, variable 28: Intensity of Agriculture. Table A.5.1 in appendix 5 shows the 
codification. Figure 5.1 shows that female contribution to subsistence is higher when 
horticulture and extensive or shifting agriculture predominates. Agriculture intensification 
implies lower female contribution to subsistence. The Ethnographic Atlas also illustrates 
                                                 
215 Female contribution to subsistence, Female Contribution, was introduced and defined in chapter 3. This 
reflects as a percentage the total contribution of women to subsistence. Tables A.3.4 and A.3.5 in appendix 3, 
presents the Ethnographic codification. For a more detailed information see chapter 3, section 3.4.2.1.  
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that, while horticulture and extensive agriculture were predominant mainly in Melanesia, 
Micronesia, Polynesia and sub-Sahara Africa; intensive agriculture was widely observed in 
most Eurasian societies216. This would relate agriculture intensification to marital systems. 
African polygyny is mainly present in sub-Saharan Africa. There is also evidence of a high 
incidence of polygyny in Melanesia217. 
 
 
Boserup (1965) argued that when population density increased, and hence the amount of 
natural resources per head was reduced, extensive agriculture could no longer survive if 
new open fields were not available. This could have partly explained why the demand for 
women’s labour in agriculture decreased in Eurasia. Moreover, large populations could 
better afford investments in basic infrastructure which in turn would have improved the 
standards of living (Boserup, 1981). Furthermore, agriculture intensification may also have 
a significant impact on land tenure systems. Property rights, or at least the need of a more 
restrictive system of land tenure, may emerge when land becomes scarce. In this way, a 
system of property rights would affect ownership and the distribution of land –among 
other movable or immovable assets-, making possible the accumulation and transmission 
of wealth across generations.  
 
In these conditions, wealthy families would be able to implicitly buy women’s work, and 
men and women from landless families would have to seek for work outside the home. In 
                                                 
216 More than seventy percent of sedentary societies in sub-Saharan Africa were classified as having extensive 
or shifting agriculture. In Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia more than ninety percent were described as 
horticulturalists. In Eurasia two thirds of societies were described as having intensive agriculture. Most 
societies in the New World were nomadic or semi-nomadic.  
217 African polygyny or Polygyny 2 was observed in New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon 
Islands in the Ethnographic Atlas. Moreover, Papua New Guinea was classified as polygynous (Po) in table 
A.2.4 in appendix 2. Only Fiji, out of five Melanesian countries and territories, was classified as monogamous 
(Mo). 
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traditional societies, where the demand for skilled labour is relatively low, manual labour-
intensive work may be regarded as inappropriate for women, and hence social stigmas 
could arise218. As a result, women retreat into the home as Goldin (1994) would have 
argued219. Therefore, increased population density may have two main effects: (i) a direct 
effect on the demand for agricultural work, and (ii) an indirect effect on institutions 
regarding ownership and the distribution of land, which in turn, moves production away 
from the family, essentially for those who are landless or incapable of investing in other 
trades.  
 
Figure 5.1 provides further insight regarding the Goldin curve. When agriculture is casual or 
incidental, female contribution to subsistence also appears to be lower220. This fact would 
reflect on hunter-gatherers and pastoralists, who are mostly nomadic or semi-nomadic. 
Among hunter-gatherers, where there is complete specialisation within the household (men 
hunt while women gather), lower female contribution to subsistence is due to the relative 
importance of hunting with respect to gathering. This, in turn, would depend on the 
                                                 
218 These social stigmas could arise if parents, husband or the potential employer regard women as 
inappropriate for the specific work. In this regard, social stigmas may be strongly and positively associated 
with income levels. In figure A.5.2 in appendix 5, we observed that gender differences in labour participation 
in high developed economies during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were lower than in low developed 
countries in the twentieth century, but still above forty women for every 100 men economically active in 
Northwest Europe. This would imply that not all families would be able to buy women’s work. Among poor 
and landless families, women would be expected to contribute to the wealth of the household.  
219 In some regions, women were closely associated with the home production of textiles. During the Sung 
period in China: “Whatever women contributed to general agriculture, in the imagination of the Chinese scholars women’s 
work largely lay elsewhere. Their work was the slow and tedious production of textiles, one largely within the confines of the home. 
Symbolically women were associated with cloth, and since ancient times the sexual division of labour had been epitomized by the 
saying that men plow and women weave.” Ebrey (1993: 132). Nevertheless the production of textiles involved costs 
that not all families would have been able to afford, “Not all women in peasant families would have worked at making 
cloth. Differences in climate and soil made some areas unsuited for the production of cloth, or so suited to something else like tea 
that the family specialized in that activity, purchasing whatever cloth they needed. The very poorest families might not be able to 
secure the land and equipment needed to produce cloth…” Ebrey (1993: 133). 
220 Murdock and Provost (1973) provide a good review of the division of labour by sex across societies.  
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availability of wild food. Among pastoralists, on the other hand, women appear to 
contribute on average less than men. In both scenarios, monogamy and polygyny have 
been frequently observed, although polygynous unions involve in most cases co-wives 
sharing habitation.  
 
White (1988) observed that in nomadic societies, sisters assist one another in household 
activities i.e. packing, unpacking, cooking or gathering food. In this way, we are inclined to 
think that the economic activity rate of women, among hunter-gatherers and pastoralists 
may be relatively lower than that for sedentary women in shifting agriculture. Although this 
result would require further analysis and research, we may be able to augment the 
conventional Goldin curve. Figure 5.2 illustrates the ‘augmented’ Goldin curve. We assume 
that given the ethnographic evidence found, the economic activity rate of nomadic and 
semi-nomadic women may be lower221. Moreover, the falling portion of the U-shaped 
relationship in the Goldin curve is well illustrated in figure 5.1.  
 
The ‘augmented’ Goldin curve may throw more light on the economic role played by 
women throughout history, and consequently on marital patterns. In chapter 3, we 
discussed how the transition from a nomadic to a sedentary lifestyle would have affected 
marital systems, and whether hunter-gatherers once they settle down would have followed 
the African polygyny route or the monogamy one222. In this regard, we are inclined to think 
                                                 
221 Our study attempts to compare the economic role played by women throughout history. In this regard, we 
acknowledge gender specific roles within the household regarding the production of household goods. 
Nonetheless, in order to understand labour and marriage patterns in the long run we need to compare male 
and female labour participation rates. 
222 As we showed earlier, high levels of polygyny where co-wives share habitation -mainly sororal polygyny-, 
were closely associated with nomads or semi-nomads. This would leave us with two possible equilibriums, 
monogamy with a low incidence of polygynous unions or the African polygyny equilibrium where many men 
and women were married polygynously and co-wives live in separate dwellings.   
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that African polygyny would have existed in Eurasia too223. If wives contribute largely to 
increase the wealth of the household, and inequality remains low, there is little reason to 
neglect the possibility of African polygyny in other regions throughout history. Sadly, the 
evidence to support this view is scant, and further research is needed. 
 
Figure 5.2 The ‘augmented’ Goldin curve 
 
 
The rising portion of the Goldin curve has been well documented and analysed. As 
traditional societies grew into modern ones and skilled labour is highly demanded, the 
opportunity cost of staying at home increases and women may move back into the labour 
force (Goldin, 1994)224. Moreover, once manual labour-intensive work gives way to more 
                                                 
223 The transition from hunting-gathering to permanent settlement and agriculture is commonly referred as 
the Neolithic revolution. 
224 Goldin (2006) divides the rising portion of the U-shaped relationship into four well defined stages: (i) Late 
Nineteenth century to 1920s, (ii) Transition, 1930-1950, (iii) ‘Roots of the Revolution’ 1950-1970s and (iv) 
The Quiet Revolution, 1970-today.  
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skilled work, social stigmas will be reduced. In this way, female labour participation appears 
to reach a historical low with the Industrial Revolution. Pinchbeck (1930) argued that 
during the Industrial Revolution female dependence on male wages increased. Horrell and 
Humphries (1995) support this view and explain that the decline in participation was 
caused not only by supply shifts but by changes in demand. Since then, many theories have 
attempted to explain how women moved back from home to the workplace. Supply factors 
such as the introduction of contraceptive methods, Goldin and Katz (2002); household 
technologies, Greenwood et al. (2005); cultural beliefs about the long run payoff to 
working, Fernandez (2007); have accompanied demand factors such as the rise of the 
clerical sector, the rate of unemployment or social stigmas associated to employers.  
 
Figure 5.3.a illustrates the Goldin curve in 1980. We use gender differences in labour 
participation, as opposed to labour force participation rates for women 45-59 years old225. 
Throughout the study, gender differences in labour participation have been captured with 
the ratio of women economically active for every 100 men (WEA). From figure 5.3.a, we 
observe that our polygynous countries or territories occupy the left upper tail of the U-
shaped relationship. The only exceptions are Burundi, Haiti, Madagascar and China. The 
first three were classified as monogamous, given the available marital status data, although 
there is evidence of polygynous behaviour in the past. In the case of China, as most 
centrally planned economies, the rates of female participation were well above the average.  
 
                                                 
225 Goldin (1994) used the labour force participation rates for women 45 to 59 years old and the log of 
GDP/capita, both for 1985. Moreover, the centrally planned economies and countries of the Middle East 
(except Israel) were excluded. Also, Goldin (1994) omitted twenty countries for which the labour force data 
differed widely from those given for employment status. The regression line is quadratic in the log of GDP 
per capita.  
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Figure A.5.1 in appendix 5 provides further insight into the Goldin curve. We present, for a 
balanced selection of countries, the U-shaped relationship between gender differences in 
labour participation and economic development for 1950 and 2000. This figure illustrates 
how the Goldin curve has pivoted upwards around the less developed countries which are 
mostly polygynous and where gender equality in labour participation has remained fairly 
constant. Generally, gender differences in labour participation have been gradually reduced. 
This has been particularly acute in high developed economies, which have also experienced 
a rapid decline in the spousal gap. If we exclude polygynous countries, LARGE spousal 
gaps would be predominantly associated with non-polygynous countries located at the 
bottom of the Goldin curve. As income rose, and families bought women’s work, we would 
expect women to marry relatively young, and men to postpone marriage to acquire wealth.  
 
Figure A.5.2 in appendix 5 shows the long term patterns (1850-2000) of gender differences 
in labour participation for a selection of countries. All of these countries are nowadays high 
developed economies. To contrast these patterns, we also include the sex ratios, given the 
total male and female populations. In this way, we observe that among high developed 
countries, the “Northwest European” and the “Mediterranean” marriage patterns can be 
easily distinguished. The former was closely associated with a SMALL spousal gap, while 
the latter present a LARGE gap226.  
                                                 
226 As we explained in chapter 4, LARGE refers to spousal gaps above our cutting point of 3 years. Haines 
(1986) provides evidence for some of these countries. The spousal gap in Great Britain and Belgium in 1900 
was 1.1 and 1.9 years respectively, while in the United States and Italy were 3.9 and 3.6 years.  
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Figure 5.3.a WEA and Economic development, 1980 
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Figure 5.3.b Gini index and Economic development, 1980 
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Source: PRED Bank, Version 3.0; Heston et al. (2002); Deininger and Squire (1996) 
Notes: WEA stands for the ratio of women economically active for every 100 men. GDP per capita stands 
for real gross domestic product ($ current prices). Gini index: a value of 0 represents absolute equality, and a 
value of 100 absolute income inequality; Countries are balanced for both figures. Figure 5.2.a: WEA = 
749.4679 – 174.6234*Log(GDP per capita) + 10.831*Log (GDP per capita)2, N=88, R2 = 0.3533; Figure 
5.2.b: Gini Index= -2.04520 + 0.6874*Log(GDP per capita) –  0.0467*Log (GDP per capita)2, N=88, R2 = 
0.3508.  
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 Figure A.5.2 illustrates that while Northern and Western European countries had a WEA 
value around fifty women economically active for every hundred men in the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century, Southern European and New World countries 
experienced lower levels. Only exception was Italy, which presents a comparable pattern to 
Northwest European countries227. These levels are rather similar to those observed for 
medium developed countries in figure 5.3.a in 1980. Nonetheless, marital patterns may also 
be influenced by other factors in the long run. One of them was introduced in chapter 3: 
the distribution of income within a country. In this way, the next section introduces the 
Kuznets curve that would relate income inequality and economic development. 
 
5.3 The Kuznets curve and Marriage 
Kuznets (1955) observed that along the process of economic development, the income 
distribution first became more unequal, and then more equal, generating an inverted U-
shaped relationship or Kuznets curve228. The hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between income inequality and economic development has been well 
documented. Barro (2000) argued that, although the Kuznets curve does not explain the 
size of differences of inequality across countries and over time, it emerges as a clear 
empirical regularity. Banerjee and Duflo (2003) using non-parametric methods show that 
the growth rate is an inverted U-shaped function of net changes in inequality. In the first 
stages of economic development (hunting-gathering) wealth inequality may not be 
substantial. This is because hunter-gatherers would not be able to accumulate and transmit 
                                                 
227 The unification of Italy occurred in 1861 and data were first available in 1871 (Bairoch et al., 1968).  
228 Robinson (1976) further developed the original hypothesis some years later.  
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wealth across generations. Similarly, if ownership and property rights are not well 
established, we would expect that wealth inequality remains relatively low.  
 
Figure 5.3.b illustrates the Kuznets curve229. Overall, we find that our polygynous countries 
present lower levels of income inequality than monogamous and medium developed ones. It 
is also likely that natural resources have pushed the levels of income inequality up in low 
developed countries. This can be partly explained with data on the distribution of land, 
which presents a rather different scenario. While polygynous countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa provide an average Gini’s index of land concentration of 0.461 in 1990, in 
monogamous Europe and America the values are 0.578 and 0.776 respectively. Among the 
high developed economies twenty years earlier in 1970, the Gini’s index of land 
concentration was 0.615230. Moreover, in some polygynous countries, property rights are 
not well established, and “communal land” prevails. Under traditional systems of land 
tenure, property may not be perfectly transmitted across generations.  
 
Therefore, if wealth inequality is low, polygyny would arise when women rather prefer to 
enter an established household than to form a new one. This would occur if an established 
household with a married couple and their children may offer a higher level of wealth or 
consumption to potential spouse. Thus, if women contribute to the household, men would 
have incentives to take a second wife. Then, a high incidence of polygyny would be 
possible when young women marry older married men. This would create large age 
differences between husband and young wives.   
 
                                                 
229 We estimate the Goldin and Kuznets curves for the same sample of countries. Our objective will be to 
compare both results later on.  
230 FAO (1995): Programme for the World Census of Agriculture 2000. 
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If, on the other hand, inequality increases, the African polygyny equilibrium would break 
down. This, in fact, is very significant for the understanding of marriage patterns over time. 
Once wealth may be accumulated and transmitted across generations, wealth inequality 
would grow within a country. In this way, the distribution of wealth would depend upon 
class, not age as before, and wealthy men and women would be highly regarded as marriage 
prospects. Moreover, if wealth inequality is accompanied by a decrease in the demand for 
women’s labour, then Harem polygyny could arise231.  
 
Harem polygyny would involve few men marrying or mating with many women232. If wealth 
inequality is high, some women would have incentives to become the second wife, 
concubine or mistress of a wealthy man. This may increase the pressure on less wealthy 
men to provide their wives with enough wealth to reduce those incentives, which would 
lead to the LARGE gap. Ultimately, women would decide about the best alternative, 
whether to remain within their family, marry and form a new household or become the 
second wife, concubine or mistress of a wealthy man. 
 
Following this line of argument, we are inclined to think that Harem polygyny would have 
occurred at the early stages of economic development, once income inequality started to 
increase. In chapter 3, we discussed that an increase in the standard of living would require 
higher levels of income inequality to maintain Harem polygyny. In addition, wealthy men 
would have incentives to compromise to monogamous marriage in order to avoid social 
conflict. As inequality fell following the Kuznets curve, Harem polygyny would progressively 
                                                 
231 Previously, we discuss the effect that the establishment of property rights may have on female labour 
participation. Landless men and women would have to seek work outside their home, which may be affected 
by social stigmas regarding the appropriateness of women to do manual labour-intensive work. 
232 Most studies do not usually distinguish between African and Harem polygyny, and treat them equally. The 
main distinction has to do with the intensity of polygyny. Harem polygyny implies many women married 
polygynously with few men, while African polygyny involves many men and women married polygynously. 
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turn into Monogamy with occasional polygyny, and later into the Monogamy equilibrium 
observed nowadays in many modern societies. Furthermore, if falling wealth inequality was 
accompanied by increasing gender equality in labour participation as figures 5.3.a and 5.3.b 
illustrate, then the spousal gap may decrease towards a SMALL gap. This is partly 
explained because women would have less incentive to marry young and more resources to 
find their ‘preferred’ man, while men would be less concerned about acquiring wealth.   
 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have discussed two relevant long term relationships regarding economic 
development. First, the Goldin curve which associates female labour participation and 
economic development. Then, we briefly explored the relationship between income 
inequality and economic development, or Kuznets curve. Figure 5.4 illustrates both 
relationships. It seems that both, gender equality in female labour participation and income 
inequality have followed opposed paths. When gender equality in labour participation was 
high income equality was low. This is also reflected on marital patterns. Among nomadic or 
semi-nomadic societies, lower rates of female contribution to subsistence and high costs 
associated with their particular lifestyle led to monogamy and some polygyny233. The 
transition from a nomadic settlement pattern to a sedentary one brought changes in marital 
systems. In this way, African polygyny would have emerged.  
 
                                                 
233 The Ethnographic Atlas shows that 61.3 percent of nomadic or semi-nomadic societies were monogamous 
and independent nuclear, while 38.2 percent were polygynous –mostly with co-wives sharing habitation- and 
0.5 percent were polyandrous.   
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As income rose, gender equality in labour participation decreased which would have been 
accompanied by an increase in income inequality. Under these circumstances, African 
polygyny would have given way to Harem polygyny and monogamy. This would have been 
accompanied by a LARGE spousal gap, which has been traditionally associated with the 
“Mediterranean” marriage pattern and some Eastern societies. Further increases in income 
would be accompanied by falling income inequality and more gender equality in labour 
participation, which in turn would lead to monogamy and a SMALL gap. 
 
Figure 5.4 The ‘augmented’ Goldin curve and the ‘augmented’ Kuznets curve 
 
 
Nonetheless, there is one question which still remains unanswered, why sub-Saharan 
Africa? Whether climatic conditions or slavery hinder population growth; geographic 
barriers obstructed the transmission of technology; or simply abundance of resources 
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and to higher rates of economic growth remains unknown. Further research and analysis 
would be required. In this way, archaeological evidence may throw some light on these 
mysteries. Nevertheless, economic development seems to have reflected on marital 
patterns, which in many cases do not appear to have evolved much234.  
 
                                                 
234 Our views attempt to supplement Galor and Weil (1996, 2000) who argued that the Gender Gap or 
relative wages have an effect on fertility decisions, population growth, capital intensity and economic growth. 
In this study, we abstract from fertility decisions, and look at marriage and the Gender Gap which is captured 
by gender differences in labour participation. 
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6. Conclusion   
This final chapter briefly summarizes the findings of this thesis. We looked at the 
relationship between female labour and marriage by focusing on two widely observed 
marriage patterns. Chapter 3 analysed marital systems, henceforth polygyny and 
monogamy, while the spousal age gap was explored in chapter 4. In both cases, we relate 
the economic role played by women in a society with these marital outcomes. After 
concluding our analysis we confirm the importance of studying this relationship. In this 
way, this thesis contributes to the existing literature in several dimensions.  
We observe that African polygyny is mainly found among sedentary societies. Nomadic and 
semi-nomadic societies tend to be more monogamous, which goes in line with our model 
that points to the relative importance of the contribution of women, as wives, to the wealth 
of the household. Among hunter-gatherers and nomadic pastoralists, female contribution 
to subsistence appears to be relatively lower than that of women in societies where 
extensive or shifting agriculture and horticulture predominates. Only sixty-four out of 442 
nomadic or semi-nomadic societies were described as having African polygyny in the 
Ethnographic Atlas.  
 
This would imply that nomadic societies were essentially monogamous or sororal-
polygynous where sisters assist each other and share habitation. The complete 
specialisation of hunter-gatherers and the costs associated with impermanent settlements 
entail that the taking of a second wife will be more costly. Regardless, polygyny was 
frequent among those who were able to afford these costs or enjoy special privileges, i.e. 
chiefs, shamans. 
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The transition from a nomadic lifestyle to a sedentary one may have brought changes to 
the way men and women mated. Given the available evidence, we contemplate two 
separate routes. On the one hand, hunter-gatherers and pastoralists became predominantly 
African polygynous, where co-wives live in separate habitation. On the other hand, they 
became monogamous, and few exceptional polygynous unions were observed. This, in fact, 
raises a fundamental question in economic development and the history of marriage and 
the family; why African polygyny has been mainly prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa?   
 
We provide two possible explanations. First, African polygyny was also predominant in 
other geographical areas. Nevertheless, the limited and scant existing evidence does not 
permit us to confirm this view. Only in Melanesia, and other scattered societies we observe 
similar patterns of behaviour. Our model predicts that, given the economic environment, 
African polygyny may arise because is the best possible choice for men and women. 
Boserup (1970) corroborates that the contribution of sub-Saharan African women was 
considerably higher than in other regions. Thus, if the economic role of women is 
associated with the economic environment, then Eurasian women would have been under 
similar economic circumstances centuries or millennia before. This raises another research 
question; when did Eurasian women enjoy similar economic circumstances to those 
experienced in some sub-Saharan countries?  
 
The economic environment required to sustain African polygyny would involve low levels 
of economic development, low income inequality and gender equality in labour 
participation. On the contrary, African polygyny would vanish -as we discussed in chapter 
3- when income rose, income inequality increased and female labour participation 
decreased. These results are illustrated by the Kuznets and Goldin curves respectively. In 
these conditions, only few wealthy men would be able to form a polygynous household, 
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which goes against the incidence of polygyny observed within some sub-Saharan countries, 
where more than 20 percent of men are polygynously married. Additionally, lower rates of 
female labour participation would make polygyny unaffordable for many men. Income 
inequality may increase once assets can be accumulated and transmitted across generations. 
Gender inequality in labour participation may increase once access to land is restricted and 
the production moves away from home. Both scenarios require a system of property rights 
and inheritance rules, which in turn have been known in Eurasian societies for centuries. 
Our knowledge is bounded, and just further archaeological and historical research may 
throw more light on the subject.  
 
The alternative explanation assumes that African polygyny was never predominant within 
Eurasian societies. Therefore, if we assume economic rationality, this can only be explained 
when economic environments were as different as chalk and cheese. Then, what makes 
sub-Saharan Africa different from Eurasia? This hypothesis entails Eurasians have never 
faced the same economic circumstances, and hence the divergent marital patterns 
observed. This explanation leads to a very pessimistic view of economic development, 
where only external forces would be able to change the sub-Saharan economic 
environment. Boserup (1981) argued that a minimal level of population density would kick 
off economic development. Large populations can better afford investments in public 
infrastructure which in turn may improve the standard of living. When population density 
increases, the amount of natural resources per head is reduced, and men and women would 
have incentives to create rules or norms regarding ownership. However, none of these facts 
have been observed in sub-Saharan Africa until recently. In this way, we are inclined to 
think that climate and geography hinder population growth, and consequently economic 
development, otherwise African polygyny would not have prevailed.  
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In chapter 4, we examine the spousal age gap. For that purpose, we concentrate on 
monogamous countries. Overall, we find that gender equality in labour participation 
reduces the spousal age gap. This, in turn, has relevant implications too. Whether 
convergence in age differences between spouses is achieved across countries, would imply 
that, given similar economic environments, men and women behave pretty much alike. In 
addition, we would explicitly show positive assortive mating in age.  
 
Although the spousal age gap has been well documented in the literature, there is little 
economic analysis about what shapes these age differences at marriage between spouses. 
This is probably due to the fact that gender specific age at marriage may provide further 
insight on fertility issues. Nonetheless, the spousal age gap remains a very strong indicator 
of the level of economic development. Based on a simple economic reasoning, we 
empirically test the relationship between the spousal gap and gender differences in labour 
participation. Once we control for sex ratios and the rate of urbanisation, the spousal age 
gap is negatively associated with gender equality in female participation. This is supported 
with current and past data. Contrasting marriage patterns such as the “Northwest 
European” of a SMALL gap and the “Mediterranean” one of a LARGE gap were 
accompanied by contrasting differences in gender labour participation. Overall, our results 
suggest that female labour have reflected on marital patterns. More importantly, we 
observe that across regions and over time, men and women under similar economic 
conditions tend to behave alike.  
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Figure A.2.1 Timeline, Ethnographic Atlas 1/  
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Table A.2.1 Distribution of countries and territories by geographical region 
Geographical Region 
United Nations  
Member States Countries or Territories
Northern Africa 6 7 
Western Africa a/ 16 16 
Eastern Africa b/ 17 18 
Middle Africa 9 9 
Southern Africa 5 5 
Western Asia 17 18 
Central Asia 5 5 
Eastern Asia 5 8 
Southern Asia c/ 9 9 
South-Eastern Asia 11 11 
Northern America d/ 2 4 
Central America 8 8 
Caribbean e/ 13 24 
South America f/ 12 13 
Eastern Europe 10 10 
Northern Europe g/ 10 13 
Southern Europe h/ 14 15 
Western Europe 9 9 
Australia and New Zealand i/ 2 2 
Melanesia 4 5 
Micronesia 5 7 
Polynesia j/ 3 9 
Total 192 225 
 
Territories excluded from sample: 
a/  Saint Helena  
b/ Mayotte 
c/ British Indian Ocean Territories 
d/ Saint Pierre et Miquelon 
e/ Saint-Barthélemy and Saint-Martin 
f/ Falkland Islands 
g/ Aland Islands, Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands 
h/ The Holy See 
i/  Norfolk Island, Christmas Islands and Cocos Islands 
j/  Pitcairn Islands 
 
Source: United Nations  
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Table A.2.2 List of excluded societies  
No date (10) Non-indigenous (9) Unclassified (5) Repeated (2) No data (1) 
Jicaque Boer Aullimind Spanish Basque Seminole 
Betsileo French Canadian Buem Tokelau  
Huastec New England Tukulor   
Guaymi Haitian Basseri   
Caddo Djuka Tristan   
Abnaki Saramacca    
Chickasaw Brazilian    
Uzbeg Camba    
Man Groote Eylandt    
Bomvana     
Source: Ethnographic Atlas  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2.3. Percentage of married men/women in polygynous unions by region 
Geographical United Nations (1990) DHS (1985-2005) 
Region Men Women Men Women 
Northern Africa 1/  4.0 16.8  12.7 
Western Africa 29.8 36.7 24.3 38.9 
Eastern Africa 20.8 24.9 10.8 18.4 
Middle Africa 24.6 37.7 15.1 31.1 
Southern Africa  7.5 4.5 13.5 
Western Asia 5.3   6.4 
Central Asia 2/   0.1  
Southern Asia 6.2  2.6 4.7 
Caribbean 3/ (*)   14.6 25.0 
Source: United Nations (1990), Demographic and Health Surveys (1985-2005), PRED Bank, Version 3.0 
Notes: The values are a weighted average. Population in 1970 and 1995 were used weights. Population data 
come from PRED Bank, Version 3.0. The asterisk denotes those regions described as New World. 
 
1/ Sudan in 1979 was the only available observation for Northern Africa 
2/ Kazakhstan in 1997 was the only available observation for Central Asia  
3/ Haiti in 2000 was the only available observation for the Caribbean  
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Figure A.2.2 Linear regression estimate of polygyny by data source 
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Figure A.2.3 Linear regression estimate of polygyny, sub-Saharan Africa (corrected) 
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Table A.2.4 Polygyny and Monogamy by country  
AFRICA (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Northern Africa (7) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World
Algeria Mo 20.0 0.0 Yes 
Egypt Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Libya OP 50.0 0.0 Yes 
Morocco OP 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Sudan Po 5.1 66.7 Yes 
Tunisia OP 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Western Sahara Po 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Western Africa (16) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World
Benin Po 20.0 80.0 Yes 
Burkina Faso Po 47.4 52.6 Yes 
Cape Verde Mo na na No 
Côte d'Ivoire Po 66.7 33.3 Yes 
Gambia Po na na Yes 
Ghana Po 63.6 36.4 Yes 
Guinea Po 25.0 62.5 Yes 
Guinea Bissau na 60.0 20.0 Yes 
Liberia Po 33.3 66.7 Yes 
Mali Po 27.3 9.1 Yes 
Mauritania Po 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Niger Po 16.7 66.7 Yes 
Nigeria Po 16.9 75.4 Yes 
Senegal Po 25.0 50.0 Yes 
Sierra Leone na 80.0 20.0 Yes 
Togo Po 100.0 0.0 Yes 
Eastern Africa (18) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World
Burundi Mo 0.0 100.0 Yes 
Comoros Po na na Yes 
Djibouti Mo na na Yes 
Eritrea Mo 0.0 33.3 Yes 
Ethiopia Po 12.9 51.6 Yes 
Kenya Po 0.0 73.9 Yes 
Madagascar Mo 0.0 80.0 Yes 
Malawi Po 0.0 66.7 Yes 
Mauritius Mo na na No 
Mozambique Po 0.0 81.8 Yes 
Reunion Mo na na No 
Rwanda Po 0.0 100.0 Yes 
Seychelles Mo na na No 
Somalia Po 0.0 100.0 Yes 
Tanzania Po 2.9 70.6 Yes 
Uganda Po 0.0 100.0 Yes 
Zambia Po 0.0 80.0 Yes 
Zimbabwe Po 0.0 100.0 Yes 
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AFRICA (continued) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Middle Africa (9) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World
Angola na 0.0 77.8 Yes 
Cameroon Po 0.0 94.1 Yes 
Central African Republic Po 0.0 100.0 Yes 
Chad Po 50.0 41.7 Yes 
Congo Po na na Yes 
Democratic Republic of the Congo Po 0.0 90.2 Yes 
Equatorial Guinea Po 0.0 100.0 Yes 
Gabon Po 0.0 66.7 Yes 
Sao Tome and Principe OP na na No 
Southern Africa (5) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World
Botswana OP 0.0 33.3 Yes 
Lesotho OP 0.0 100.0 Yes 
Namibia Po 0.0 66.7 Yes 
South Africa Mo 0.0 85.7 Yes 
Swaziland Po 0.0 100.0 Yes 
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ASIA (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Western Asia (18) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World
Armenia Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Azerbaijan Mo na na Yes 
Bahrain Mo na na Yes 
Cyprus Mo na na Yes 
Georgia na 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Iraq OP 0.0 50.0 Yes 
Israel Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Jordan OP 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Kuwait na na na Yes 
Lebanon na 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Oman na na na Yes 
Palestine na na na Yes 
Qatar Mo na na Yes 
Saudi Arabia OP 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Syrian Arab Republic OP 0.0 50.0 Yes 
Turkey Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
United Arab Emirates Po na na Yes 
Yemen OP 100.0 0.0 Yes 
Central Asia (5) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World
Kazakhstan Mo 100.0 0.0 Yes 
Kyrgyzstan Mo na na Yes 
Tajikistan Mo na na Yes 
Turkmenistan Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Uzbekistan Mo na na Yes 
Eastern Asia (8) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World
China Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea na 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Hong Kong SAR Mo na na Yes 
Japan Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Macau SAR Mo na na Yes 
Mongolia na 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Republic of Korea Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Taiwan na 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Southern Asia (9) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World
Afghanistan Po 0.0 25.0 Yes 
Bangladesh OP 50.0 0.0 Yes 
Bhutan na 0.0 0.0 Yes 
India OP 18.2 0.0 Yes 
Islamic Republic of Iran OP 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Maldives Po na na Yes 
Nepal Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Pakistan OP 25.0 0.0 Yes 
Sri Lanka OP 0.0 0.0 Yes 
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ASIA (continued) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
South-Eastern Asia (11) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World
Brunei Darussalam Mo na na Yes 
Cambodia na 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Indonesia Mo 7.4 3.7 Yes 
Lao People's Democratic Republic na 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Malaysia Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Myanmar Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Philippines Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Singapore Mo na na Yes 
Thailand Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Timor-Leste na 100.0 0.0 Yes 
Viet Nam Mo 20.0 0.0 Yes 
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AMERICA (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Northern America (4) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World
Bermuda Mo na na No 
Canada Mo 35.8 0.0 No 
Greenland na na na Yes 
United States Mo 28.0 2.6 No 
Central America (8) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World
Belize Mo 0.0 0.0 No 
Costa Rica Mo 0.0 0.0 No 
El Salvador Mo 0.0 0.0 No 
Guatemala Mo 0.0 0.0 No 
Honduras Mo 100.0 0.0 No 
Mexico Mo 11.8 0.0 No 
Nicaragua Mo 0.0 0.0 No 
Panama Mo 0.0 0.0 No 
Caribbean (24) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World
Anguilla na na na No 
Antigua and Barbuda na na na No 
Aruba Mo na na No 
Bahamas Mo na na No 
Barbados Mo na na No 
British Virgin Islands Mo na na No 
Cayman Islands na na na No 
Cuba OP 0.0 0.0 No 
Dominica OP 0.0 0.0 No 
Dominican Republic na na na No 
Grenada Mo na na No 
Guadeloupe Mo na na No 
Haiti Mo na na No 
Jamaica Mo na na No 
Martinique Mo na na No 
Montserrat na na na No 
Netherlands Antilles Mo na na No 
Puerto Rico Mo na na No 
Saint Kitts and Nevis OP na na No 
Saint Lucia Mo na na No 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Mo na na No 
Trinidad and Tobago Mo na na No 
Turks and Caicos Islands na na na No 
Virgin Islands Mo na na No 
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AMERICA (continued) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
South America (13) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World
Argentina Mo 0.0 20.0 No 
Bolivia Mo 25.0 0.0 No 
Brazil Mo 17.9 3.6 No 
Chile Mo 0.0 0.0 No 
Colombia Mo 40.0 10.0 No 
Ecuador Mo 33.3 0.0 No 
French Guiana OP na na No 
Guyana Mo 33.3 0.0 No 
Paraguay Mo 0.0 0.0 No 
Peru Mo 50.0 0.0 No 
Suriname na 50.0 0.0 No 
Uruguay Mo na na No 
Venezuela Mo 38.9 5.6 No 
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EUROPE (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Eastern Europe (10) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World 
Belarus Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Bulgaria Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Czech Republic Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Hungary Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Poland Mo na na Yes 
Republic of Moldova na na na Yes 
Romania Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Russian Federation Mo 11.1 11.1 Yes 
Slovakia Mo na na Yes 
Ukraine Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Northern Europe (13) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World 
Channel Islands na na na Yes 
Denmark Mo na na Yes 
Estonia na na na Yes 
Faroe Islands na na na Yes 
Finland Mo na na Yes 
Iceland Mo na na Yes 
Ireland Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Isle of Man na na na Yes 
Latvia Mo na na Yes 
Lithuania Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Norway Mo na na Yes 
Sweden Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
United Kingdom Mo na na Yes 
Southern Europe (15) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World 
Albania na 100.0 0.0 Yes 
Andorra na na na Yes 
Bosnia and Herzegovina na na na Yes 
Croatia Mo na na Yes 
Gibraltar na na na Yes 
Greece Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Italy Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Macedonia, The FYR of na na na Yes 
Malta Mo na na Yes 
Montenegro na na na Yes 
Portugal Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
San Marino Mo na na Yes 
Serbia Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Slovenia Mo na na Yes 
Spain Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
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EUROPE (continued) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Western Europe (9) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World 
Austria Mo na na Yes 
Belgium Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
France Mo na na Yes 
Germany Mo na na Yes 
Liechtenstein Mo na na Yes 
Luxembourg Mo na na Yes 
Monaco Mo na na Yes 
Netherlands Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Switzerland Mo na na Yes 
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OCEANIA (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Australia and New Zealand (2) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World
Australia Mo 75.0 0.0 No 
New Zealand Mo 100.0 0.0 No 
Melanesia (5) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World
Fiji Mo 25.0 0.0 Yes 
New Caledonia OP 0.0 100.0 Yes 
Papua New Guinea Po 28.6 9.5 Yes 
Solomon Islands OP 0.0 12.5 Yes 
Vanuatu OP 33.3 0.0 No 
Micronesia (7) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World
Guam Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Kiribati Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Marshall Islands Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Micronesia, Federated States of Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Nauru na 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Northern Mariana Islands na 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Palau Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Polynesia (9) Marital System Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2 Old World
American Samoa Mo Na na Yes 
Cook Islands na 25.0 0.0 Yes 
French Polynesia Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Niue na 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Samoa OP 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Tokelau na 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Tonga Mo 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Tuvalu na 0.0 0.0 Yes 
Wallis and Futuna na 0.0 0.0 Yes 
 
Notes:  Marital System: (Po: Polygynous; OP: Occasional Polygynous; Mo: Monogamous) 
Polygyny 1: Percentage of societies within a country with polygyny where co-wives sharing habitation. 
Polygyny 2: Percentage of societies within a country with polygyny where co-wives living in separate 
dwellings. 
Old World: Countries where more than half of the population speak an indigenous language as 
mother tongue. We define a language as indigenous if it was known in the continent where the 
country belongs before 1500 
 
Sources: Marital System: Dorjhan (1959), Chamie (1986), United Nations (1990), United Nations (2000a), 
Demographic and Health Surveys (1985-2005). 
Polygyny 1: Ethnographic Atlas. 
Polygyny 2: Ethnographic Atlas. 
Old World: Ethnographic Atlas, Alesina et al (2003) and Lewis (2009).  
 
Data are available on request. To request this dataset please contact: A.Diez@warwick.ac.uk  
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Table A.3.1 Fertility rates and Polygyny, 1960-2000  
  Polygynous Non Polygynous 
1955-60 Fertility Surviving Fertility Surviving 
  rate one year rate one year 
Mean 6.7 5.5 6.2 5.4 
St. Dev. 0.6 0.5 1.3 1.1 
N 27 27 55 55 
  Polygynous Non Polygynous 
1975-80 Fertility Surviving Fertility Surviving 
  rate one year rate one year 
Mean 6.9 6.1 4.9 4.5 
St. Dev. 0.7 0.6 1.5 1.3 
N 27 27 55 55 
  Polygynous Non Polygynous 
1995-00 Fertility Surviving Fertility Surviving 
  rate one year rate one year 
Mean 5.8 5.2 3.2 3.1 
St. Dev. 1.0 0.8 1.3 1.2 
N 27 27 55 55 
Source: Authors’, PRED Bank, Version 3.0; United Nations (2007) 
Notes: Fertility rate: Average number of children that would be born to a woman in her lifetime. Infant 
mortality rate: Number of deaths of infants under one year of age per 1,000 live births in a given 
year.  
Polygynous countries refer to those countries classified in A.2.4 as (Po). Non Polygynous refer to 
those countries classified in A.2.4 as monogamous (Mo) or occasional polygynous (OP).  
 
 
 
 
Table A.3.2 Gini’s index of land concentration 
  Polygynous Non Polygynous 
Census rounds 1970 1990 1970 1990 
Mean 0.397 0.461 0.623 0.656 
St. Dev. 0.055 0.079 0.171 0.154 
N 3 7 40 57 
Source: Author’s; FAO (1995) Programme for the World Census of Agriculture 2000  
Notes: Gini’s (or Lorenz) index of concentration is a measure of concentration of agricultural areas. It 
varies from 0, when all holdings have the same area, to 1, when all agricultural land in a country is in one 
holding. Polygynous countries refer to those countries classified in A.2.4 as Po. Non Polygynous refer to 
those countries classified in A.2.4 as monogamous (Mo) or occasional polygynous (OP). 
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Table A.3.3 Percentage of married men/women in polygynous union by residence 
 
  Men Women 
Country Year Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
Guinea 1999 33.8 27.0 36.2 53.7 46.6 56.3 
Senegal 1997 34.5 26.7 38.9 48.6 43.8 51.1 
Benin 2001 29.1 21.6 33.5 45.8 37.4 50.2 
Togo 1998 24.5 15.7 28.2 42.8 33.9 46.6 
Mali 2001 26.8 17.7 29.8 42.7 33.8 45.6 
Chad 1997 24.9 20.3 26.5 39.2 36.8 39.9 
Niger 1998 23.5 21.3 23.9 37.8 39.4 37.5 
Côte d'Ivoire 1999 17.0 9.4 21.2 35.0 25.3 40.1 
Cameroon 1998 17.7 12.8 19.8 33.1 26.3 36.0 
Uganda 2001 18.0 12.9 18.8 32.7 36.4 32.1 
Tanzania 1996 15.0 12.7 15.6 28.8 20.6 31.0 
Mozambique 1997 16.3 8.2 18.6 28.5 18.5 30.9 
CAR 1995 12.0 7.9 14.7 28.5 26.2 29.9 
Comoros 1996 19.1 15.7 20.5 25.3 20.0 27.0 
Ghana 1998 12.9 6.7 15.7 22.7 15.7 25.8 
Gabon 2000 11.6 11.4 12.3 22.0 20.4 27.0 
Malawi 1992 9.1 4.3 10.0 20.8 12.1 21.9 
Kenya 1998 9.8 6.7 11.0 16.3 11.0 17.8 
Zambia 2002 9.1 3.2 12.4 16.2 6.2 21.6 
Rwanda 1992 10.9 6.9 11.0 14.4 9.0 14.7 
Ethiopia 2000 8.9 2.5 9.8 13.6 6.9 14.5 
Mauritania 2001 6.2 7.7 4.8 11.6 11.1 12.0 
Eritrea 1995 5.3 5.3 5.2 7.1 8.2 6.7 
Pakistan 1991 3.6 4.2 3.3 4.7 3.2 5.4 
Nepal 2001 2.6 2.8 2.6 4.5 4.3 4.5 
Source: Demographic and Health Surveys (1985-2005) 
Notes: Countries selected were those with available data for men and women. Surveys presented are the 
latest available. 
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Figure A.3.1 Gains from consumption given equal consumption differentials  
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Table A.3.4 Economic dependence by activity (variables 1-5) 
 
Code 
 
Description 
 
0 
 
0 - 5% Dependence 
 
1 
 
6 – 15% Dependence 
 
2 
 
16 – 25% Dependence 
 
3 
 
26 – 35% Dependence 
 
4 
 
36 – 45% Dependence 
 
5 
 
46 – 55% Dependence 
 
6 
 
56 – 65% Dependence 
 
7 
 
66 – 75% Dependence 
 
8 
 
76 – 85% Dependence 
 
9 
 
86 – 100% Dependence 
Source: Ethnographic Atlas.  
Notes: There are five activities described in the Ethnographic Atlas: (i) variable 1: Gathering, (ii) variable 2: 
Hunting, (iii) variable 3: Fishing, (iv) variable 4: Animal Husbandry and (v) variable 5: Agriculture.  
 
 
 
Table A.3.5 Sex differences (variables 50-54) 
 
Code 
 
Description 
 
New Code 
 
0 
 
Missing data 
 
- 
 
1 
 
Males only or almost alone 
 
0% 
 
2 
 
Males appreciably more 
 
25% 
 
3 
 
Differentiated but equal participation 
 
50% 
 
4 
 
Equal participation, no marked differentiation 
 
50% 
 
5 
 
Females appreciably more 
 
75% 
 
6 
 
Females only or almost alone 
 
100% 
 
7 
 
Irrelevance of gender, especially industrialized production 
 
- 
 
8 
 
Activity present:: Sex participation unspecified 
 
- 
 
9 
 
Absent or unimportant activity 
 
- 
Source: Ethnographic Atlas.  
Notes: There are five activities described in the Ethnographic Atlas: (i) variable 1: Gathering, (ii) variable 2: 
Hunting, (iii) variable 3: Fishing, (iv) variable 4: Animal Husbandry and (v) variable 5: Agriculture.  
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Table A.3.6 Settlement patterns (variable 30) 
 
Code 
 
Description 
 
New Code 
 
0 
 
Missing data 
 
- 
   
 
1 
 
Nomadic or fully migratory 
 
Nomadic 
   
 
2 
 
Semi-nomadic  
 
3 
 
Semi-sedentary 
 
Semi-sedentary 
 
4 
 
Compact but impermanent settlements  
   
 
5 
 
Neighbourhoods of dispersed family homesteads  
 
6 
 
Separated hamlets, forming a single community 
 
Sedentary 
 
7 
 
Compact and relatively permanent settlements  
 
8 
 
Complex settlements  
Source: Ethnographic Atlas  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.3.7 Mean size of local community (variable 33) 
 
Code 
 
Description 
 
0 
 
Missing data 
 
1 
 
Fewer than 50 
 
2 
 
50-99 
 
3 
 
100-199 
 
4 
 
200-399 
 
5 
 
400-1000 
 
6 
 
1,000 without any town of more than 5,000 
 
7 
 
Towns of 5,000-50,000 (one or more) 
 
8 
 
Cities of more than 50,000 (one or more) 
Source: Ethnographic Atlas  
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Table A.3.8 Societies by Size of Community and Marital System  
Code Size of community Monogamy Polygyny 1 Polygyny 2
1 Fewer than 50 58 22 3 
2 50-99 49 18 11 
3 100-199 41 11 19 
4 200-399 26 11 16 
5 400-1000 18 3 11 
6 1,000 without any town of more than 5,000 6 0 0 
7 Towns of 5,000-50,000 (one or more) 12 1 10 
8 Cities of more than 50,000 (one or more) 32 0 1 
 Total 242 66 71 
 
Source: Ethnographic Atlas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.3.2 WEA Vs Percentage of Women Economically Active, 1980 
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Source: PRED Bank, Version 3.0 
Notes: Figure A.3.2 includes the linear prediction.  
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Figure A.3.3 Female Contribution to Subsistence by Marital System 
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Source: Ethnographic Atlas. 
Notes: Only sedentary societies were included (sedentary = 1). As a result, Polygyny 1 societies were removed 
from sample. Total subsistence includes hunting, fishing, gathering, animal husbandry and agriculture.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.3.9 Ancient Civilisations, Marriage and Economic Activity 
 
  Marital Settlement Dependence  Female  
Name Year System Pattern Agriculture (%) Contribution
Babylonians BC 2000 Monogamy Sedentary 60 Very low 
Ancient Egyptians BC 1400 Monogamy Sedentary 70 Low 
Aryans BC 800 Monogamy na 60 na 
Hebrews BC 800 Monogamy Sedentary 40 Very low 
Romans AD 1000 Monogamy Sedentary 60 na 
Icelander AD 1100 Monogamy Sedentary 10 Low 
Khmer AD 1292 Monogamy Sedentary 50 Equal 
Source: Ethnographic Atlas. 
Notes: Female Contribution refers only to female contribution to Agriculture 
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Table A.3.10 WEA, Economic Development and Polygyny 
Base year=1980 Probit Probit Probit Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
WEA 0.009***  0.006***  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  
     
Log GDP per capita  -0.214***  -0.140** 
  (0.048)  (0.067) 
     
Sex ratio 15-44   -0.006* 0.007 
   (0.004) (0.006) 
     
URBAN   -0.007*** -0.002 
   (0.002) (0.003) 
     
Muslim80   0.002** 0.001 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 112 100 112 100 
pseudo-R2 0.168 0.403 0.415 0.429 
Chi-square 13.6 32.2 37.3 30.8 
Log-Likelihood -51.5 -32.2 -36.2 -30.7 
Notes: Dependent variable is polygyny, taking the value of 1 if Polygyny (Po), 0 otherwise.  
Table A.2.4 in appendix 2 provides a list of countries by predominant marital system.    
Marginal effects are shown in table.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01) 
 
 
Figure A.3.4 Predicted values of polygyny Vs GDP per capita, 1980 
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Figure A.3.5a Predicted values of polygyny, sub-Saharan Africa  
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Figure A.3.5b Predicted values of polygyny, Eurasia and Melanesia 
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Female Labour 
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Figure A.4.1a Spousal Age Gap decomposition, 1950-2000 (Selection of countries) 
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Sources: Patterns of First Marriage (United Nations, 1990), Demographic Yearbooks (United Nations, 1977; 
1979; 1984; 1997) World Marriage Patterns (United Nations, 2000b), World Fertility Report (United Nations, 
2004), Demographic and Health Surveys (1985-2005), PRED Bank, Version 3.0. 
 
 
Figure A.4.1b Spousal Age Gap decomposition, 1950-2000 (Selection of countries) 
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Sources: Patterns of First Marriage (United Nations, 1990), Demographic Yearbooks (United Nation, 1977; 
1979; 1984; 1997) World Marriage Patterns (United Nations, 2000b), World Fertility Report (United Nations, 
2004), Demographic and Health Surveys (1985-2005), PRED Bank, Version 3.0. 
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Figure A.4.2 Computation of the singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM)  
 
Source: Hajnal (1953)  
 
 
 
Figure A.4.3 Cohabitation in Europe, 1996 
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Source: Kiernan (2002)  
(1) Add the proportions single or never married up to and including the age group 
45-49 and multiply the sum by 51  
 
(2) Add 1500  
 
(3) Average the proportions for 45-49 and 50-54  
 
(4) Multiply the result by 50 and subtract it from (2)  
 
(5) Subtract the result of (3) from 100  
 
(6) Divide the result of (4) by the result of (5) 
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Table A.4.1 Descriptive Statistics by geographical region [Polygynous (Po)] 
Geographical Gap WEA (+15) Sex ratio (15-44) URBAN 
 Region (years) Women/100 Men Women/100 Men (%) 
Northern Africa 6.7 35 101 44.6 
 0.6 3.2 2.8 30.4 
 2 6 8 12 
Western Africa 7.7 75 103 22.5 
 1.4 14.2 6.9 13.0 
  36 78 58 78 
Eastern Africa 5.0 83 103 15.3 
 1.1 8.9 4.5 11.1 
 32 66 46 66 
Middle Africa 5.6 69 105 30.6 
 1.2 11.2 4.4 16.4 
  15 42 29 42 
Southern Africa 2.9 56 106 17.2 
 0.6 7.2 6.9 9.5 
 2 12 7 12 
Western Asia 5.2 15 44 60.1 
 3.8 16.0 11.9 24.0 
  2 6 4 6 
Southern Asia 5.1 63 93 15.8 
 1.7 9.9 3.0 6.9 
 4 12 8 12 
Melanesia 4.8 79 91 9.8 
 0.7 1.8 0.5 6.8 
  2 6 4 6 
Total 6.1 72 101 23.1 
 1.8 17.6 11.1 17.2 
  95 228 164 234 
Sources: Patterns of First Marriage (United Nations, 1990), Demographic Yearbooks (United Nation, 1977, 
1979, 1984, 1997) World Marriage Patterns (United Nations, 2000b), World Fertility Report (United Nations, 
2004), Demographic and Health Surveys (1985-2005), PRED Bank, Version 3.0. 
Notes: The geographical regions refer to the United Nations classification. Data on women economically 
active for Micronesia and Polynesia regions are not available, and hence they are removed from the table. 
Table A.4.3 presents descriptive statistics for these two regions. 
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Table A.4.2 Descriptive Statistics by geographical region [Occas. polygynous (OP)] 
Geographical Gap WEA (+15) Sex ratio (15-44) URBAN 
 Region (years) Women/100 Men Women/100 Men (%) 
Northern Africa 5.3 34 99 47.1 
 1.4 10.1 7.8 19.8 
 10 18 14 18 
Middle Africa 5.7 . 105 28.1 
 0.5 . 0.7 13.2 
  2 0 2 6 
Southern Africa 4.7 72 109 16.0 
 0.7 16.0 8.8 16.3 
 7 12 8 12 
Western Asia 4.5 23 95 45.3 
 0.9 9.5 14.1 22.2 
  15 30 23 30 
Southern Asia 5.2 45 95 25.3 
 1.2 18.6 3.5 13.4 
 23 30 25 30 
Caribbean 3.4 40 102 50.9 
 1.3 18.6 6.6 16.8 
  6 6 9 18 
South America 3.1 . . 68.0 
 0.7 . . 8.7 
 4 0 0 6 
Melanesia 3.6 93 94 27.8 
 1.1 3.5 7.3 22.8 
  8 6 12 18 
Total 4.6 42 97 37.3 
 1.3 24.0 9.7 22.3 
  75 102 93 138 
Sources: Patterns of First Marriage (United Nations, 1990), Demographic Yearbooks (United Nation, 1977, 
1979, 1984, 1997) World Marriage Patterns (United Nations, 2000b), World Fertility Report (United Nations, 
2004), Demographic and Health Surveys (1985-2005), PRED Bank, Version 3.0. 
Notes: The geographical regions refer to the United Nations classification. Data on women economically 
active for Micronesia and Polynesia regions are not available, and hence they are removed from the table. 
Table A.4.3 presents descriptive statistics for these two regions.  
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Table A.4.3 Descriptive Statistics by geographical region (Polynesia and Micronesia) 
Geographical  Gap WEA (+15) Sex ratio (15-44) URBAN 
 Region (years) Women/100 Men Women/100 Men (%) 
Micronesia 2.8 . 91 41.7 
 0.4 . 12.6 20.0 
 5 0 7 30 
Polynesia 2.6 . 94 39.2 
 0.3 . 6.9 13.4 
  5 0 6 18 
Total 2.7 . 93 40.8 
 0.4 . 10.1 17.7 
  10 0 13 48 
Sources: Patterns of First Marriage (United Nations, 1990), Demographic Yearbooks (United Nation, 1977, 
1979, 1984, 1997) World Marriage Patterns (United Nations, 2000b), World Fertility Report (United Nations, 
2004), Demographic and Health Surveys (1985-2005), PRED Bank, Version 3.0. 
Notes: The geographical regions refer to the United Nations classification. 
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Figure A.4.4a Sex ratios, 1950-2000 (European countries) 
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Figure A.4.4b Sex ratios, 1950-2000 (Non-European countries) 
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Source: United Nations (2000a) 
. 
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Table A.4.4 Descriptive Statistics by marital system 
Descriptive Gap WEA (+15) Sex ratio (15-44) URBAN 
Statistics (years) Women/100 Men Women/100 Men (%) 
  Monogamy (Mo) 
Mean 3.3 54 100 53.9 
St. Dev 1.2 21.8 7.9 23.9 
Obs. 445 606 518 672 
  Occasional Polygyny (OP) 
Mean 4.6 42 97 37.3 
St. Dev 1.3 24.0 9.8 22.3 
Obs. 75 102 93 138 
  Polygyny (Po) 
Mean 6.1 72 101 23.1 
St. Dev 1.8 17.6 11.1 17.2 
Obs. 95 228 164 234 
  Total 
Mean 3.9 57 100 44.8 
St. Dev 1.7 23.1 8.9 25.8 
Obs. 615 936 775 1044 
Sources: Authors’, Patterns of First Marriage (United Nations, 1990), Demographic Yearbooks (United 
Nation, 1977, 1979, 1984, 1997) World Marriage Patterns (United Nations, 2000b), World Fertility Report 
(United Nations, 2004), Demographic and Health Surveys (1985-2005), PRED Bank, Version 3.0. 
Notes: The geographical regions refer to the United Nations classification. Data on women economically 
active for Micronesia and Polynesia regions are not available, and hence they are removed from the table. 
Table A.4.3 presents descriptive statistics for these two regions.  
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Figure A.4.5a Spousal Age Gap and WEA by decades (Unbalanced Panel) 
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Figure A.4.5b Spousal Age Gap and WEA by decades (Balanced Panel) 
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Source: Patterns of First Marriage (United Nations, 1990), Demographic Yearbooks (United Nation, 1977, 
1979, 1984, 1997) World Marriage Patterns (United Nations, 2000b), World Fertility Report (United Nations, 
2004), Demographic and Health Surveys (1985-2005), PRED Bank, Version 3.0. 
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Table A.4.5 Panel Data Estimates for the Spousal Age Gap, 1970-2000 
Independent variables Random effects Random effects 
 1950-2000 1970-2000 
 (1) (2) 
WEA -0.021*** -0.010** 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
   
Sex ratio (15-44) -0.024** -0.024** 
 (0.010) (0.012) 
   
URBAN -0.016*** -0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
   
CEDAW -0.215* -0.189* 
 (0.117) (0.110) 
   
Constant 7.789*** 6.707*** 
 (1.086) (1.226) 
Observations 421 323 
2R  0.235 0.162 
Breusch-Pagan LM 140.7 [0.000] 102.7 [0.000] 
Hausman test 7.83 [0.100] 2.10 [0.717] 
Notes:   1. Dependent variable is age gap at marriage 
2. Robust standard errors are denoted in parentheses. 
3. * , **, and *** denote 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively 
 
. 
 
 
 
Figure A.4.6 Spousal Age Gap and WEA by sub-sample, 1950-2000 
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Source: Patterns of First Marriage (United Nations, 1990), Demographic Yearbooks (United Nation, 1977, 1979, 
1984, 1997) World Marriage Patterns (United Nations, 2000b), World Fertility Report (United Nations, 2004), 
Demographic and Health Surveys (1985-2005), PRED Bank, Version 3.0. 
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Figure A.4.6 Spousal Age Gap and WEA by sub-sample, 1950-2000 (continued) 
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 Source: Patterns of First Marriage (United Nations, 1990), Demographic Yearbooks (United Nation, 1977, 1979, 
1984, 1997) World Marriage Patterns (United Nations, 2000b), World Fertility Report (United Nations, 2004), 
Demographic and Health Surveys (1985-2005), PRED Bank, Version 3.0. 
 
 
 
Figure A.4.7 Spousal Age Gap and WEA, 1850-2000 (Selection of countries) 
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Source: Bairoch et al. (1968), Patterns of First Marriage (United Nations, 1990), Demographic Yearbooks 
(United Nation, 1977, 1979, 1984, 1997) World Marriage Patterns (United Nations, 2000b), World Fertility 
Report (United Nations, 2004), Demographic and Health Surveys (1985-2005), PRED Bank, Version 3.0 
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Appendix 5: Marriage and Economic 
Development 
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Table A.5.1 Intensity of Agriculture (variable 28) 
 
Code 
 
Description 
 
0 
 
Missing data 
 
1 
 
No agriculture  
 
2 
 
Casual agriculture, incidental to other subsistence modes 
 
3 
 
Extensive or shifting agriculture, long fallow, and new fields cleared annually  
 
4 
 
Horticulture, vegetal gardens or groves of fruit trees 
 
5 
 
Intensive agriculture, using fertilization, crop rotation, or other techniques to shorten or 
eliminate fallow period 
 
6 
 
Intensive irrigated agriculture 
Source: Ethnographic Atlas 
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Figure A.5.1 WEA and Economic Development, 1950 and 2000 
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Sources: PRED Bank, Version 3.0 and Penn World Tables 6.1 
Notes:  WEA stands for the ratio of women economically active for every 100 men. GDP per 
capita stands for real gross domestic product ($ current prices) 
Figure A.5.1 illustrates a balanced selection of countries.  
Year, 1950: WEA = 539.31 – 155.46*Log(GDP per capita) + 11.84*Log (GDP per 
capita)2, N=50, R2 = 0.4018. 
Year, 2000: WEA = 434.70 – 90.69*Log(GDP per capita) + 5.39*Log (GDP per capita)2, 
N=50, R2 = 0.3469.  
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Figure A.5.2 WEA and Sex ratios, 1850-2000 
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Sources: Bairoch et al. (1968), PRED Bank, Version 3.0. 
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Figure A.5.2 WEA and Sex ratios, 1850-2000 (continued) 
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Sources: Bairoch et al. (1968), PRED Bank, Version 3.0. 
